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ABSTRACT 
This study examines the relationships and interrelationships between carbon 
disclosure and carbon performance, and between carbon performance and financial 
performance. It also examines the relationship between carbon disclosure and financial 
performance. Additionally, it investigates the relationship between agency cost and 
carbon disclosure, and between agency cost and carbon performance. Finally, this 
research investigates the trends in improvement of carbon disclosure and carbon 
performance of the companies, over the study period. The interrelationships between 
carbon disclosure and carbon performance, and between carbon performance and 
financial performance, have not been investigated by any study before. Similarly, no 
study has yet investigated the relationship between carbon disclosure and financial 
performance. The relationships between carbon disclosure/carbon performance and 
agency cost, have not been studied either by any previous research. Whilst a couple of 
studies have conducted trend analysis of carbon disclosure previously, no study has yet 
undertaken trend analysis of carbon performance. These examinations are performed by 
using a cross-sectional sample of the world’s largest 500 firms, drawn from most major 
industry sectors, who participated in the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) questionnaire 
survey over the five-year period from 2011 to 2015. Both full sample and country-wise 
analysis have been done, to test the hypotheses of this study. 
Carbon disclosure and carbon performance scores for the sample companies are 
taken from the CDP database. Data for financial performance indicators, agency costs 
and relevant control variables, are collected from Thomson Reuters Datastream 
database.  
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Findings of this study indicate that there is a significant positive relationship 
between a firm’s carbon disclosure, and its carbon performance. They also indicate that 
carbon disclosure and carbon performance of business, influence each other positively. 
Country-wise analysis shows that carbon disclosure is significantly positively related to 
carbon performance in all of the four regions of this study - namely North America, 
EU, UK and Asia-Pacific. Both way positive interrelationship between carbon 
disclosure and carbon performance, holds true in all regions except the UK.  
 The study also finds that carbon performance of a business is significantly negatively 
related to both accounting-based measure as well as market-based measure of a firm’s 
financial performance. It also finds that there is no significant interrelationship between 
carbon performance and accounting-based measure of a firm’s financial performance. 
However, carbon performance and market-based measure of a firm’s financial 
performance, influence each other negatively - this relationship might vary across 
industries. Carbon performance is negatively related to both accounting-based measure 
as well as market-based measure of a firm’s financial performance, in all regions except 
the UK. There is no significant and consistent interrelationship between carbon 
performance and any of the measures of firm financial performance, in any region.  
 
Results of this study indicate that there is a significant negative relationship 
between carbon disclosure and accounting-based measure of a firm’s financial 
performance. However, there is no significant and consistent relationship between 
carbon disclosure and a firm’s market-based financial performance. There is a 
significant negative relationship between carbon disclosure and accounting-based 
measure of a firm’s financial performance, in all regions. However, there is no 
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significant relationship between carbon disclosure and market-based measure of a firm’s 
financial performance in any region.    
This study also finds out that there is a positive but insignificant relationship 
between carbon disclosure and agency cost, both when agency cost is measured by 
Expense Ratio or by Asset Utilization Ratio. Results also indicate that carbon 
performance does not significantly affect a firm’s agency cost when agency cost is 
measured by Expense Ratio. However, when agency cost is measured by Asset 
Utilization Ratio, there is a significant negative relationship between carbon 
performance and agency cost. Carbon disclosure and carbon performance both 
significantly positively affect agency cost in North America, however there is no 
significant and consistent relationship between agency cost and both carbon disclosure 
and carbon performance, in any other region.  
Results of this study show that the level of carbon disclosure for the sample 
companies, have significantly and consistently improved during the study period. On the 
other hand, carbon performance did not significantly improve towards the beginning of 
the study period. It started improving later, but these improvements were not always 
consistent. Country-wise analysis shows similar patterns in all regions.   
This study contributes to the literature that deals with the relationships and 
interrelationships between carbon disclosure, carbon performance and financial 
performance, by producing a number of novel findings that suggest there is a positive 
interrelationship between carbon disclosure and carbon performance;  carbon 
performance and market-based measure of financial performance influence each other 
negatively; carbon disclosure and accounting-based measure of financial performance 
are negatively related and carbon performance negatively affects agency cost.   
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background  
Greenhouse gas (GHG) emission has become one of the primary threats for the 
existence of life on earth. The excessive concentration of GHG in earth’s atmosphere, 
causes adverse consequences in natural ecosystems and humankind, creating the 
phenomenon of global warming or climate change (United Nations, 1992; Liu et al., 
2015; Stern, 2006). Companies have always played a pivotal role in facing the problems 
of climate change because they are one of the biggest emitters of GHG (Hoffmann & 
Busch, 2008). In recent times, stakeholders such as shareholders, consumers and 
regulatory authorities, have started exerting pressure on corporations to decrease their 
GHG emissions (Jeswani et al., 2008; Weinhofer & Hoffman, 2010; Liesen et al., 2015; 
Comyns, 2016). Consequently, corporations are now expected to play a vital role in 
reducing their GHG emissions and in contributing towards stabilizing climate change 
(Luo & Tang, 2014). Businesses nowadays face an ever-increasing demand to 
disseminate information about their climate change related activities, also referred to as 
carbon disclosures, to satisfy the concerns of relevant stakeholders (Meng et al., 2014). 
Carbon disclosure is attracting increasing attention from scholars, stakeholders and 
regulators (e.g., Stanny, 2013; Matsumura et al., 2013). This is due to the fact that 
through carbon disclosure, stakeholders such as government and the public can better 
monitor firms’ carbon emissions, which are likely to contribute to improved corporate 
carbon performance. As a result, corporate carbon disclosures have been steadily 
increasing in both size and complexity in the past decade (Peng et al., 2015).  
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   Recent years have seen intense societal and scientific debate about climate 
change, which often centres on corporations (Howard-Grenville et Al., 2014). 
Consequently, businesses have been increasingly asked to provide more information on 
their climate change strategies and plans for managing and reducing carbon emissions. 
For example, since 2002, Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP), a consortium of over 300 
institutional investors with $41 trillion in assets, has asked the world’s 500 largest firms 
every year to disclose their GHG emissions, risks, opportunities, and management 
strategies. On top of that, mandatory initiatives that aim at increased transparency or 
improved emissions management, have recently been introduced at the national level of 
many countries. For example, in the US, all facilities that emit a minimum of 25,000 
metric tons of CO2 equivalents, are now required to disclose their emissions (U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency, 2012). In the UK, all stock-listed companies must 
report their GHG emissions (U.K. Government, 2013). Similar initiatives have been 
introduced in many other countries and jurisdictions.  
 In recent times, businesses have started viewing climate change as an opportunity 
rather than a burden (Margolick & Russell, 2004, The World Bank, 2018). The equity 
market has started to realize the magnitude of the impact that the transition to a low-
carbon global economy is expected to have on firms’ competitiveness and long-term 
valuation (Goldman Sachs Sustain, 2009). Financial markets have also started to reward 
companies that are moving ahead on climate change, while those lagging behind are 
assigned more risk (Cogan, 2006; Kolk et al., 2008). As a result, an increasing number 
of firms have allocated resources to the communication of information on their climate 
change activities to interested parties.  
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   Existing literature has identified many benefits that businesses can achieve 
from recording and subsequent disclosure of their climate change-related activities. In a 
meta-analysis, Albertini (2013) confirms a positive relationship between environmental 
disclosure and corporate financial performance. Sullivan and Gouldson (2012) find that 
proactive climate-related measures and carbon disclosures, as well as the development 
of climate-friendly products, can improve a company’s image. Additionally, the pressure 
to disclose emissions can lead to improved carbon management which in effect can 
reduce energy consumption and energy costs (Matisoff, 2013). Improved carbon 
management can also help companies deal with natural (e.g., drought, flood) and 
regulatory risks related to climate change. Carbon disclosure also helps investors 
estimate a company’s regulatory and natural risks related to climate change 
(McLaughlin, 2011). According to Dhaliwal et al. (2011), nonfinancial disclosure, which 
includes carbon disclosure, is associated with improved stock performance and cost of 
capital. Companies who handle climate change risks and opportunities efficiently, can 
position themselves as attractive options for climate-conscious investors (Juravle and 
Lewis, 2009). Therefore, carbon disclosure can be used by businesses as a means to 
showcase their climate change activities.  This chapter is structured as below:  
Section 1.2 discusses the motivation for undertaking this research. Section 1.3 
outlines the objectives of this research. Section 1.4 discusses the contributions of this 
study. Section 1.5 provides the structure of this research, and section 1.6 summarises the 
chapter.   
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1.2 Motivation of this study  
The study of carbon disclosure is gaining increasing importance in recent years 
due to the fact that through carbon disclosure businesses can communicate their climate 
change activities to its stakeholders (Hahn et al., 2015). These disclosures can help 
stakeholders such as shareholders and creditors to make better investment decisions for a 
particular company. Carbon disclosure can also help stakeholders such as regulatory 
agencies, institutional investors and the public, to better monitor and regulate a 
business’s carbon emissions which are likely to contribute to improved carbon 
performance of the business. Improved carbon performance can also affect the financial 
performance of the business. Therefore, it is evident that the study of carbon disclosure 
and carbon performance, which falls under the broad category of environmental 
disclosure and environmental performance, are very important areas of study that 
deserve to be well researched.  The growing concerns about carbon emission by 
businesses, and the increased importance of the study of carbon disclosure and carbon 
performance, provide multiple motivations for this study.  
Firstly, despite its importance, limited research has been done to investigate the 
relationship between carbon disclosure and carbon performance, and the findings of 
these research have been largely inconclusive. In addition, most of this research has been 
done for specific countries and industries. To address this research gap, this study would 
like to investigate the relationships between carbon disclosure, carbon performance and 
financial performance, for the top 500 global companies which includes most major 
industries.  
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Secondly, in current literature, some studies find that superior carbon performers 
make more carbon disclosure, whereas some other studies find that inferior carbon 
performers make more carbon disclosure. However, none of the current studies 
investigate the disclosure practices of average carbon performers (businesses who are 
neither superior carbon performers nor inferior carbon performers). Additionally, to the 
best of my knowledge, no study has yet investigated whether there is an interrelation 
between environmental disclosure/carbon disclosure and environmental 
performance/carbon performance. If an interrelationship between carbon disclosure and 
carbon performance can be established, it can help managers of businesses to make 
decisions regarding their carbon disclosure and carbon performance activities. 
Therefore, this study would like to investigate the carbon disclosure practices of average 
carbon performers and to determine if there is any interrelationship that exists between a 
business’s carbon disclosure and its carbon performance.  
 
Thirdly, most of the studies that have been done to investigate the relationship 
between carbon performance and financial performance, have produced conflicting 
results (Rahman et al., 2014). In addition, this study could not find any existing research 
that investigates the interrelationship between carbon performance and financial 
performance. If an interrelationship between carbon performance and financial 
performance can be established that shows the impact of carbon performance on 
corporate financial performance and vice versa, it would be very useful for business 
managers to assess the impact of any activity they would like to undertake to improve 
their carbon performance. This study could not also find any major research that 
investigates the relationship between carbon disclosure and financial performance. Also, 
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the relationship between environmental disclosure/corporate social performance 
disclosure, and financial performance, is not well researched. Findings of any research 
on the relationship between carbon disclosure and company financial performance, 
would help firm management to assess the potential benefit of disclosing carbon 
activities. This study therefore, intends to investigate the relationship and 
interrelationship between carbon performance and financial performance, as well as the 
relationship between carbon disclosure and financial performance.     
Fourthly, this research could find only a few studies that investigate the 
relationship between corporate disclosure and agency cost. However, this study could 
not find any existing research that investigates the relationship between carbon 
disclosure and agency cost, and between carbon performance and agency cost. It is 
important to know whether agency cost is related to carbon disclosure and carbon 
performance. Presence or absence of a relationship between agency cost and carbon 
disclosure/carbon performance, can explain the motivation or lack of motivation of a 
firm manager to disclose their climate change activities and improve their carbon 
performance. This study would like to address this research gap by investigating the 
relationship between agency cost and carbon disclosure, and between agency cost and 
carbon performance.  
Finally, there are only a few studies that analyse the trends in carbon disclosure 
over the years. The latest trend analysis available has been done until the year 2008. On 
the other hand, this study could not find any trend analysis for carbon performance. It is 
important for many interested parties to know the trends in improvement of both carbon 
disclosure and carbon performance. These facts motivated this study to undertake a trend 
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analysis of carbon disclosure and carbon performance by the 500 largest global firms, 
over the years 2011 to 2015.  
 
1.3 Research objectives   
Based on the research gap and/or research need identified in the previous section, 
this study would like to examine the relationships and interrelationships between carbon 
disclosure, carbon performance and financial performance. It also would like to examine 
the relationship between agency cost and carbon disclosure, and between agency cost 
and carbon performance. Additionally, this research intends to investigate the trends in 
improvement of carbon disclosure and carbon performance over the period of this study. 
These examinations would be performed by using a cross-sectional sample of the 
world’s largest 500 firms that participated in the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) 
questionnaire survey over the five-year period 2011 to 2015. 
The specific objectives of this study are: 
1. To examine the relationship (one-way relationship) and interrelationship (both-
way relationship) between carbon disclosure and carbon performance  
2. To examine the relationship (one-way relationship) and interrelationship (both-
way relationship) between carbon performance and financial performance  
3. To examine the relationship between carbon disclosure and financial 
performance  
4. To examine the relationship between agency cost and carbon disclosure, and 
between agency cost and carbon performance  
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5. To study the trends in improvement of carbon disclosure and carbon performance 
over the study period. 
 
Based on the above objectives, the primary research question investigated in this study 
is:  
How do carbon disclosure, carbon performance, financial performance, 
and agency cost influence each other, and what is the trend in carbon 
disclosure and carbon performance over the years.   
As this study examines the relationship between carbon disclosures, carbon 
performance, financial performance and agency cost, these terms will be defined below:  
 
Carbon disclosure: Carbon disclosure includes disclosure by an organisation of 
information such as GHG emissions intensity and energy use, participation in emissions 
trading schemes, corporate governance and strategy in relation to climate change, 
performance against GHG emissions reduction targets, and risks and opportunities 
related to the impacts of climate change. In other words, carbon disclosure can be 
defined as a set of quantitative and qualitative information that is related to a business’s 
past and forecasted carbon emissions levels, its exposure to and financial implications of 
climate change associated risk and opportunities, and its past and future actions to 
manage these risks and opportunities. This information may be released via the firm’s 
annual reports, stand-alone sustainability reports, via the firms’ websites or through 
other dissemination channels such as the Carbon Disclosure Project (Cotter et al., 2011).  
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Carbon performance: According to Hoffmann and Busch (2008), corporate carbon 
performance is indicated by a firm’s carbon intensity, carbon dependency, carbon 
exposure and carbon risk. These indicators are described below: 
Carbon intensity: Carbon intensity relates to a company’s physical carbon performance 
and describes the extent to which its business activities are based on carbon usage for a 
defined scope and fiscal year. 
Carbon dependency: Carbon dependency describes the change in a company’s physical 
carbon performance within a given time period. The indicator is measured as the 
company’s relative performance change from the status quo to the predicted carbon 
intensity. 
Carbon exposure: Carbon exposure relates to a company’s monetary carbon 
performance, and describes the monetary implications of the business activities due to 
carbon usage for a defined scope and fiscal year. 
Carbon risk: Carbon risk describes the change in a company’s monetary carbon 
performance within a given period. The indicator is measured as the relative 
performance change from the status quo to the predicted carbon exposure. 
 
Financial performance:  
In a broader sense, financial performance refers to the degree to which financial 
objectives are being or have been accomplished. It is the process of measuring the 
results of a firm's policies and operations in monetary terms. It is used to measure firm's 
overall financial health over a given period. The financial performance indicators used in 
the study, are discussed in detail in subsequent chapters. 
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Agency cost:  
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), the divergence of action due to the 
incomplete alignment of the interests of agents and principals may lead to an agency 
problem. The sacrifice of wealth by the principal, and potential costs associated with 
monitoring the agents is known as the agency cost. It is also discussed in detail in later 
chapters.  
 
1.4 Contribution of this study 
 
This study is likely to contribute to the emerging area of research on carbon 
disclosure and carbon performance in a number of ways. This study would like to 
conduct a global study, consisting of a large sample drawn from most major industries 
covering most major regions of the world, to investigate a one-way as well as both-way 
relationship between carbon disclosure and carbon performance. No previous study has 
investigated the both-way relationship between carbon disclosure and carbon 
performance. Also, most of the previous studies on one-way relationship between carbon 
disclosure and carbon performance, have been done with a smaller sample covering 
specific countries and specific industries. This research also contributes by conducting a 
first-ever study that investigates the disclosure practices of average carbon performers.   
Studies have been done in the past to investigate the relationship between carbon 
performance and financial performance (for example Matsumura et al., 2013 and 
Albertini, 2013). However, no research has yet investigated the interrelationship 
between carbon performance and financial performance. This study also contributes by 
taking a novel attempt to investigate the interrelationship between carbon performance 
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and financial performance. To the best of my knowledge, no study has yet assessed the 
relationship between carbon disclosure and financial performance. This study is the first 
ever research to investigate the relationship between carbon disclosure and financial 
performance.  
By investigating the relationship between carbon disclosure and agency cost 
(measured by both Expense Ratio and Asset Utilization Ratio), this study adds to the 
scant literature that is currently available in this area. On the other hand, there is no 
existing research that has determined the relationship between carbon performance and 
agency cost. By taking a first-ever attempt to investigate the relationship between carbon 
performance and agency cost, this study contributes greatly to the literature.  
While some existing research has done trend analysis of carbon disclosure by 
businesses over the years, no study has yet done so for carbon performance. This study 
contributes to the literature by investigating the trends in improvement of carbon 
disclosure and carbon performance, for the largest firms in the world over a relatively 
recent period. 
 
 
 
1.5 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis consists of eight chapters. The table below provides the chapter-wise 
structure of this research: 
Chapter 1 This chapter discusses the background, motivation, objectives and 
contributions of this study.  
Chapter 2 This chapter discusses carbon disclosure reporting frameworks available 
globally and regionally. This description provides a contextual framework 
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for this study.   
Chapter 3 This chapter discusses different theories that have the potential to explain 
the relationships and interrelationships between carbon disclosure, carbon 
performance, financial performance and agency cost. This study utilizes 
these theories to develop its hypotheses and explain its findings. 
Chapter 4 This chapter provides an extensive review of existing literature that deals 
with the relationship and interrelationship between carbon disclosures, 
carbon performance, financial performance and agency cost. By doing so, 
this chapter identifies the research gap in existing literature.  
Chapter 5 Based on the research gap identified in chapter 4, this chapter develops 
the hypotheses of this study, by utilising propositions of relevant theories 
and a number of conceptual frameworks developed in this study. 
Chapter 6 This chapter outlines the methods used in this study to test the hypotheses 
developed in the previous chapter. This chapter explains the research 
sample selection process. It also shows the process of selecting and 
measuring the dependent, independent and control variables used in this 
study. This chapter also outlines the models used in this study to test its 
hypotheses. 
Chapter 7 This chapter provides the results from the tests conducted to test the 
hypotheses of this study. This chapter also conducts diagnostic tests to 
validate the data and models used in this study. This chapter analyses and 
interprets the relationship between carbon disclosure and carbon 
performance; between carbon performance and financial performance; 
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between carbon disclosure and financial performance; between carbon 
disclosure and agency cost and between carbon performance and agency 
cost. This chapter also investigates any trends in improvement of carbon 
disclosure and carbon performance during the study period.  
Chapter 8 This chapter concludes this study with a discussion of this research’s 
potential implications, limitations and suggestions for future research.  
 
 
1.6 Chapter summary 
This chapter provides a brief background for the study followed by motivations 
for this study. It then provides the objectives and research questions and contributions of 
this study. This chapter also provides definitions of certain terms that are integral to 
understanding this study. Finally, this chapter provides a structure of this thesis. The 
following chapter will discuss certain carbon disclosure reporting frameworks that are 
relevant to this study.   
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CHAPTER 2 CARBON DISCLOSURE REPORTING 
FRAMEWORKS 
2.1 Introduction  
As discussed in the previous chapter, one of the primary objectives of this study 
is to investigate carbon disclosure practices of Global 500 companies. To do so, it is 
important to have an idea about the carbon disclosure reporting frameworks available 
globally, regionally or country-wise. Therefore, this section describes carbon emissions 
and climate change disclosure practices and frameworks relevant to the sample 
companies. This description provides a contextual framework for this study. Most of the 
sample companies are from one of the four regions namely: North America, European 
Union, the UK and Asia-Pacific. There are only four companies who are outside these 
regions (two each from South America and Brazil). The following sections describe the 
carbon disclosure reporting frameworks available in these four regions and countries 
inside these regions, as applicable. It also describes global reporting frameworks that are 
relevant for carbon disclosure. This chapter is structured as below:  
Section 2.2 discusses carbon disclosure frameworks available globally. Section 
2.3 discusses regional/country-wise carbon disclosure reporting frameworks, and section 
2.4 summarises the chapter. 
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2.2 Global carbon disclosure reporting frameworks 
The Global Reporting Initiatives (hereafter GRI) and Climate Change Reporting 
Framework (hereafter CCRF) are the two most important global carbon disclosure 
reporting frameworks that are relevant for this study. They will be described in the 
following sections. However, before discussing them, it will be worthwhile to briefly 
describe the Kyoto Protocol, which although is not strictly a carbon disclosure 
framework, has far-reaching implications on all global, regional and country-wise 
carbon reporting frameworks.  
The Kyoto Protocol is an international agreement linked to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, which commits participating countries by 
setting internationally binding emission reduction targets. Recognising that developed 
countries are principally responsible for the current high levels of GHG emissions in the 
atmosphere as a result of more than 150 years of industrial activity, the Protocol places a 
heavier burden on developed nations under the principle of "common but differentiated 
responsibilities". The Kyoto Protocol was adopted in Kyoto, Japan, on 11 December 
1997, and entered into force on 16 February 2005. Both the Convention and its Protocol 
created a framework for the implementation of an array of national climate policies, and 
stimulated the creation of the carbon market and new institutional mechanisms that 
could provide the foundation for future mitigation efforts. The Protocol has put in place 
an accounting and compliance system with a set of rules and regulations. In particular, 
the Protocol lays down specific rules concerning the reporting of information by 
participating countries that have to demonstrate that they are meeting their 
commitments. (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2018). 
16 
 
2.2.1 Global Reporting Initiatives (GRI) 
The GRI is a voluntary disclosure framework that includes disclosure about 
climate change and its impact. This framework guides organisations on how they can 
report their sustainability performance. The guidelines of this reporting framework 
include Performance Indicators and Management Disclosures that companies can adopt 
voluntarily to disclose their performance in key sustainability areas, including GHG 
emissions and initiatives to reduce them, as well as energy consumption and reduction 
initiatives (Cotter et al., 2011). 
The GRI has pioneered and developed a comprehensive Sustainability Reporting 
Framework that is widely used around the world. The Framework, which includes 
Sustainability Reporting Guidelines and Sector Guidance, guides organisations on how 
they can report their sustainability performance. The guidelines of this reporting 
framework include Performance Indicators and Management Disclosures that companies 
can adopt voluntarily to disclose their performance in key sustainability areas including 
GHG emissions and initiatives to reduce them, as well as energy consumption and 
reduction initiatives.   
 
2.2.1.1 The Sustainability Reporting 
The GRI Sustainability Reporting Guidelines assist in the preparation of 
sustainability reports by organisations, regardless of their size, sector or location. The 
Guidelines offer an international reference for all those interested in the disclosure of 
governance approach, and of the environmental, social and economic performance and 
impacts of organisations. The Guidelines are useful in the preparation of any type of 
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document which requires such disclosure. The most current generation of the GRI 
Guidelines are The G4 Guidelines.  
The G4 Guidelines: The G4 guidelines include two different types of Standard 
Disclosures: General Standard Disclosures and Specific Standard Disclosures. 
GENERAL STANDARD DISCLOSURES: They include disclosure about:  
 Strategy and Analysis 
 Organisational Profile 
 Identified Material Aspects and Boundaries 
 Stakeholder Engagement 
 Report Profile 
 Governance 
 Ethics and Integrity 
SPECIFIC STANDARD DISCLOSURES: These include  
 Disclosures on Management Approach and 
 Indicators 
(Global Reporting Initiatives, 2013)    
 
2.2.2 Climate Change Reporting Framework (CCRF) 
The Climate Disclosure Standard Board’s (hereafter CDSB) Climate Change 
Reporting Framework, is a voluntary reporting framework designed to elicit climate 
change-related information of value to investors. Created in line with the objectives of 
financial reporting and rules on non-financial reporting, the climate change reporting 
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framework seeks to filter out what is required to understand how climate change affects 
a company’s financial performance. 
The CDSB climate change reporting framework is designed for use by 
companies in making disclosures in, or linked to, their mainstream financial reports 
about the risks and opportunities that climate change presents to their strategy, financial 
performance, and condition. CDSB’s intention is that disclosures that comply with the 
climate change reporting framework will be of value to investors. The climate change 
reporting framework adopts and relies on relevant provisions of existing standards and 
practices, including the Greenhouse Gas Protocol and International Financial Reporting 
Standards, as well as reflecting developments in regulatory and voluntary reporting, and 
carbon trading rules. The Framework is “standard-ready” for adoption by regulators 
contemplating the introduction or development of climate change disclosure practices.  
 
2.2.2.1 Requirements of Climate Change Reporting Framework (CCRF) 
The CCRF has specified certain requirements for organisations to follow. The 
main requirements are requirements on determination, requirements on preparation, 
requirements on presentation, and Requirements on disclosure content. All of the 
requirements are to be applied wholly and faithfully, and they shall be read and applied 
in conjunction with: Chapter 3, which describes the characteristics of decision useful 
information that shall be applied in determining, preparing and presenting disclosures in 
accordance with the requirements; Chapter 4, which sets out the type of information that 
is useful to investors and is therefore to be considered for disclosure and  the guidance 
and explanatory material that accompany the requirements. 
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Following is a summary of the above requirements: 
Requirements on determination: An organisation shall determine the disclosures to be 
made under the CCRF according to the categories of disclosure content that are of value 
to investors, and a process that involves a thorough assessment of how climate change has 
actually affected or has the potential to affect the organisation’s strategic objectives. 
Following are the main requirements related to the determination:  
 Disclosures shall take account of the content requirements in Chapter 4 of the 
CCRF. 
 Disclosures shall focus on investors as the primary users of information 
 Disclosures shall bring to bear management’s view of the organisation’s strategy 
and objectives. 
 Disclosures shall comply with regulatory requirements for financial reporting or 
corporate disclosure of climate change-related information. Where there is a 
conflict between the requirements of CCRF and the regulatory requirements, the 
regulatory requirements shall be applied, and the nature and effect of the conflict 
disclosed. 
Requirements on preparation: Disclosures shall be made on a consistent basis and shall 
include the information that is necessary to maximize its value to investors. Following are 
the main requirements related to preparation:  
 Disclosures under the CCRF shall enable investors to assess the future prospects 
of the organisation as well as its past performance. 
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 Information shall be provided on an annual basis for the same period covered by 
the mainstream financial report, or for a period of twelve months ending in that 
period. 
 Subject to the CCRF recommendations about organisational boundaries for 
greenhouse gas emissions reporting (described in Chapter 4), disclosures shall be 
made to the organization for which consolidated financial statements are prepared. 
 Disclosures shall include a statement of conformance with the CCRF 
requirements. In cases where full conformance has not been possible because of 
the organisation’s particular circumstances, the statement shall identify those 
requirements with which it has not been possible to conform, in whole or in part, 
together with an explanation of the relevant circumstances, information about the 
organisation’s stage of conformance, and its plans for full application of the 
requirements. 
 The statement of conformance shall include details of the standards, policies and 
organisational boundary used for preparing information under the CCRF, and 
confirmation that the standards, policies and organisational boundary, have been 
used consistently from one reporting period to the next. 
 Requirements on presentation: Disclosures shall be presented and communicated to 
make them useful for investors. Following are the main requirements related to 
presentation: 
 Disclosures shall be clear and straightforward 
 Information shall be reported in a place and in such a way as to explain the links 
between the organisation’s strategy, operations and climate change impacts. 
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 Organisations shall disclose performance measures and indicators used by 
management to manage the business, and to track progress against climate change-
related targets. 
 Disclosures shall explain changes in approach and changes in results from year to 
year. 
 Disclosures shall be consistent with the associated financial statements of the 
organisation. Therefore, if financial statements include segment information, 
disclosures about climate change shall also reflect that segmentation. 
Requirements on disclosure content: The CCRF requirements seek to ensure that 
disclosures include information that is essential to an understanding of how climate 
change affects management’s objectives, the strategies for meeting those objectives, and 
the performance of the organisation. Disclosure shall include the following information:  
a) Strategic analysis, risk and governance: Disclosure about strategic analysis shall 
include a statement about the long-term and short-term impact climate change 
actually and potentially has on the organisation’s strategic objectives.  
b) Risks: Disclosure about risks shall include an explanation and qualitative 
assessment of the organisation’s exposure to current and anticipated (long-term 
and short-term) significant risks associated with climate change. 
c) Opportunities: Disclosure about opportunities shall include an explanation and 
qualitative assessment of current and anticipated (long-term and short-term) 
significant opportunities associated with climate change. 
d) Management Actions: Disclosure shall include a description of the organisation’s 
long-term and short-term strategy or plan to address climate change-related risks, 
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opportunities and impacts, including targets to reduce GHG emissions, and an 
analysis of performance against those targets. 
e) Future outlook: Disclosures shall include information about the future outlook, 
long-term and short-term, including trends and factors related to climate change 
that are likely to affect management’s view of the organisation’s strategy or the 
timescales over which achievement of the strategy is typically planned. 
f) Governance: Disclosures shall describe the governance processes and 
organisational resources that have been assigned to the identification, management 
and governing body oversight of climate change-related issues. 
g) Greenhouse gas emissions:  
 
Following are the main GHG emissions content requirements:  
1. Gross absolute Part 1 and Part 2 GHG emissions shall be calculated by 
reference to one or more recognised GHG emissions reporting schemes, 
and disclosed in CO2 equivalent metric tonnes. 
2. Normalized GHG emissions shall be disclosed for the organisation. 
3. GHG emissions results shall be accompanied by contextual disclosures that 
include: 
 the name or names of the recognised GHG emissions reporting 
scheme(s) used to calculate GHG emissions 
 the quantification methodology used for calculating GHG emissions 
 key assumptions made in the preparation of disclosures 
 emission factors and/or the source of emission factors used to calculate 
GHG emissions from activity data 
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 the global warming potentials used and their source 
 in support of Scope 2 (indirect) GHG emissions results, disclose details 
(in KWh, MWh or GWh) of the purchased electricity the organization 
has consumed; 
 a description of the main effects of uncertainty in the calculation of 
GHG emissions e.g., data gaps, assumptions, extrapolations, 
metering/measurement inaccuracies etc. 
 a statement on whether and to what extent GHG emissions results have 
been verified or assured, internally or by an independent third party 
 confirmation or otherwise, that Scope 1 and 2 GHG emissions results 
relate to activities and sources within the organizational boundaries 
 GHG emissions results shall be categorised/disaggregated as 
appropriate in the circumstances 
 Movements in GHG emissions results over time, shall be disclosed and 
explained 
(Climate Disclosure Standard Board, 2013)  
This study intends to investigate carbon disclosure practices of Fortune 500 
companies. The majority of the firms of this sample are from the following regions: 
North America, European Union, UK and Asia-Pacific. The disclosure frameworks for 
all these regions are discussed below:  
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2.3 Regional/country-wise carbon disclosure reporting frameworks 
The following sections describe regional and country-wise disclosure 
frameworks that are relevant and useful for businesses who intend to disclose their 
climate change activities:  
  
2.3.1 North America 
Carbon disclosure reporting frameworks of United States of America (USA) and Canada 
are describe briefly in the following sections:  
 
The United States of America:  
In the USA, The Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program (GHGRP)  requires reporting 
of greenhouse gas data and other relevant information from large GHG emission 
sources, fuel and industrial gas suppliers, and CO2 injection sites. This data can be used 
by businesses and others to track and compare facilities' greenhouse gas emissions and 
identify opportunities to cut pollution, minimise wasted energy, and save money.  A 
total of 41 categories of reporters are covered by the GHGRP. Facilities determine 
whether they are required to report based on the types of industrial operations located at 
the facility, their emission levels, or other factors. Facilities are generally required to 
submit annual reports if: 
 GHG emissions from covered sources exceed 25,000 metric tons CO2 
equivalent per year 
 Supply of certain products would result in over 25,000 metric tons CO2 
equivalent of GHG emissions, if those products were released, combusted, or 
oxidized 
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 The facility receives 25,000 metric tons or more of CO2 for underground 
injection 
Approximately 8,000 facilities are required to report their emissions annually. Total 
reported emissions from these facilities are about 3 billion metric tons CO2 equivalent, 
which is about 50 percent of total U.S. GHG emissions. Additional GHGs are accounted 
for by approximately 1,000 suppliers. In total, data covering 85-90 percent of U.S GHG 
emissions are reported (The United States Environmental Protection Agency 2017).  
In January 2010, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission issued new guidance 
clarifying that publicly-traded companies need to disclose financially material impacts 
related to climate change. Material impacts may range from compliance costs related to 
emissions regulation to the physical impacts of changing weather patterns on operations. 
Specifically, the SEC's interpretative guidance highlights the following areas as 
examples of where climate change may trigger disclosure requirements: 
 Impact of Legislation and Regulation: When assessing potential disclosure 
obligations, a company should consider whether the impact of certain existing 
laws and regulations regarding climate change is material. In certain 
circumstances, a company should also evaluate the potential impact of pending 
legislation and regulation related to this topic. 
 Impact of International Accords: A company should consider and disclose 
when material, the risks or effects on its business of international accords and 
treaties relating to climate change. 
 Indirect Consequences of Regulation or Business Trends: Legal, 
technological, political and scientific developments regarding climate change, 
may create new opportunities or risks for companies. For instance, a company 
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may face decreased demand for goods that produce significant greenhouse gas 
emissions, or increased demand for goods that result in lower emissions than 
competing products. As such, a company should consider for disclosure 
purposes, the actual or potential indirect consequences it may face due to climate 
change related regulatory or business trends. 
 Physical Impacts of Climate Change: Companies should also evaluate for 
disclosure purposes, the actual and potential material impacts of environmental 
matters on their business (US Securities & Exchange Commission, 2015). 
 
Many states in the USA have separately mandated disclosure of GHG emission. 
The Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, is a California State Law that fights global 
warming by establishing a comprehensive program to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions from all sources, throughout the state (California Air Resources Board, 2006). 
In 2003, New York State proposed and obtained commitments from 
nine Northeast states, to form a cap and trade carbon dioxide emissions, under a program 
for power generators, called the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI). This 
program was launched on January 1, 2009, with the aim being to reduce the carbon 
"budget" of each state's electricity generation sector, to 10 percent below their 2009 
allowances, by 2018. 
 
Canada: 
The Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reporting Program (GHGRP), collects 
information on greenhouse gas emissions annually, from facilities across Canada. It is a 
mandatory program for those who meet the requirements. Facilities that emit 50 
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kilotonnes or more of GHGs in carbon dioxide (CO2) equivalent units, per year, must 
report their emissions to Environment and Climate Change Canada. Emissions data is 
available by gas (in tonnes, and tonnes of CO2 equivalent), for each facility and each 
year of data collected (2004-Present). The GHGs included are: carbon dioxide (CO2), 
methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFC), perfluorocarbons 
(PFC) and sulphur hexafluoride (SF6). 
Several provincial governments have established substantial programs to reduce 
emissions in their respective territories. British Columbia, Manitoba, Ontario and 
Quebec, have joined the Western Climate Initiative, a group of 7 states of the Western 
United States, whose aim is to establish a common framework for a carbon credit market 
Government of Canada, 2017). 
 
2.3.2 European Union 
In compliance with the Kyoto protocol, the European Union (EU) pioneered the 
first carbon reduction scheme known as the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme 
(EU ETS), in 2005, which mandated carbon reduction targets for all European Union 
members. The EU ETS is a cornerstone of the EU's policy to combat climate change, 
and its key tool for reducing greenhouse gas emissions cost-effectively. It operates in 31 
countries (all 28 EU countries plus Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway). It limits 
emissions from more than 11,000 heavy energy-using installations (power stations & 
industrial plants) and airlines operating between these countries, and it covers 
around 45% of the EU's greenhouse gas emissions. As per this scheme, all EU members 
are asked to report their emissions progress against the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UN FCCC) commitments, to the EU commission. The 
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Reporting formats and guidelines are issued under European commission decision 
2007/589/EC. These guidelines require the largest EU companies to report about the six 
greenhouse gases controlled by the Kyoto protocol. On top of that, EU members should 
report their progress against the Kyoto targets every two years (Aguiar 2009). 
Additionally, some EU member countries have introduced regulations that require the 
disclosure of environmental issues as well as GHG emissions. For instance, the Grenelle 
II Act in France, requires firms to include in their annual reports, a section on social and 
environmental consequences of their activities (Najah, 2012).  
The EU ETS works on the 'cap and trade' principle. A cap is set on the total 
amount of certain greenhouse gases that can be emitted by installations covered by the 
system. The cap is reduced over time, so that total emissions fall. Within the cap, 
companies receive or buy emission allowances which they can trade with one another as 
needed. They can also buy limited amounts of international credits from emission-saving 
projects around the world. The limit on the total number of allowances available, ensures 
that they have a value. After each year, a company must surrender enough allowances to 
cover all its emissions, otherwise heavy fines are imposed. If a company reduces its 
emissions, it can keep the spare allowances to cover its future needs, or else sell them to 
another company that is short of allowances. Trading brings flexibility, that 
ensures emissions are cut where it costs least to do so. A robust carbon price also 
promotes investment in clean, low-carbon technologies (European Commission, 2017). 
 
2.3.3 The United Kingdom 
The government of the United Kingdom (UK), enacted Climate Change Act 
2008, to deal with climate change and carbon emissions. The Act attempts to ensure that 
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the net UK carbon account for all six Kyoto greenhouse gases for the year 2050, is at 
least 80% lower than the 1990 baseline. The Act aims to enable the United Kingdom to 
become a low-carbon economy, by achieving a range of greenhouse gas reduction 
targets. An independent Committee on Climate Change, has been created under the Act 
to provide advice to the UK Government on these targets.  This act covers businesses 
that were not considered in the EU ETS. According to this scheme, firms are required to 
measure their energy use and emissions, and report them to the government. The Act 
requires the Government to set legally binding emissions targets, called carbon budgets, 
every five years. It also established an independent expert body, the Committee on 
Climate Change (the CCC), to advise Government on the level of those emissions 
targets. It also reports to Parliament on progress made on reducing emissions (Najah, 
2012). 
 
2.3.4 Asia-Pacific 
In the Asian and Pacific regions, most of the sample companies belong to 
Australia and Japan. In 2007, Australia introduced a single national framework, for 
corporations to report on greenhouse gas emissions, energy use, and energy production. 
That framework, known as the National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting (NGER) 
Scheme, operates under the National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Act 2007 (Cth). 
Corporations that meet an NGER threshold must register and then report each 
year. Information collected through the NGER Scheme provides the basis for assessing 
liability under the carbon pricing mechanism. The Clean Energy Regulator administers 
the NGER Act. Participation in the NGER scheme has been summarised in seven steps 
to assist reporting corporations. The following are the steps: 
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Thresholds: There are two types of thresholds to determine which corporations are 
required to participate in the NGER scheme. These are facility thresholds and corporate 
group thresholds. As a guide, businesses emitting more than 25,000 tonnes of carbon 
dioxide equivalent, or consuming more than 25,000-megawatt hours of electricity, or 2.5 
million litres of fuel in a financial year, can expect to be required to report.  
Registration: Corporations that meet a threshold must apply for registration.  
Data collection: Registered corporations must collect data and keep records about the 
greenhouse gas emissions and energy use and production of the members of their group, 
so they can report each year. In particular, each registered corporation must keep records 
of the activities of the members of its group, that allow it to report accurately under the 
NGER Act, and enable the Regulator to ascertain whether the corporation has complied 
with its obligations under the NGER Act. Under the NGER Act (section 22, Records to 
be kept), corporations are required to keep all records (this would include those that 
inform decisions, and the final decisions made relating to the NGER Act), for five years 
from the end of the year in which the activities take place.  
Reporting: Once registered, corporations are required to report each year that they 
remain registered. NGER reports are due by 31 October, following the financial year 
reporting period.  
Data publication: The Clean Energy Regulator is required to publish a summary of 
reported information, by 28 February each year. The Clean Energy Regulator only 
publishes information for registered corporations that exceed the publishing threshold. 
This snapshot of corporations' greenhouse gas emissions and energy use, is used to 
inform government policy development, assist government programs and activities, and 
meet Australia's international reporting obligations. 
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Monitoring and compliance: Participants are encouraged to voluntarily comply with 
legislative requirements. The NGER Act provides a range of monitoring and 
enforcement powers, where required (e.g., penalties).  
Audits: The NGER Act provides for greenhouse and energy audits of reporting 
corporations registered under the Act. It also requires a Register of Greenhouse and 
Energy Auditors. Audits determine if registered corporations are complying with the 
NGER Act.  
Penalties: Corporations that fail to register and report, or otherwise fail to comply with 
their obligations under the NGER Act, may be liable for penalties. The NGER Act 
allows for administrative, civil, and/or criminal responses, in relation to contraventions 
of the Act. Part 5 of the NGER Act sets out penalty provisions. These include fines of up 
to $340,000 (2,000 penalty units) for failure to apply for registration, and daily fines of 
up to $17,000 (100 penalty units) for each day of non-compliance. Obligations under the 
NGER Act continue, even if the period has expired or the due date has passed (National 
Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Act, 2007, Cth). 
Japan introduced in 2005 (effective April 2006) the Mandatory Greenhouse Gas 
Accounting and Reporting System, based on the revised Act on Promotion of Global 
Warming Countermeasures (Act No. 117 of 1998).  This system requires specified 
entities (which emit GHG emissions above a defined threshold) to calculate their GHG 
emissions and report the results to the Government. Industrial companies, commercial 
businesses, universities, freight carriers, etc. (as specified in the Law Promoting the 
Rational Use of Energy) who consume more than 1,500kl (crude oil equivalent) of 
energy per year, or emit more than 3,000t-CO2 per year, must report their GHG emission 
levels. 
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The main objective of the system is to promote voluntary emissions-reduction 
efforts of emitters, through assessment of the current GHG emission levels. Under this 
system, “specified establishment emitters” are considered those that use more than 1,500 
kl energy per year by crude oil equivalent for all establishments, and that satisfy the 
following requirements:  
- Conduct business activities with each establishment emitting 3,000 tons or more 
CO2 by type of greenhouse emission gas;  
- Employ 21 or more staff in total, for all establishments 
The other category “specified transportation emitters,” are considered those that fall in 
the transportation sector, including specified freight carriers, specified consigners, 
specified passenger carriers, and specified air carriers, under the Act on the Rational Use 
of Energy (Industrial Efficiency Policy Database, 2007). 
 
2.4 Chapter summary  
This section provides a background for this study, by discussing relevant 
institutional frameworks in regards to the carbon disclosure frameworks available across 
the globe. Global carbon disclosure frameworks available currently, such as The Global 
Reporting Initiatives, that include The Sustainability Reporting guidelines and Climate 
Change Reporting Frameworks, are discussed in detail in the first part of this section. 
The next part of this section discusses regional/country-wise carbon disclosure reporting 
frameworks, available in North America, European Union, United Kingdom and Asia-
Pacific. In North America and Asia-Pacific, relevant frameworks from only USA, 
Canada, Australia and Japan respectively, are discussed, as most other counties from 
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these regions do not have any substantial carbon disclosure frameworks. The next 
chapter will discuss the theories that are relevant for this study. 
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CHAPTER 3 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
 
3.1 Introduction   
The previous chapter provides a background and context for this study by 
discussing relevant institutional frameworks in regard to the carbon disclosure 
frameworks available across the globe. The objective of this chapter is to review 
different theories, that have the potential to explain the relationship and interrelationship 
between carbon disclosure, carbon performance, financial performance and agency cost. 
This study utilises these theories to develop its hypothesis and explain its findings. The 
theories discussed in this chapter are Legitimacy Theory, Stakeholder Theory, Voluntary 
Disclosure Theory, Signalling Theory, Proprietary Costs Theory, Instrumental 
Stakeholder Theory, and Agency Theory. This chapter is structured as below:  
Section 3.2 discusses Legitimacy Theory. Section 3.3 discusses Stakeholder 
Theory. Section 3.4 discusses Voluntary Disclosure Theory. Section 3.5 discusses 
Signalling Theory. Section 3.6 discusses Proprietary Cost Theory. Section 3.7 discusses 
Instrumental Stakeholder Theory. Section 3.8 discusses Agency Theory and Section 3.9 
summarises the chapter.  
There are primarily two types of theories that have been used in prior research to 
explain the relationship between corporate performance and voluntary disclosure. They 
are categorised as socio-political theories, such as Legitimacy Theory and Stakeholder 
Theory, and economic-based theories, such as Signalling Theory and Voluntary 
Disclosure Theory.  
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3.2 Legitimacy Theory 
As per Cormier and Gordon (2001), the concept of legitimacy originates from the 
social contract concept, where an organisation derives its legitimacy from the contract 
between it and society.  Legitimacy is defined by Lindblom (1994) as a condition or 
status which exists when an entity’s value system is congruent with the value system of 
the larger social system of which the entity is a part. When a disparity, actual or 
potential, exists between the two values systems, there is a threat to the entity’s 
legitimacy. Suchman (1995) defines legitimacy as “a generalized perception or 
assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some 
socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions”. 
As mentioned earlier, the concept of a social contract is related to Legitimacy 
Theory. Companies and other organisations exist at society’s will and are beholden to 
some degree to society’s wishes. Legitimacy is accomplished if society perceives that 
the company is operating in accordance with the existing norms and values of the 
society.  Therefore, the organisation will always try to seek the legitimacy that is given 
by the society based on the social contract between them. When the organisation feels 
that its legitimacy is threatened, it will pursue several strategies to retain this legitimacy.  
Therefore, organisations may use social and environmental disclosure as a tool to 
deal with society’s demands and needs. By making social and environmental 
disclosures, firms attempt to convey a message to several types of stakeholders, 
highlighting that they are conforming to their expectations, and persuading them about 
their performance in order to maintain their legitimacy (Cotter et al., 2011).  
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As per Hannele (2010), if the organisation is not considered legitimate by the 
society, i.e. if a legitimacy gap exists, the organisation may use different strategies to 
bridge the gap. The actions taken in such a situation depend on management’s 
perceptions of the threats to legitimacy. 
As per Lindblom (1994), when management perceives that a legitimacy gap exists, they 
will implement different strategies such as:   
 to correct the behaviour of their organisation realigning it with the desires of 
society 
 to change the perception that society has of their behaviour, but not the 
Behaviour itself 
 to transform the perception that society has of their behaviour, manipulating it, 
deceiving it, or simply distracting its attention, and/or 
 to indoctrinate society with the aim of modifying its expectations and 
accommodate them to the organisation’s ends  
Legitimacy Theory assumes that businesses may disclose social and 
environmental information voluntarily, to legitimise their activities, so as to give the 
impression of being socially responsible to the society (Deegan, 2002; O’Donovan, 
1999). Therefore, Legitimacy Theory has been used by many previous studies such as 
Deegan et al. (2000), Deegan (2002) and Gray et al. (1996), to explain the reasons for 
social and environmental disclosure.  
When a business feels threatened as a result of its poor performance, it releases 
positive information to refine its image and bridge the legitimacy gap (Deegan & 
Rankin, 1996; O’Donovan, 2002). In this case, businesses use soft social and 
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environmental disclosure to deal with society’s demands and needs (Freedman & Jaggi, 
2005; Lindblom, 1994; Reverte, 2009). By making positive social and environmental 
disclosure, businesses indicate to several types of stakeholders, that they are meeting 
their expectations (Deegan & Gordon, 1996; Deegan & Rankin, 1996). These firms 
release positive social and environmental information, via annual reports (Cho & Patten, 
2007; Deegan et al., 2000; O’Donovan, 2002) and corporate websites (Cho & Roberts, 
2010), to maintain legitimacy in the eyes of stakeholders. 
In summary, when businesses feel there is a lack of legitimacy due to breach of 
social contract, they would make positive social and environmental disclosure to retain 
legitimacy.   
 
3.3 Stakeholder Theory  
Stakeholders have been defined by Freeman and Reed (1983, p.91) as “any 
identifiable group or individual who can affect the achievement of an organisation’s 
objectives, or is affected by the achievement of an organisation’s objectives”. According 
to this definition, many people or organisations can be classified as stakeholders such as 
shareholders, creditors, government, media, employees, local communities, local 
charities future generation etc. (Deegan & Unerman, 2006). Clarkson (1995, pp 106-
107) divides stakeholders into primary and secondary stakeholders. Primary 
stakeholders are defined as “one without whose continuing support the corporation 
cannot survive as a going concern”. While secondary stakeholders are defined as “those 
who influence or affect, or are influenced or affected by the corporation”. However, 
these stakeholders are not engaged in transactions with the corporation, and are not 
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essential for its survival. O’ Dwyer (2005)  suggests that the broader ethical perspective 
that both primary and secondary stakeholders have particular minimum rights that 
should not be violated, can be extended to the notion that all stakeholders also have the 
right to be provided with information about how the organisation is affecting them by 
means of, for example, pollution, community sponsorship, provision of employment, 
safety initiatives etc., even if they choose not to use the information and even if they 
cannot directly have an impact on the survival of the organisation.  
Stakeholder Theory has two branches: the ethical branch or normative branch, 
and the managerial branch or positive branch. Ethical branch argues that all stakeholders 
have the right to be treated fairly by an organisation. It also argues that issues of 
stakeholder power are not directly relevant. Therefore, the impact of the organisation on 
the life experience of a stakeholder should determine the organisation’s responsibility to 
that stakeholder, rather than the extent of that stakeholder’s economic power over the 
organisation (Deegan & Unerman, 2006). As per Hasnas (1998), the ethical branch of 
Stakeholder Theory, states that managers should manage the business for the benefit of 
all stakeholders”, rather than for the stockholders only, regardless of whether 
stakeholder management leads to improved financial performance or not. According to 
the normative Stakeholder Theory, management must give equal consideration to the 
interests of all stakeholders, and, when these interests conflict, management should 
manage the business in a way so that it attains the optimal balance among them. 
Therefore, normative branch of Stakeholder Theory suggests that businesses have true 
social responsibilities.  
The managerial branch of the Stakeholder Theory, assumes that expectations of 
various stakeholders will impact on an organisation’s operating and disclosure policies. 
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However, the organisation will not respond to all stakeholders, rather it will respond to 
those that it deems to be powerful (Bailey et al., 2000; Buhr, 2002). Nasi et al. (1997) 
suggest that the most powerful stakeholder will be attended to first. This view is 
supported by Wallace (1995, p. 87) who argues that the higher the group in the 
stakeholder hierarchy, the more clout they have and the more complex their 
requirements will be.   
According to Gray et al. (1996, p.45) this perspective tends to be more 
‘organisation-cantered’. Under this perspective, stakeholders are identified by the 
organisation of concern, by reference to the extent to which the organisation believes the 
interplay with each group needs to be managed in order to further the interests of the 
organisation. The more important the stakeholder to the organisation, the more effort 
will be exerted in managing the relationship. Information is a major element that can be 
employed by organisations to manage or manipulate the stakeholder in order to gain 
their support and approval or to distract their opposition and disapproval.  
A stakeholder’s power to influence corporate management is viewed as a 
function of the stakeholder’s degree to control over resources required by the 
organisation. The more critical the stakeholder resources are to the continued viability 
and success of the organisation, the greater the expectation that stakeholder demand will 
be addressed. A successful organisation is considered to be one that satisfies the 
demands (sometimes conflicting) of various powerful stakeholder groups.  Therefore, 
the organisations will undertake various activities such as public reporting, to meet the 
expectations of important stakeholders. Organisations will have incentives to disclose 
information about their activities to respective stakeholder groups, to indicate clearly 
that they are conforming with those stakeholder groups (Ullman, 1985).    
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Under ethical branch, firms focus on a broad range of stakeholders and their 
various information needs (Gray et al., 1996). However, under the managerial branch, 
firms’ management uses disclosure as a tool to deal only with the informational needs of 
the various powerful stakeholder groups (Bailey et al., 2000; Reverte, 2009). Therefore, 
Stakeholder Theory suggests that businesses would use disclosure practices as an 
important tool to maintain their legitimacy, and to meet its stakeholders’ expectations.  
 
3.4 Voluntary Disclosure Theory  
Meek et al. (1995, p.555), define voluntary disclosure as “free choices on the part 
of company management to provide accounting and other information deemed relevant 
to the decision needs of users of their annual reports”. Voluntary disclosure tries to 
provide a clear view to stakeholders about the business’s long-term sustainability and 
reducing information asymmetry and agency conflicts between managers and investors 
(Healy & Palepu, 2001; Boesso & Kumar, 2007).  
According to Verrecchia (1983); Dye (1985) and Clarkson et al. (2008), 
Voluntary Disclosure Theory assumes that firms with superior environmental 
performance will be motivated to disclose information about their good performance 
practices, to differentiate themselves from firms with inferior environmental 
performance. To achieve these objectives, good performers will disclose verifiable or 
actual information about their environmental performance. This type of information is 
difficult to mimic by a firm’s counterparts and competitors. Conversely, firms with poor 
environmental performance, will prefer to be silent about their performance if outsiders 
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are unable to identify whether the non-disclosure of performance information originates 
from poor performance or from high proprietary costs (Verrecchia, 1983). 
On a similar note, Clarkson et al. (2008) predict a positive association between 
environmental performance and the level of discretionary environmental disclosure. The 
reason being, superior environmental performers, will convey their ‘‘type’’ by pointing 
to objective environmental performance indicators which are difficult to mimic by 
inferior type firms. On the other hand, inferior performers will choose to disclose less or 
to be ‘‘silent’’ on their environmental performance, thus being placed in a pool of firms 
where investors and other users ascribe the ‘‘average type’’ to that pool.  
 
3.5 Signalling Theory 
Signalling Theory can be used to explain the motivation of firms to voluntarily 
disclose company information (Bin Abdullah, 2008). Signalling Theory is concerned 
with the issue of information asymmetry problems (Akerlof 1970; Levin, 2001; Morris, 
1987; Ross, 1977). This theory explains how information asymmetry problems (one 
party having more or better information than others) can be reduced by the party with 
more information signalling it to others. As part of signalling, companies communicate 
firm quality or value through voluntary disclosure, financial accounts and so on. In the 
case of voluntary corporate disclosure, managers provide additional information to 
investors, to help them make investment decisions (Cotter et al., 2011). Companies with 
good performance are likely to disclose more information, to signal their good quality to 
investors (Bin Abdullah, 2008).    
Signalling Theory was originally developed to clarify the information asymmetry 
in the labour market (Spence, 1978). Subsequently, it has been used to explain voluntary 
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corporate disclosures (Ross, 1977). Signalling Theory discusses how to address 
problems caused by information asymmetry in any social setting. It suggests that 
information asymmetry should be reduced if the party possessing more information can 
send signals to interested parties (An et al., 2011). As a result of the information 
asymmetry problem, companies signal certain information to investors, to show that they 
are better than other companies in the market, for the purpose of attracting investments 
and enhancing a favourable reputation (Verrecchia, 1983).  
A signal can be an observable action, or an observable structure, which is used to 
indicate the hidden characteristics (or quality) of the signaller. The sending of a signal is 
usually based on the assumption that it should be favourable to the signaller, e.g., 
indicating a higher quality of its products compared to its competitors (An et al., 2011). 
By signalling companies, on the one hand, would make investors and other 
stakeholders reassess the value of the company, and then make decisions more 
favourable to the company (Whiting & Miller, 2008). On the other hand, the favour of 
various stakeholders would make a company obtain more investment, and therefore 
reduce the costs of raising capital. There are a number of means for companies to signal 
information about themselves. Among those, voluntary disclosure of positive accounting 
information is considered to be one of the most effective (Ross, 1979; Watson et al., 
2002 and Xiao et al., 2004). Voluntary disclosure is used for signalling, where 
companies would disclose more information than required by mandatory laws and 
regulations, in order to signal that they are better (Campbell et al., 2001). To be 
effective, the signal must be difficult to be copied by another firm (Morris 1987). One of 
the ways, for example, a business can achieve this is to make hard disclosures (Clarkson 
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et al., 2008) regarding its superior environmental performance through discretionary 
disclosure channels, by using objective measure.   
As signalling and voluntary disclosure theories predict a positive relationship 
between environmental performance and environmental disclosure, we can assume that 
superior carbon performers would try to distinguish themselves from poor carbon 
performers, by making verifiable and hard disclosures to signal their good carbon 
performance to various stakeholders.  
Contrary to previous theories, Proprietary Costs Theory states that companies 
limit voluntary disclosure of relevant information to the financial market because of 
disclosure-related costs, such as preparation and competitive costs. (Verrecchia, 1983; 
Dye, 1986; Darrough & Stoughton, 1990; Wagenhofer, 1990). As proprietary cost 
theory provides a completely different perspective as to why some businesses do not like 
to disclose at all regardless of their performance, this theory is discussed below briefly. 
 
3.6 Proprietary Costs Theory 
According to Healy and Palepu (2001), firms’ decisions to disclose information 
to investors, is influenced by concern that such disclosures can damage their competitive 
position in the markets. Studies such as Verrecchia (1983); Darrough and Stoughton 
(1990); Wagenhofer (1990); Feltham and Xie (1992); Newman and Sansing (1993); 
Darrough (1993); Gigler (1994), conclude that firms have an incentive not to disclose 
information that will reduce their competitive position, even if it makes it more costly to 
raise additional equity. Therefore, the managers may be unwilling to disclose more 
44 
 
information if they believe it contains proprietary information which can be harmful to 
their firm (Dye, 1985; Verrecchia, 1983, 1990). 
As per Prencipe (2004), proprietary costs theory considers not only the benefits, 
but also the costs related to the release of information. Particularly, it states that 
companies limit voluntary disclosure when proprietary costs arise from it. These costs 
include not only the costs of preparing, disseminating and auditing information, but also 
the cost deriving from disclosing information which may be used by competitors and 
other parties in a way that is harmful for the reporting company.  
Proprietary costs can be divided into two types: internal costs which include the costs of 
preparing and disclosing information, and external costs which result from a 
consequence of competitors’ action to use the information disclosed for their own 
advantage (Prencipe, 2004). Hence, firms have an incentive to voluntarily disclose 
certain information if: a) they seek some benefits from this disclosure such as reduction 
in the cost of equity capital (Botosan, 1997; Botosan & Plumlee, 2002) or debt capital 
(Sengupta, 1998), and the benefits of this disclosure exceeds its costs; or b) the 
disclosure of this information does not harm the firm’ share value, and in turn can 
facilitate a reduction in information asymmetry problems (Cotter et al, 2011). 
 
3.7 Instrumental Stakeholder Theory  
Instrumental Stakeholder Theory suggests that everything else being equal, firms 
that practice stakeholder management will perform better in profitability, stability, and 
growth etc. terms. It implies “certain” results can be obtained if “certain” behaviours are 
adopted (Pesqueux & Damak‐Ayadi, 2005). Donaldson and Preston (1995, p. 71) claim 
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that Instrumental Stakeholder Theory can be “used to identify the connections, or lack of 
connections, between stakeholder management, and the achievement of traditional 
corporate objectives”. Therefore, Instrumental Stakeholder Theory could be interpreted 
as research into the positive or negative links between stakeholder management and 
financial performance, and into what would explain these links (Egels-Zandén & 
Sandberg, 2010). Donaldson and Preston (1995. p. 67) also describe instrumental 
Stakeholder Theory as “the proposition that corporations practicing stakeholder 
management will, other things being equal, be relatively successful in conventional 
performance terms. 
 
3.8 Agency Theory 
Agency theory describes the agency relationships between managers and 
shareholders, and between shareholders and debt holders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976 and 
Watts and Zimmerman, 1978, 1983). Jensen and Meckling (1976, p.308) define the 
agency relationship as “a contract under which one or more persons (the principals) 
engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf, which 
involves delegating some decision-making authority to the agent”. Agents correspond to 
managers, whereas principals correspond to shareholders, from a company’s 
perspective.  Agency theory is based on the problems related to the separation of 
ownership and control. Agency problem may arise, when the management (agent) make 
decisions on behalf of the owners/shareholder (principals). 
As per Cotter et al. (2011), providers of capital, such as shareholders and 
creditors, delegate strategic and operational decision making to managers. Managers 
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should therefore, act and make decisions that maximise shareholders’ value, and ensure 
payment of debts to the creditors. However, as agency theory suggests, managers (the 
agents) make use of their position and power for their own benefit, rather than the 
benefit of shareholders and creditors (the principals). This agency problem occurs 
because of separation of firm ownership and control, and is worsened by information 
asymmetry problems between managers and debt holders. This information asymmetry 
happens as managers have better knowledge about firm’s future value compared to 
shareholders and creditors. This can result in adverse selection and moral hazard 
problems, because capital providers are not sure whether managers are acting in their 
best interests.  Managers, shareholders and creditors all have incentives to pursue their 
own interests. Monitoring and bonding devices are the most common tools used by 
capital providers to reduce agency and information asymmetry problems. Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) have identified three types of costs that arise due to an agency problem. 
These costs are Monitoring costs, Bonding cost, and Residual loss. These costs are 
briefly described below:  
 
Monitoring Costs: 
Monitoring costs are incurred when the shareholders/debt holders (principals) try 
to monitor the activities of the management (agents). Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
suggest that principal and agent are concerned in maximizing their own interest or 
wealth, while agents (decision makers) may not take actions in the best interest of the 
owners (principals). Therefore, the principal has to monitor the agents by setting up 
monitoring mechanisms. Examples of monitoring devices that are used by shareholders 
to ensure managers provide complete information, include the appointment of a board of 
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directors, the use of board committees, and hiring of external auditors who will audit the 
financial reports (Cotter et al., 2011). The cost of undertaking the audits and cost of 
having a board committee, can be referred to as monitoring costs.  
 
Bonding Costs: 
As agents are concerned with maximising their own wealth, a bonding device 
needs to be established that will align the interest of the managers (agent) of the firm, 
with those of the owners, the shareholders (Henderson et al., 1992).  The bonding 
devices that could be used are contractual agreements such as debt contracts and 
compensation packages provided to managers, that bond managers’ interest to those of 
the capital providers. On the other hand, managers have incentives to provide credible 
information to shareholders and debt holders, and they do this by preparing audited 
financial reports and other disclosures (Watson et al., 2002). Managers are required to 
bond themselves to prepare these financial statements, which are costly and referred to 
as bonding cost (Mamun et al., 2013).  However, Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that 
agents may take action by spending resources in assuring that it would not take actions 
which would not have a negative effect on the principal, which is considered as bonding 
costs.  
 
Residual Loss: 
Even after monitoring and bonding costs are incurred, there may still be a loss to 
the principals due to the agents making decisions that are different from those that could 
maximize principals’ interest (Williamson, 1988). This loss is recognized as a residual 
loss.  
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In summary, the divergence of action due to the incomplete alignment of the 
interests of agents and principals, may lead to an agency problem. The sacrifice of 
wealth by the principal and potential costs associated with monitoring the agents, is 
known as the agency cost. 
 
3.9 Chapter summary  
In summary, The Legitimacy Theory suggests that when businesses feel there is 
a lack of legitimacy due to a breach of social contract, they would make positive social 
and environmental disclosure to retain their legitimacy. Stakeholder Theory suggests 
that businesses would use disclosure practices as an important tool to maintain their 
legitimacy and to meet its stakeholders’ expectations. Voluntary Disclosure Theory and 
Signalling Theory, assume that firms with superior environmental performance will be 
motivated to disclose information about their good performance practices, to 
differentiate themselves from firms with inferior environmental performance, and to 
signal their superior performance to the investors. Instrumental Stakeholder Theory 
suggests that everything else being equal, firms that practice stakeholder management 
will perform better in profitability, stability, and growth, etc. terms. Agency Theory 
suggests managers (the agents) make use of their position and power for their own 
benefit, rather than the benefit of shareholders and creditors (the principals). The 
sacrifice of wealth by the principal and costs associated with monitoring the agents is 
known as the agency cost. These theories will be used in subsequent chapters, to analyse 
relevant literature, formulate hypotheses for this study, and interpret the findings of this 
study.  The next chapter discusses existing literature relevant to this study. 
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CHAPTER 4 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
4.1 Introduction  
The primary objective of this chapter is to provide an extensive review of 
existing literature that deal with relationship and interrelationship between carbon 
disclosures, carbon performance, financial performance and agency cost. As carbon 
disclosure and carbon performance are sub-sets of environmental disclosure and 
environmental performance, and there are limited research on carbon disclosure and 
carbon performance, this study will also shed light on existing studies that discuss the 
relationship between environmental disclosure and environmental performance. This 
chapter is structured as below: 
Section 4.2 reviews existing research that investigates the relationship between 
environmental disclosure/carbon disclosure, and environmental performance/carbon 
performance. Section 4.3 provides a review of literature that deal with the relationship 
between environmental performance/carbon performance and financial performance. 
Section 4.4 discusses prior literature that investigates the interrelationship between 
carbon performance and financial performance. Section 4.5 reviews prior literature 
relevant to the relationship between carbon disclosure and financial performance. 
Section 4.6 deals with the relationship between carbon disclosure/carbon performance 
and agency cost. Prior studies that conducted trend analysis for improvement of carbon 
disclosure and carbon performance, are discussed in section 4.7. Section 4.8 provides a 
summary of the chapter.  
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4.2 Relationship between environmental disclosure/carbon disclosure 
and environmental performance/carbon performance 
There are vast amount of studies that examine the relationship between 
environmental performance and environmental disclosure, however, findings of these 
studies had been inconclusive. Some of these studies suggest a negative relationship 
between environmental performance and environmental disclosure, while others suggest 
a positive relationship. A few studies find no relationship between environmental 
performance and environmental disclosure. On the other hand, being a very recent area 
of research, there are not many studies that investigate the relationship between carbon 
disclosure and carbon performance. The following sections discuss previous studies that 
deal with the relationship between environmental performance/carbon performance and 
environmental disclosure/carbon disclosure:  
 
 
4.2.1 Relationship between environmental disclosure and environmental 
performance   
One of the most important studies that find positive relationship between 
environmental performance and environmental disclosure is the study by Clarkson et al. 
(2008). This study attempts to investigate a hitherto unresolved research issue in 
environmental accounting - the empirical association between the level of corporate 
environmental disclosures and corporate environmental performance. The authors revisit 
this relation by testing competing predictions from economics based and socio-political 
theories of voluntary disclosure, using a more rigorous research design than used in the 
previous research. They find that there is a positive association between environmental 
performance and the level of discretionary disclosures in environmental and social 
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reports or related web disclosures. In other words, they find superior environmental 
performers are more forthcoming in truly discretionary disclosure channels, as predicted 
by economics based voluntary disclosure theories. However, the results are inconsistent 
with the negative association predicted by socio-political theories.   
Al-Tuwaijri et al. (2004) investigate the relationships between economic 
performance, environmental performance, and environmental disclosure, after explicitly 
considering that these three corporate functions are jointly determined. They find that 
good environmental performance is positively associated with good economic 
performance. They also suggest that good environmental performance is associated with 
more extensive quantifiable environmental disclosures of specific pollution measures 
and occurrences.  
As mentioned earlier, the theory that explains a positive relationship between 
environmental performance and environmental disclosure is the Voluntary Disclosure 
Theory. This theory suggests that companies have incentives to disclose ‘good news’ to 
differentiate themselves from companies with ‘bad news’, to avoid the adverse selection 
problem (Dye, 1986; Verrecchia, 1983).  According to Voluntary Disclosure Theory, 
businesses are likely to disclose their practices and performance when the perceived 
benefits exceed the associated costs; especially when they want to maximise their market 
value (Clarkson et al., 1992). There are benefits in disclosing positive information and 
costs in disclosing negative information, especially when stakeholders are not aware of 
the negative (Li et al., 1997). Voluntary Disclosure Theory, therefore predicts that 
companies will selectively disclose positive information, and will disclose more positive 
information if their environmental performance is good and they wish to distinguish 
themselves from bad or average performers. This, coupled with pressure from some 
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investors and consumers for good environmental performance, would lead to more 
positive perceptions of the firm and higher market value. They will also withhold 
negative information unless conditions force them to disclose it (Dye, 1985). Bewley 
and Li (2000) and Li et al. (1997), have argued that true environmental performance is 
not directly observable to investors; thus, companies with superior performance tend to 
make direct voluntary disclosures that cannot be easily matched by poor performers 
(Clarkson et al., 2008). Hence, this theory predicts a positive association between 
environmental performance and the level of discretionary environmental disclosure.   
On the other hand, a high number of studies dealing with the relationship 
between environmental performance and environmental disclosure, find a negative 
relationship between performance and disclosure. These studies suggest companies with 
inferior environmental performance make more environmental disclosures.  
Clarkson et al. (2011) examine how the environmental information voluntarily disclosed 
by a sample of Australian firms, relates to their underlying environmental performance. 
They focus on both the level and nature of environmental disclosures found in annual 
reports and stand-alone environmental or sustainability reports, and score the disclosures 
using an index developed by Clarkson et al. (2008) based on Global Reporting Initiative 
(GRI) Guidelines. The study, consistent with predictions of socio-political theories, finds 
that firms with greater emissions (a higher pollution propensity) make more 
environmental disclosures in total.   
Freedman et al. (2004) and Freedman and Stagliano (2008) assess the association 
between environmental performance and environmental reporting of US electric utilities 
affected by the 1990 Clean Air Act (CAA). The emission of Sulphur Dioxide (SO2) is 
used as the measure for environmental performance. From the examination of the annual 
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reports and 10Ks of 38 companies in 1990 and 1995, Freedman et al. (2004) find that 
companies with higher SO2 emissions level, greater number of power plants targeted for 
SO2 emissions reduction under the CAA and SO2 emissions allowance shortfall, 
published greater SO2 emissions disclosure.  Freedman and Stagliano (2008), examine 
the SO2 emissions disclosure of 32 electric utilities in 1999 and 2001. They consider all 
disclosure made in the annual reports, 10Ks and stand-alone reports and on the company 
websites. Companies with higher SO2 emissions level that did not meet the SO2 
emissions standard and needed more SO2 emissions allowance made extensive SO2 
emissions disclosure.  
Berthelot et al. (2003) summarise the reasons for an organisation to increase its 
environmental disclosure. One of the reasons they find is poor environmental 
performance.  
Cho and Patten (2007) and Patten (2002a, 2002b), observe that companies with poor 
environmental performance would be subject to greater exposure to the potential public 
and regulatory scrutiny, than companies with relatively better environmental 
performance. Their studies suggest that poor environmental performance leads to higher 
level of environmental disclosure.  
Deegan and Rankin (1996) investigate the environmental reporting practices of a 
sample of 20 Australian companies which were successfully prosecuted by the New 
South Wales and Victorian Environmental Protection Authorities, during the period 
1990-1993. This study finds that organisations (both prosecuted and non-prosecuted) are 
not very willing to provide any information within their annual reports about any 
negative environmental implications of their operations. This is consistent with findings 
of previous studies. The prosecuted firms provided significantly more positive 
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environmental disclosures than non-prosecuted firms. This implies that firms which have 
been prosecuted tend to counter the negative news of their prosecution with positive 
news about their environmental initiatives.  
Some other prior empirical research such as Brammer and Pavelin (2006); De 
Villiers and Van Staden (2009); Gray et al. (1996); Hackston and Milne (1996),  provide 
evidence on the predisposition of poor environmental performers, to disclose extensive 
environmental disclosure and/or highlight positive environmental actions while 
suppressing negative environmental effects.  
The negative relationship between environmental performance and 
environmental disclosure could be explained by Legitimacy Theory and Stakeholder 
Theory. According to these theories, businesses with poor carbon performance would 
disclose positive but unverifiable information about their environmental performance to 
maintain legitimacy, positively influence perceptions of stakeholders, and avoid any 
possibility of litigation. Therefore, it can be assumed that companies with inferior 
environmental performance would make more environmental disclosure  
In additon, there are few studies that find no relationship between environmental 
performance and environmental disclosure. By comparing the content analysis ratings of 
Environmental Information Disclosure (EID) in annual reports, with environmental 
performance ratings obtained from the Council on Economic Priorities (CEP), Ingram 
and Frazier (1980) show that there is no association between environmental performance 
and EID. After studying the 26 largest CEP-rated companies in the US, based on an EID 
index comprising 18 items across four categories, Wiseman (1982) obtains the same 
results. Freedman and Wasley (1990) examine 49 CEP-rated companies and found that 
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neither the annual report nor the 10-K environmental report, was indicative of a firm's 
actual environmental performance. 
Sutantoputra et al. in their 2012 study, identify the level of environmental 
disclosure of 53 ASX200 Australian listed companies and test whether better-performing 
companies with either lower emissions or more positive Corporate Monitor 
environmental ratings, were likely to disclose more information on their environmental 
performance. This research finds no evidence that good performers disclose more as a 
way of promoting themselves and separating themselves from poor performers, or that 
poor environmental performers disclose more by relaying as much positive information 
as they can to try to improve their public image.  
 
4.2.2 Relationship between carbon disclosure and carbon performance  
As carbon disclosure is a very new area of research, there are not many studies 
that investigate the relationship between carbon disclosure and carbon performance. 
Some of the most relevant studies are discussed below: 
Peng et al. (2015) use hand-collected data from the annual CSRs of listed 
companies in China during 2008–2010, to investigate two questions: (i) what factors 
cause the companies’ decisions of whether or not to make carbon information disclosure 
and (ii) what forces influence the extent to which carbon emission information is 
disclosed. In this paper, they examine both external and internal factors, and they find 
that companies operating in high-emission sectors are more likely to make carbon 
information disclosure and tend to disclose more information. In addition, firms which 
have better performance are more willing to make the carbon information disclosure, but 
the content of their disclosure does not significantly differ from those with relatively 
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poorer performance. This study also shows that a company may be more likely to make 
carbon information disclosure when the number of industry competitors engaging in 
carbon information disclosure increases. Finally, the study results suggest that 
companies’ decisions of whether to make carbon information disclosure may follow the 
moves of their industry peers. 
Freedman and Jaggi (2004) examine the association between CO2 emissions and 
environmental disclosure. They investigate the disclosure made in the annual reports and 
10Ks of 66 US electric utilities. They find that only one-third of emitters made such 
disclosures. They observe that companies with a higher level of CO2 emissions provide 
more disclosure, and company size (total assets), profitability (return on equity) and 
market risk (beta), does not influence the extent of the CO2 emissions disclosure. 
Sullivan and Kozak (2006) study the climate change disclosure of European 
electricity utilities. They observe that although many of the European electricity utilities 
reviewed provided a significant amount of information on their greenhouse gas 
emissions and related aspects of their business strategy, the majority did not provide 
sufficient information as needed by an institutional investor.  Information provided by 
the companies did not explain how climate change issues were factored into business 
decision making or overall strategy, and most of the company reporting focused on 
historic performance rather than on the consideration of future trends in policy and 
company emissions. 
Alrazi et al. (2010) examine the quality and the determinants of the 
environmental reporting published by 51 electric utilities from several countries. They 
find that the quality of the reporting was relatively high. The association between 
environmental performance and environmental reporting is only significant for CO2 
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emission disclosures in the annual reports (not on websites). Companies from code law 
countries produce higher quality environmental information than companies from 
common law countries. Law enforcement and company size are positively associated 
with CO2 emissions disclosure. 
Cotter and Najah (2012) re-investigate the relationship between environmental 
performance and carbon and climate change related disclosure. They also examine the 
consequence of implementing carbon risk management and disclosure on both investors 
and non-investor stakeholders. The results of this study show that carbon risk 
management is significantly and positively associated with carbon disclosure quality that 
is made via CDP and sustainability reports, and thereby support the economics-based 
disclosure theories. Companies with good carbon risk management records disclose such 
information to separate themselves from inferior firms. These disclosures assist firms to 
reduce information asymmetry problems between the firm and external parties, 
especially its investors. This research also finds that while the firms' management has 
committed to reduce their carbon emission levels and adopted several strategies to 
mitigate climate change risks, these practices have neither reduced the ex-ante cost of 
equity capital nor increased the market value. In general, the results suggest that 
although investors are gradually becoming more interested in climate change 
information; the use of this data among mainstream investors is yet not very common. 
The last finding of this study shows that although carbon disclosure is not associated 
with non- investor stakeholders’ perceptions, carbon risk management is positively and 
significantly associated. This could lead to a conclusion that instead of using disclosures, 
firms’ management uses their carbon risk management activities to influence non-
investor stakeholders’ perceptions about these activities.  
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Cotter et al. (2011) investigate three important issues in climate change reporting 
in the Australian context. It explores (a) the gaps between regulatory requirements and 
authoritative guidance regarding climate disclosure in Australia, (b) reporting practices 
in this area, and (c) the demands for increased disclosure and standardization of that 
disclosure. The study result indicates that there seems to be a lack of sufficient 
disclosure in company reports and websites about several aspects of climate change 
impacts and their management. The results also show that the disclosures that are made 
tend to lack technical detail and are somewhat skewed towards the more positive aspects 
of climate change impacts and management.   
Rankin et al. (2011) use institutional governance systems theory to examine 
hypothesized links between voluntary Australian corporate GHG disclosures, internal 
organizational systems, and private regulation, that guide GHG disclosures as evidence 
of reported corporate response to climate change. The study finds evidence of proactive 
corporate GHG disclosures within the “market governance system” in existence in 
Australia in 2007 where companies operated in a public policy vacuum in relation to 
climate change. Results of the two model analyses indicate that firms which disclose 
GHG emissions information are more likely to have also implemented an environmental 
management system (EMS), have stronger governance systems, make publicly available 
disclosures to the CDP, are larger, and operate in either the energy and mining or 
industrial sector. When the authors examine the extent and credibility of disclosures by 
the sub-sample of 80 firms that disclose GHG emissions data, they find that those firms 
are more likely to have an EMS that is ISO 14001-certified, use the Global Reporting 
Initiative (GRI) to guide sustainability disclosures, and disclose to the CDP, with those 
disclosures being publicly available. In addition, larger firms in the mining and energy 
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and industrial sectors are also more likely to disclose credible GHG emissions 
information guided by ISO 14064-1. 
 
4.2.3 Summary of previous studies dealing with the relationship between 
environmental disclosure/carbon disclosure and environmental performance 
/carbon performance  
In summary, findings of previous studies dealing with environmental 
disclosure/carbon disclosure and environmental performance/carbon performance, show 
inconclusive results. Studies such as Clarkson et al. (2011), Freedman et al. (2004), 
Freedman and Stagliano (2008), Berthelot et al. (2003), Cho and Patten (2007), Patten 
(2002a, 2002b), and Deegan and Rankin (1996), predict that poor environmental 
performance will lead businesses to make higher level of environmental disclosures. 
Freedman and Jaggi (2004) predict a negative association between carbon performance 
and carbon disclosure. On the other hand, studies such as Clarkson et al (2008), and Al-
Tuwaijri et al. (2004), suggest that superior environmental performers will make more 
extensive quantifiable disclosure. Similar results are found from studies that examine 
relationship between carbon disclosure and carbon performance. Studies such as Peng et 
al. (2015), and Cotter and Najah (2012), predict positive association between carbon 
performance and carbon disclosure 
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4.3 Relationship between environmental performance/carbon 
performance and financial performance 
As mentioned earlier, the study of carbon performance is a relatively new field of 
study which falls under the broad area of environmental performance. Therefore, before 
discussing the relationship between carbon performance and financial performance, the 
relationship between environmental performance and financial performance will be 
discussed first. A vast amount of research have been done to predict impact of firm’s 
environmental performance on its financial performance. However, these studies largely 
produce conflicting findings. While the majority of the studies indicate a positive impact 
of firm’s environmental performance on its financial performance, a good number of 
studies indicate negative impact and some even show no impact. 
The following sections will review existing literature and theories in order to understand 
the relationship between environmental performance and financial performance, and 
carbon performance and financial performance.  
 
4.3.1 Relationship between environmental performance and financial performance 
Jaggi and Freedman (1992) evaluate the impact of pollution performance of pulp 
and paper firms in the United States, on their economic and market performance. 
Pollution performance measurement is based on a pollution index developed from 
pollution emission reports filed with the regional offices of the Environmental Protection 
Agency by pulp and paper firms for their individual plants. Economic performance is 
measured by Net Income, ROE, ROA, Cash flow/Equity and Cash flow/Assets; market 
performance is measured by the PE ratio and systematic risk. The association between 
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the pollution index and economic and market performance variables is tested by the 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients. The results of this study indicate that, in the short run, 
pollution performance is negatively associated with economic performance, and that the 
markets do not reward good pollution performance.  
Cordeiro and Sarkis (1997) argue that studies that try to evaluate the relationship 
between corporate environmental pro-activism and financial performance by using 
historical corporate accounting performance and stock market measures of performance, 
do not yield any consistent pattern of relationship between firm’s environmental pro-
activism and financial performance. The authors revisit this relationship using a novel 
measure of firm performance: security analyst earnings forecasts. Their study 
demonstrates a significant, negative relationship between environmental pro-activism 
(using Toxic Release Inventory data) and industry analyst 1- and 5-year earnings-per-
share performance forecasts for a sample of 523 US firms in 1992. 
Filbeck and Gorman (2004) utilize data from the Investor Responsibility 
Research Centre as well as a proprietary database, to investigate the relationship 
between environmental performance and financial performance of electric utilities in the 
United States. They chose this sector because, as producers and distributors of energy, 
utilities produce substantial amounts of pollution. Their result differs from many of the 
earlier studies in that they do not find a positive relationship between holding period 
returns and an industry-adjusted measure of environmental performance. They in fact, 
find evidence of a negative relationship between financial return and a more pro-active 
measure of environmental performance.  
Wagner et al. (2002) examine the relationship between the environmental and 
economic performance of firms in the European paper manufacturing industry. It 
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initially discusses possible functional relationships between environmental and 
economic performance rooted in different theoretical frameworks and links these to 
recent empirical and theoretical analyses of the Porter hypothesis. Following this, it 
reports the results of an empirical study carried out in the European paper industry. 
Findings of the study fit better with ‘traditionalist’ reasoning about the relationship 
between environmental and economic performance, which predicts the relationship to be 
uniformly negative.  
Sarkis and Cordeiro (2001) investigate separately the differential relationships 
between pollution prevention and end-of-pipe efficiencies, with a short-run financial 
performance which is measured using return on sales (ROS). After controlling for both 
firm size and financial leverage, the authors find that for 482 US firms in 1992, pollution 
prevention and end-of-pipe efficiencies are both negatively related to ROS, and that this 
negative relationship is larger and more significant for pollution prevention efficiencies. 
These findings contradict studies that argue waste minimization, recycling, 
remanufacturing, and other environmental practices, will greatly enhance the “bottom-
line” for organisations.  
As mentioned earlier, the traditional view among scholars regarding 
environmental protection, is that it comes at an additional cost imposed on firms, which 
may weaken their global competitiveness. This traditional paradigm was challenged by 
Professor Michael Porter (Porter, 1991) and his co-author Claas van der Linde (Porter 
and van der Linde, 1995). Based on case studies, the authors suggest that pollution is 
often a waste of resources, and that a reduction in pollution may lead to an improvement 
in the productivity where the resources are used. More stringent but properly designed 
environmental regulations (in particular, market-based instruments such as taxes or cap-
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and-trade emissions allowances) can “trigger innovation that may partially or more than 
fully offset the costs of complying with them” in some instances (Porter and van der 
Linde, 1995). This view is famously known as the Porter Hypothesis. 
Albertini (2013) suggests that although the relationship between corporate 
environmental performance and financial performance has received a high degree of 
attention in research literature, the results of these studies are still contradictory. This 
article integrates prior research studying this relationship, and identifies the potential 
moderators that may have played a role in the apparent inconsistent results observed to 
date. They conduct a meta-analysis of 52 studies over a 35-year period that confirms a 
positive relationship between environmental performance and financial performance. 
Moderators’ analysis reveals that the relationship is significantly influenced by the 
environmental and financial performance measures, the regional differences, the activity 
sector, and the duration of the studies.  
Song et al. (2017) examine the relationship between environmental management 
and financial performance of Chinese listed firms from 2007 to 2011. Results of the 
study indicate that environmental management is significantly positively related to 
financial performance in the following year, implying that environmental management 
can significantly improve future profitability. However, as environmental investment 
consumes capital and resources, results indicate that environmental management is not 
significantly related to improved financial performance in the current year – rather, it 
will improve the financial performance in the following year.  
Salama (2005) argues that conventional estimates of the relationship between 
corporate environmental performance and corporate financial performance, are not very 
robust as they are typically based on simple ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. In 
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this paper, the author tests whether this relationship holds using median regression 
analysis that is more robust to the presence of outliers and unobserved firm 
heterogeneity. Based on panel data of 239 British companies, the study finds that the 
relationship between corporate environmental performance and corporate financial 
performance, is stronger when median regression is used.  
Stefan and Paul (2008) aim to review empirical evidence of improvement in 
environmental performance causing improvement in economic or financial performance. 
Their findings suggest that improvement in environmental performance is likely to help 
businesses improve their financial performance, either by increasing revenue or by 
reducing costs.  
Improvement in environmental performance may help increase in revenue by:    
a) Providing firms, selling to the public sector and other businesses, better access to 
certain markets. b) Helping firms to differentiate their products given that credible 
information about the environmental features of the product is available, consumers are 
willing to pay, and there is barrier to imitation and c) helping firms to sell pollution 
control technologies when firms already have R&D facilities.  
Improvement in environmental performance can help in cost reduction for  
a) industries that are highly regulated and scrutinized by the public, such as chemical, 
energy, pulp and paper, metallurgy, etc. b) firms that have a flexible production process 
c) firms that are in highly competitive industries where optimization of resources is 
important d) firms that are in industries where market-based environmental policies are 
implemented and d) firms that already have R&D facilities. 
Improvement in environmental performance can also help in reducing the cost of 
capital for firms with shares traded on stock markets. It can also help in reducing the 
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cost of labour for firms whose emissions may affect their workers’ health, who seek to 
attract young, well-educated workers, and which are located in areas where sensitivity to 
environmental concerns is important.  
Drawing on the resource-based view of the firm, Russo and Fouts (1997) posit 
that environmental performance and economic performance are positively linked, and 
that industry growth moderates the relationship, with the returns to environmental 
performance higher in high-growth industries. They test these hypotheses with an 
analysis of 243 firms over two years, using independently developed environmental 
ratings. Results indicate that "it pays to be green", and that this relationship strengthens 
with industry growth. 
On the other hand, Elsayed and Paton (2005) conduct static and dynamic panel 
data analysis of the link between the environmental performance of 227 UK firms, and 
their financial performance. The results of the study imply that environmental 
performance has a neutral impact on firm performance. This finding is consistent with 
theoretical work suggesting that firms invest in environmental initiatives until the point 
where the marginal cost of such investments equals the marginal benefit. 
Iwata and Okada (2011) examine the effects of environmental performance on 
financial performance using data from Japanese manufacturing firms from 2004 to 2008.  
The authors consider two different environmental issues of waste emission and 
greenhouse gas emissions, as proxies for environmental performance. In addition, to 
clarify how each financial performance responds to a firm's effort in dealing with 
different environmental issues, they utilise many financial performance indices 
reflecting various market evaluations. The estimation results of the study show different 
effects of each environmental performance on financial performance. Waste emissions 
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do not generally have significant effects on financial performance. On the other hand, 
greenhouse gas reduction leads to an increase in financial performance in the whole 
sample and in clean industries, although it does not have significant effects on financial 
performance in dirty industries. Furthermore, as the firm growth rate increases, the 
partial effects of waste emissions on financial performance decrease, whereas the partial 
effects of greenhouse gas emissions on financial performance increase. 
 
4.3.2 Relationship between carbon performance and financial performance 
Similar to the relationship between environmental performance and financial 
performance, existing literature have produced conflicting results regarding the 
relationship between carbon performance and financial performance. However, in the 
case of the relationship between carbon performance and financial performance, the 
majority of the studies predict a positive relationship while a few predict a negative and 
mixed or no relationship.    
Ennis et al. (2012) analyses the relationship between emissions performance and 
financial performance of FTSE 350 companies over the period 2006-2009. They find a 
positive relationship between changes in emissions and changes in revenue. This means, 
if carbon emission increases and therefore carbon performance decreases, revenue will 
increase. They find that emissions levels are not presently drivers of stock prices. They 
also find that the financial market is not yet responsive to the carbon performance of 
companies.  
Using carbon emissions data for 2006 to 2008 that S&P 500 firms disclosed 
voluntarily, Matsumura et al. (2013) predict and find a negative association between 
carbon emissions and firm value. They find that the capital markets integrate both 
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carbon emissions and the act of voluntary disclosure of this information into their firm 
valuations. The markets penalize all firms for their carbon emissions; firms that do not 
disclose their carbon emissions face a further penalty for non-disclosure.  
The study by Wang et al. (2014) focuses on the relationship between GHG 
emissions and financial performance in Australia. Based on the 2010 GHG emission 
dataset from 69 Australian public firms listed on the ASX 200, the authors propose new 
linear regression models to investigate the relationship between GHG emissions and 
Tobin's Q. After carefully controlling for the effect of a number of variables on firm-
level financial performance, they find that Tobin's Q is positively related to GHG 
emissions in Australia. Increase in GHG emission would decrease carbon performance. 
So, the findings of this study prove a negative relationship between financial 
performance and carbon performance. Such a positive relationship between corporate 
financial performance and GHG emissions advocates the win–lose reasoning argued in 
the literature, that money spent on GHG reductions would possibly harm firm 
competitiveness. 
On the other hand, Boiral et al. in their 2012 study, aim to propose an integrated 
model of the determinants of corporate strategies to reduce GHG emissions and their 
impacts on environmental and economic performance, based on a survey of 319 
Canadian manufacturing firms. They argue that the analysis of the relationship between 
carbon emissions and corporate performance is polarised around two main approaches: 
(i) the win-lose approach and (ii) the win-win approach. The first approach suggests that 
the efforts that companies make to reduce their carbon emissions lead to costs that are 
detrimental to their competitiveness. By contrast, the second approach suggests that 
reductions to carbon emissions increase firm competitiveness and thus sustainable 
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competitive advantage. The results of the study, show that, in Canada, the industrial 
firms most committed to tackling climate change tend to have better financial 
performance than other firms. This confirms, in broad terms, the hypothesis of a win-
win relationship between the commitment to reduce GHG emissions and financial 
performance.  
Gallego-Álvarez et al. (2015) analyse the impact of the variation in carbon 
dioxide emissions on financial and operational performance. By using international data 
consisting of 89 companies for the period 2006 to 2009, the findings show a reduction in 
emissions that generate a positive impact on financial performance. Overall, this 
research shows that companies promote greater environmental behavior in order to 
obtain higher financial performance.   
Wang et al. (2016) in their study attempt to investigate the relation between 
carbon performance and financial performance. They use a sample of US S&P 500 
corporations and use emissions reduction to measure carbon performance and Tobin’s Q 
to measure financial performance. The results show a positive relation between carbon 
performance and financial performance. In addition, they find firms with better financial 
performance tend to be more transparent in carbon disclosure. The authors also argue a 
higher degree of correlation between carbon performance and financial performance 
indicates that managers who have financial and social obligations and who have chosen 
carbon projects have not only improved firm green image but have also generated 
tangible economic benefit for their organizations. 
Nishitani et el. (2014) analyse how a firm’s management of greenhouse gas 
emissions affects its economic performance. They use the theoretical model from Cobb– 
Douglas production and inverse demand functions, which predict that in conducting 
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GHG emissions management, a firm will enhance its economic performance because it 
promotes an increase in demand for its output and improves its productivity.  The results 
of the study which uses panel data on Japanese manufacturing firms during the period 
2007–2008, support the view that a firm’s GHG emissions management enhances a 
firm’s economic performance through an increase in demand and improvement in 
productivity - however, the latter effect is conditional. Although a firm’s efforts to 
maintain lower GHG emissions improves productivity, efforts to reduce GHG emissions 
further, does not always improve it, especially for energy-intensive firms. Because firms 
attempting to maintain lower GHG emissions are more likely to improve their 
productivity, there is a possibility that firms with high GHG emissions can also enhance 
economic performance by reducing their emissions in the long term, even if additional 
costs are incurred. In addition, better GHG emissions management increases the demand 
of environmentally conscious customers because a product’s life cycle GHG emissions 
in the upper stream of the supply chain influence those in the lower stream, and 
customers evaluate the suppliers’ GHG emissions management in terms of green supply-
chain management. 
Nishitani and Kokubu (2012) examine the influence of firms' reductions of 
greenhouse gas emissions on firm value, measured by Tobin's Q. In this study, the 
authors argue that if the stockholders/investors regard the reduction of GHG emissions 
as a form of intangible value, the reduction of GHG emissions will enhance firm value. 
To prove this relation more precisely, they analyse not only the effect of the reduction of 
GHG emissions on firm value but also that of the market discipline imposed by the 
stockholders/investors in terms of the reduction of GHG emissions. Using data on 641 
Japanese manufacturing firms in the period 2006-2008, the study finds that firms with 
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strong market discipline imposed by stockholders/investors, are more likely to reduce 
GHG emissions, and consequently, firms that reduce more GHG emissions are more 
likely to enhance firm value. 
Griffin et al. (2012) analyse US and Canadian companies’ disclosures of 
greenhouse gas emissions to the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) over a number of 
years. This study analyses the relationship between voluntary greenhouse gas emission 
disclosures and company stock price. The stock price analysis generates two key 
findings: one, that greenhouse gas emission levels associate negatively with stock price, 
although the valuation effects are more incrementally more pronounced for S&P 500 
versus TSE 200 companies and, two, that the negative valuation effects are stronger for 
emission-intensive industries such as utilities, energy, and materials. 
Delmas and Nairn-Birch (2011) conduct an empirical analysis based on a 
longitudinal database including over 1100 US firms across a range of industries for the 
period 2004-2008. This study investigates the impact of greenhouse gas emissions on 
corporate financial performance, and develops complementary hypotheses based on 
accounting and market based corporate performance measures, to represent a short-term 
and long-term perspective on financial performance. Their results reveal that increasing 
carbon emissions positively impact financial performance when using accounting-based 
measures such as ROA, while it has a negative impact on market-based measures of 
financial performance such as Tobin’s Q. This implies that carbon performance is 
negatively related to financial performance when it is measured by ROA, while carbon 
performance is positively related to financial performance when it is measured by 
Tobin’s Q.  
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Hart and Ahuja (1996) analyse the relationship between emission reductions and 
firm performance by using data from US firms obtained from Standard and Poor's 500 
list for 1989 to 1992 and found no unanimity among emission reductions and operational 
and financial performance. 
 
4.3.3 Summary of previous studies dealing with the relationship between 
environmental performance/carbon performance and financial performance  
While the majority of the studies suggest a positive relationship between 
environmental performance/carbon performance and financial performance, a large 
number of studies predict a negative relationship as well. Jaggi and Freedman (1992) 
predict that in the short run, pollution performance is negatively associated with 
economic performance and that the markets do not reward good pollution performance. 
Cordeiro and Sarkis (1997) demonstrate a significant negative relationship between 
environmental pro-activism and industry analyst earnings-per-share. Filbeck and 
Gorman (2004) find evidence of a negative relationship between financial return and a 
more pro-active measure of environmental performance. Sarkis and Cordeiro (2001) find 
that pollution prevention and end-of-pipe efficiencies are both negatively related to 
ROS. Ennis et al. (2012) find if carbon emission increases and therefore carbon 
performance decreases, revenue will increase. They also find that emissions levels are 
not presently drivers of stock prices. According to them, the financial market is not yet 
responsive to the carbon performance of companies.  
Matsumura et al. (2013) predict and find a negative association between carbon 
emissions and firm value. They observe that markets penalise all firms for their carbon 
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emissions. Wang et al. (2014) find that when measured by Tobin’s Q, financial 
performance is negatively related to carbon performance.  
On the other hand, Porter and van der Linde (1995) suggest that improvement in 
environmental performance may lead to an improvement in productivity and can trigger 
innovation that may partially or more than fully offset the costs of complying with them 
in some instances, and therefore, will improve the financial performance of the firm. 
Albertini (2013) and Salama (2005) confirm a positive relationship between 
environmental performance and financial performance. Stefan and Paul (2008) suggest 
that improvement in environmental performance is likely to help businesses improve 
their financial performance either by increasing revenue or by reducing costs. Russo and 
Fouts (1997) posit that environmental performance and economic performance are 
positively linked, and that industry growth moderates the relationship, with the returns to 
environmental performance higher in high-growth industries. Song et al. (2017) indicate 
that as environmental investment consumes capital and resources, environmental 
management is not significantly related to improved financial performance in the current 
year - rather it will improve the financial performance in the following year.  
Boiral et al. (2012) predict two possible relationships between carbon 
performance and financial performance: the win-lose approach and win-win approach. 
Findings of their study confirm a win–win relationship between the commitment to 
reduce GHG emissions and financial performance. Gallego-Álvarez et al. (2015) show 
that reduction in emissions, which would improve carbon performance, generates a 
positive impact on financial performance of a company.  Wang et al. (2016) show a 
positive relation between carbon performance and financial performance. Nishitani et el. 
(2014) support the view that a firm’s GHG emissions management enhances a firm’s 
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economic performance through an increase in demand and improvement in productivity. 
Nishitani and Kokubu (2012) suggest that if the stockholders/investors regard the 
reduction of GHG emissions as a form of intangible value, the reduction of GHG 
emissions will enhance firm value. Griffin et al. (2017) found that if carbon performance 
improves, stock price also increases and vice versa. Delmas and Nairn-Birch (2011) 
suggest that carbon performance is negatively related to financial performance when it is 
measured by ROA while carbon performance is positively related to financial 
performance when it is measured by Tobin’s Q.  
 
 
4.4 Interrelationship between carbon performance and financial 
performance 
This study could not find any existing study that investigates the interrelationship 
between carbon performance and financial performance. However, it found two studies 
that deal with the interrelation between environmental performance and financial 
performance. Nakao et al. (2007) perform statistical analyses of five years’ financial 
data from approximately 300 listed firms of Japan as well as the results of the Nikkei 
environmental management surveys. Nikkei environmental management survey is an 
annual survey that assesses the environmental management of Japanese companies and 
recognizes initiatives toward sustainability in terms of both environment and business 
management. The study finds that firm’s environmental performance has a positive 
impact on its financial performance and vice versa. However, this tendency for positive 
two-way interactions appears to be only a relatively recent phenomenon. The tendency 
for realising the positive two-way interactions is not limited to the top-scoring firms in 
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terms of both financial and environmental performance. On the contrary, this is also a 
trend that can be observed fairly generally among the firms covered by the Nikkei 
environmental management surveys. Indices such as ROA, earnings per share and 
Tobin’s Q are all useful in representing the financial performance of the firms. Earnhart 
and Lizal (2006) analyse the effects of ownership structure on corporate environmental 
performance, and examine the relationship between financial performance and 
environmental performance by using an unbalanced panel of Czech firms from 1993 to 
1998. Their analysis provides evidence that greater profitability improves environmental 
performance by allowing a firm to generate internal financial resources that may be used 
for emission-reducing investments. 
 
4.5 Relationship between carbon disclosure and financial performance 
This study could not find any major existing research that investigates the 
relationship between carbon disclosure and financial performance. Even the relationship 
between environmental disclosure/corporate social performance disclosure, and financial 
performance are not well researched. The limited research that have been done in this 
area have produced conflicting results. Belkaoui (1976) examines the stock market 
reaction to pollution disclosure made in annual reports. The study finds that the stock 
market return of firms that disclosed environmental information yields higher returns 
than those firms that did not. Some researchers such as Berman et al., 1999; Brammer 
and Pavalin (2006); Weber et al. (2008) and Tang et al. (2012), argue that there should 
be a positive relationship between the disclosure of Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR) performances and company financial performances. The reasoning is that by 
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reporting and improving their CSR work, companies can receive the reputation as good 
company citizens, thus can attract investors as well as other stakeholders. The results of 
a study by Chen et al. (2015) show that improved corporate social performance as well 
as more transparent disclosures of corporate social performance would have a strong 
relationship with improving the internal utilisation of financial resources of the 
companies. But such corporate social performance and its disclosures, are not 
necessarily improving the company's external financial performances.  
 
On the other hand Freedman and Jaggi (1988) examine the association between 
the extent of pollution disclosure and economic performance of firms belonging to four 
highly polluted industries - namely paper and pulp, oil refinery, chemical and steel. 
Ratios are used to measure economic performance. The results of the study indicate that 
there is no association between the extensive of pollution disclosure and economic 
performance. 
 
4.6 Relationship between carbon disclosure/carbon performance and 
agency cost 
There are only a few studies that investigate the relationship between disclosure 
and agency cost. Existing literature that deals with this relationship are discussed below: 
As explained before, the agency relationship between managers and owners lead to 
information asymmetry problem because managers can access information more than 
shareholders. According to Barako et al. (2006), voluntary disclosure is used by 
managers as a means of mitigating the agency problem, whereby they disclose more 
voluntary information to reduce the agency costs. Voluntary disclosure is also used as a 
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means to convince the external users that managers are acting in an optimal way 
(Watson et al., 2002). Borghei-Ghomi and Leung (2013), opine that GHG voluntary 
disclosure can be regarded as a means by which firms can reduce information 
asymmetry about GHG and the subsequent agency costs. Results of their study find a 
positive association between the level of GHG voluntary disclosure, firm size and 
corporate governance. In other words, it could be inferred that disclosing firms seek to 
reduce information asymmetry and the subsequent agency costs. According to Gray et 
al. (1995) management has superior information than outsiders, regarding the firms’ 
operations. Investors demand information for monitoring contracts with companies and 
assessing companies’ valuation. As a result, firms will be motivated to disclose 
information voluntarily as disclosure may help them to obtain resources on the best 
terms and conditions. Richardson and Welker (2011) argue that as per agency theory, the 
information asymmetry increases agency costs. Hence, companies may voluntarily 
choose to disclose information to reduce both information asymmetry and agency costs. 
This study could not find any existing research that investigates the relationship between 
carbon performance and agency cost. 
 
4.7 Trends in the improvement of carbon disclosure and carbon 
performance  
There is lack of research that studies the trends in improvement of carbon 
disclosure and carbon performance by businesses over the years. The available studies 
are discussed below:  
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Choi et al. (2013) analyse the corporate reaction of Australia’s largest 100 companies 
over the period of 2006 to 2008 when the Australian government announced a series of 
regulations with regard to carbon emission disclosure. Over their study period, the 
percentage of Australian companies providing meaningful information on environmental 
factors including carbon emissions had increased substantially from 42% to 67%. In 
addition, the quality of that information had also improved in all areas including 
assessments of risks and opportunities provided by climate change, detailed disclosures 
of carbon emissions, quantification of energy consumption from different sources, 
strategies to reduce carbon emissions, and proper accountability for climate change 
strategies. The study also reveals that during the study period 1) the number of 
companies acknowledging and identifying the risk of climate change has doubled 2) 
firms disclosing strategies to achieve a reduction of future carbon emissions has almost 
doubled. 3) The number of companies reporting information of the change in carbon 
emissions almost trebled and 4) details of carbon emission accountability increased 
almost fivefold. Industries showing most significant changes in the disclosure quality, 
included Materials, Consumer Staples, Industrials, Financial, and Consumer 
Discretionary.  The results also showed that larger firms with higher profitability tend to 
make more quality disclosures. 
The study by Kolk et al. (2008) aims to study corporate responses towards 
climate change related to the development of reporting mechanisms for greenhouse 
gases, in particular, carbon disclosure. Analysis of responses of this study indicates that 
CDP has been successful in using institutional investors to ask firms to disclose 
extensive information about their climate change activities. The authors agree that 
response rates in terms of numbers of disclosing firms are impressive and growing. 
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However, neither the level of carbon disclosure that CDP promotes nor the more 
detailed carbon accounting, provide information that is particularly valuable for 
investors, NGOs or policy makers. They also argue that although carbon disclosure as a 
project of commensuration, has achieved some progress in technical terms, it has 
achieved very little in relation to the cognitive and value dimensions. 
Stannay (2013) examines three disclosures (answering the questionnaire, 
disclosing emissions and accounting methodology) made to the CDP by S&P 500 firms, 
for the years 2006 through 2008. The frequencies of the three disclosures increased from 
2006 to 2008. The disclosure patterns over the three years suggest that firms’ disclosures 
are routine since once most firms begin to make a disclosure, they continue to do so. The 
estimations found that the most significant factor in a firm’s subsequent disclosure 
(answering, emissions, and accounting) is its previous disclosure. For the two 
disclosures, answering the questionnaire and emissions, that have higher frequencies 
during the period, the regulatory proxy is not significant. The finding that the majority of 
firms answer the questionnaire, but do not disclose their emissions or how they account 
for these emissions, supports and contributes to the legitimacy literature, which predicts 
that a firm will answer the questionnaire, but not disclose its GHG emissions or how it 
accounts for them. By answering the questionnaire, a firm avoids scrutiny, a primary 
motivation for disclosing according to the Legitimacy Theory. In particular, when a firm 
answers the questionnaire, it deters the possibility of being targeted by a shareholder 
resolution. By making selective disclosures, that is answering the questionnaire, but not 
disclosing emissions or accounting methodology, firms circumvent the intent of 
voluntary reporting schemes such as the CDP. The ability to avoid potential costs from 
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voluntary schemes suggests a problem in relying on them to address climate change 
(King and Lenox, 2000).  
Staney and Ely (2008) examine the factors associated with US S&P 500 firms’ 
decision to disclose information requested by institutional investors through CDP about 
the current and projected effects of climate change. The results of the study support 
voluntary disclosure theories. It shows that firms subject to more scrutiny because of 
their size, previous disclosures, and foreign sales, are more likely to respond to the CDP 
questionnaire. During the study period, voluntary disclosure via the CDP questionnaire 
increased from 48 to 58% for S&P 500 firms. Out of the 42% firms who did not answer 
the questions posed by the CDP, 15% responded but declined to provide any 
information, and 22% did not respond all. This lack of response is surprising as the 
institutional investors who requested this information have a large ownership interest in 
these firms. The study does not find that firms in carbon-intensive industries are more 
likely to disclose. It also does not find any positive relation between disclosure and 
investment in new assets. This prompts the authors to believe that while companies may 
be investing in new assets, they might not be investing in assets that minimize carbon 
emissions, or else they would have disclosed this information to institutional investors. 
 
4.7.1 Summary of previous studies dealing with trends in improvement of carbon 
disclosure and carbon performance  
There are insufficient studies that analyse the trends in improvement of carbon 
disclosure over time. Choi et al. (2013) find that over the period of 2006 to 2008 when 
the Australian government announced a series of regulations with regard to carbon 
emission disclosure, the percentage of Australian companies providing meaningful 
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information on environmental factors including carbon emissions, had increased 
substantially from 42% to 67%. Kolk et al. (2008) find that response rates in terms of 
numbers of firms disclosing carbon information to CDP, are impressive and growing. 
Stannay (2013) examines three disclosures (answering the questionnaire, disclosing 
emissions and accounting methodology) made to the CDP by S&P 500 firms for the 
years 2006 through 2008.  The study finds that frequencies of the three disclosures 
increased from 2006 to 2008. Staney and Ely (2008) find that during the study period, 
voluntary disclosure via the CDP questionnaire increased from 48 to 58% for S&P 500 
firms.  
 
4.8 Chapter summary 
This chapter provides a background for this study by discussing existing 
literature that investigates the relationship and interrelationship between environmental 
disclosure/carbon disclosure and environmental performance/carbon performance; 
between environmental performance/carbon performance and financial performance; 
between carbon disclosure and financial performance; between carbon disclosure/carbon 
performance and agency cost and the trends in improvement of carbon disclosure and 
carbon performance. Finding of these studies will be useful in interpreting the results of 
this study. The next chapter will develop the hypotheses of this study. 
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CHAPTER 5 HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
 
5.1 Introduction  
Based on the research gap identified in chapter 4, this chapter develops the 
hypotheses of this study by utilising relevant theories and a number of conceptual 
frameworks developed in this study. These hypotheses will be tested, and the findings of 
the tests will be interpreted in the next chapter. This chapter is structured as below:  
Sections 5.2 to 5.4 develop the first three hypotheses of this study concerning the 
relationship and interrelationship between carbon disclosure and carbon performance. 
Sections 5.5 and 5.6 develop hypotheses that deal with the relationship and 
interrelationship between carbon performance and financial performance. Section 7.7 
develops a hypothesis that predicts a relationship between carbon disclosure and 
financial performance. Sections 5.8 and 5.9 hypothesise relationship between carbon 
disclosure and agency cost and between carbon performance and agency cost. Section 
5.9 hypothesises trends in improvement of carbon disclosure and carbon performance. 
Section 5.10 summarises the chapter.   
 
5.2 Relationship between carbon disclosure and carbon performance 
Limited research has been done to investigate the relationship between carbon 
disclosure and carbon performance and the findings of this research have been largely 
inconclusive. Most of this research has been done for specific countries and on specific 
industries. To address this research gap, this study investigates the relationship between 
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carbon disclosure and carbon performance for the top 500 global companies that include 
all industries except the financial services sector.  
As discussed in the Theoretical Background chapter, socio-political theories such 
as Legitimacy Theory and Stakeholder Theory propose a negative relationship between 
carbon performance and carbon disclosure. These theories predict that business with 
poor environmental performance/carbon performance would make soft and unverifiable 
qualitative disclosure about their performance to maintain legitimacy and to satisfy 
expectations of various stakeholders. Firms must manage the interests of consumers and 
wider society, as well as continue to satisfy their shareholders, and must maintain their 
legitimacy to ensure survival. The greater the perceived importance of shareholders' 
information needs and community concerns to a business, the higher the level of 
environmental/carbon disclosures by the business. Therefore, it can be assumed that 
companies with inferior carbon performance would make more carbon disclosure to 
satisfy important stakeholders and retain their legitimacy as suggested by Stakeholder 
Theory and Legitimacy Theory. Based on these theoretical reasoning of Legitimacy 
Theory and Stakeholder Theory, we can hypothesize that the worse the carbon 
performance of a business, the more carbon disclosure it is likely to make. Therefore, the 
first hypothesis of this study is:    
 
H1 – There is a negative relationship between carbon disclosure and carbon 
performance  
 
In contrast to the theories discussed above, economic based Voluntary Disclosure 
Theory and Signalling Theory, propose a positive relationship between carbon 
disclosure and carbon performance. These theories suggest that companies with good 
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performance are likely to make hard and high-quality verifiable disclosure to signal their 
good quality to investors and to differentiate themselves from companies with ‘bad 
news’ to avoid the adverse selection problem. In the context of these predictions of 
Voluntary Disclosure Theory and Signalling Theory, we can hypothesize that better 
carbon performers will make more disclosure. This gives our second hypothesis as 
below: 
 
H2- There is a positive relationship between carbon disclosure and carbon 
performance 
 
5.3 Interrelationship between carbon disclosure and carbon 
performance 
As discussed before, many studies have investigated the relationship between 
environmental disclosure/carbon disclosure and environmental performance/carbon 
performance. However, to the best of my knowledge, the interrelationship between 
environmental disclosure/carbon disclosure and environmental performance/carbon 
performance, have not been investigated by any prior research. In other words, no study 
so far has attempted to find out whether environmental disclosure/carbon disclosure 
affects environmental performance/carbon performance, and vice versa. For example, 
we know that improved environmental performance/carbon performance may lead to 
higher environmental disclosure/carbon disclosure, but we do not know whether higher 
environmental disclosure/carbon disclosure as a result of improved environmental 
performance/carbon performance in a period, will lead to better environmental 
performance/carbon performance in the next period.  This study would like to address 
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this research gap by investigating whether there is a both-way relationship between 
carbon disclosure and carbon performance.  
The theory that can explain a possible interrelation between carbon disclosure 
and carbon performance is Instrumental Stakeholder Theory. This theory suggests that 
everything else being equal, firms that practice stakeholder management will perform 
better in profitability, stability, growth and other conventional performance terms 
(Donaldson and Preston, 1995. p. 67). 
   In line with the propositions of Stakeholder Theory, we already know that 
companies would voluntarily make carbon disclosure to satisfy their stakeholders. As 
per the propositions of Instrumental Stakeholder Theory, this action by the companies 
(satisfying stakeholders by making voluntary carbon disclosure) consequently is likely 
to improve carbon performance of these companies. When carbon performance of these 
companies improve, they are likely to disclose these information to signal their good 
quality to investors as suggested by Signalling Theory. The following diagram shows the 
relationship: 
 
Figure 5.1 Interrelationship between carbon disclosure and carbon performance 
 
CD  Instrumental Stakeholder Theory CP     Signalling Theory CD  
 
CD = Carbon disclosure   CP = Carbon performance 
 
Source: developed for this study 
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Based on the above arguments, we can predict a two-way positive relationship 
between carbon disclosure and carbon performance where an increase in carbon 
disclosure will improve carbon performance (as predicted by Instrumental Stakeholder 
Theory) and consequently, improved carbon performance will lead to more carbon 
disclosure (as predicted by Signalling Theory). This analysis leads to the next hypothesis 
of this study as below:  
 
H3 - Carbon disclosure and carbon performance influence each other positively.  
 
5.4 Disclosure practices of average carbon performers 
As discussed in the literature review section, prior studies produce vastly 
conflicting findings regarding the relationship between environmental 
performance/carbon performance and environmental disclosure/carbon disclosure. Some 
studies find that superior environmental performers/carbon performers make more 
environmental disclosure/carbon disclosure whereas some other studies find that inferior 
environmental performers/carbon performers make more environmental 
disclosure/carbon disclosure.  However, none of the existing studies predict anything 
about the disclosure practices of firms who are neither superior performers nor inferior 
performers, i.e., firms who can be considered as average carbon performers. This lack of 
previous studies opens up the potential for a new area of research. Therefore, this study 
would like to investigate carbon disclosure practices of average carbon performers. 
As both superior carbon performers and inferior carbon performers make high 
carbon disclosure, we can assume that firms whose carbon performance are neither 
superior nor inferior do not make a high level of carbon disclosure. In other words, 
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businesses with superior carbon performance and inferior carbon performance would 
make significantly more carbon disclosure than businesses with average carbon 
performance. This argument gives rise to the next hypothesis of this study as below:   
 
H4 - Both superior and inferior carbon performers make significantly more carbon 
disclosure than average carbon performers.  
 
5.5 Relationship between carbon performance and financial 
performance 
It is evident from the previous discussion in the literature review section, that the 
relationship between carbon performance and financial performance is a contentious 
issue. There are strong arguments and evidence to support a negative relationship as well 
as a positive relationship between corporate carbon performance and financial 
performance. However, in the recent past, the business environment has changed 
drastically due to the effects of climate change. Climate change and global warming 
have emerged to be one of the most important problems affecting the future of life on 
this planet, and it is by, and large agreed that GHG emissions including carbon dioxide 
(CO2), are the main cause of climate change and global warming.  Business which emits 
GHG is one of the major players that contribute to adverse climate change and global 
warming. There is immense pressure on businesses from different stakeholders, to 
reduce GHG emission and thereby improve their carbon performance. As discussed 
earlier, businesses would incur costs to improve their carbon performance. However, the 
benefit they would get from improvement in carbon performance, especially in the long 
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run, would outweigh the cost. Reductions in carbon emissions would increase firm 
competitiveness and thus sustainable competitive advantage. By GHG emissions 
management, a firm will enhance its economic performance as it promotes an increase in 
demand for its output and improves its productivity.  
Stakeholders of business such as governments, non-governmental organisations, 
local communities, consumers, trading partners, employees, investors, financial agencies 
and stockholders, are conscious of corporate environmental management including GHG 
emission management, especially in developed countries. This would directly or 
indirectly influence the financial performance of business. For example, if a firm emits 
too much CO2 it may have risk of paying for the extra emission in countries that would 
penalise too much CO2 emission, especially in the future. The firm may also suffer from 
a loss of trust and reputation from carbon conscious consumers and other stakeholders. 
Such risks have negative effects on the evaluation of a firm's future profits. On the other 
hand, a firm that actively tries to manage their GHG emission might gain positive 
reputation among some stakeholders and may influence them to expect that the firm will 
succeed in reducing environmental risks and production costs in the long term, and 
thereby would be able to improve its financial performance. Therefore, firms have an 
incentive to address various environmental issues against the backdrop of various 
stakeholders' interests (Salama, 2004).  
The positive relationship predicted between corporate carbon performance and 
financial performance can possibly be explained by the propositions of Stakeholder 
Theory. This theory, which have been discussed in detail before, argues that by 
matching and concentrating on the interests of various stakeholder groups, which will 
lead to their satisfaction, managers can increase the efficiency of their organisation’s 
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adaptation to external demands (Orlitzky et al., 2003). Corporate environmental 
performance is a kind of corporate investment (McWilliams and Siegel, 2001), and as a 
form of corporate investment, it creates opportunities to enhance organisational financial 
performance in the future (Jones, 1995). 
Based on the above arguments coupled with the reasoning of Stakeholder 
Theory, we can predict that improvement of carbon performance of a firm will lead to 
improvement in its financial performance, especially in the long run.  
 
Therefore, the next hypothesis of this study is as below:  
 
 
H5: There is a positive relationship between carbon performance and financial 
performance 
 
5.6 Interrelationship between carbon performance and financial 
performance 
While many studies investigate the relationship between environmental 
performance/carbon performance and financial performance, there is no known research 
that investigates interrelation between carbon performance and financial performance.  
This study has already explained and justified in the previous section that there is a 
positive relationship between carbon performance and financial performance, i.e. 
improved carbon performance of a business would improve its financial performance. 
Now, the study of Nakao et al. (2007) and Earnhart and Lizal (2006), suggest that when 
a firm’s financial performance improves, it can generate additional internal financial 
resources to improve its environmental performance. In other words, improvement in 
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environmental performance of a business would improve its financial performance, and 
consequently, improved financial performance would help to improve its environmental 
performance. As there is no known study that investigates interrelationship between 
carbon performance and financial performance and as carbon performance is a subset of 
environmental performance, we can argue that improvement in carbon performance of a 
firm will lead to improvement in its financial performance, and this improvement in 
financial performance will allow the firm to invest in emission reduction technologies 
and activities which in turn will improve the firm’s carbon performance. This 
relationship is shown in the diagram below:  
 
Figure 5.2 Interrelationship between carbon performance and financial 
performance 
 
     Additional Resources                 CP   
      
 
CP = Carbon performance; FP = Financial performance 
 
Source: developed for this study 
 
The above argument leads to the next hypothesis of the study as below:  
 
H6: Carbon performance and financial performance influence each other positively 
 
CP FP  
90 
 
5.7 Relationship between carbon disclosure and financial performance 
There are numerous studies that deal with the relationship between 
environmental disclosure/carbon disclosure and environmental performance/carbon 
performance. The majority of these studies find a positive relationship between them 
whilst a good number of studies find a negative relationship as well. Similarly, there are 
large number of studies that investigate the relationship between environmental 
performance/carbon performance and financial performance. In this case also, there are 
conflicting results. Whilst the majority of the studies find a positive relationship between 
environmental performance/carbon performance and financial performance, many 
studies propose a negative relationship. However, there is no known research that 
investigates if and how environmental disclosure/carbon disclosure affects the financial 
performance of a firm. It would be useful for stakeholders of businesses, if the 
relationship between environmental disclosure/carbon disclosure and carbon 
performance could be established.  Therefore, this study would like address this research 
gap by finding out how carbon disclosure of a business affects its financial performance.  
In Section 5.3, this study has already explained and justified that, as per the 
proposition of Instrumental Stakeholder Theory, if a firm performs stakeholder 
management, for example, by making voluntary carbon disclosure, carbon performance 
of the firm is likely to improve. On the other hand, section 5.5 of this study explained 
and justified that improved carbon performance of a firm is likely to improve its 
financial performance. Considering these two arguments, we can suggest that carbon 
disclosures will positively affect firms’ future carbon performance. This improved 
carbon performance then, will positively affect the firm’s financial performance. If 
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carbon disclosure of a firm positively affects its carbon performance, and carbon 
performance positively affects its financial performance, then we can argue that carbon 
disclosure of a business will positively affect its financial performance. This predicted 
relationship is show in the diagram below: 
 
 
Figure 5.3 Relationship between carbon disclosure and financial performance 
 
 
 
 
 
        
 
   
 
 
 
Source: developed for this study 
 
 
The above arguments lead to the next hypothesis of the study as below: 
 
H7: There is a positive relationship between carbon disclosure and financial 
Performance   
 
 
Carbon disclosure Carbon performance  
 
Carbon performance Financial performance  
Carbon disclosure Financial performance  
 
92 
 
5.8 Relationship between carbon disclosure and agency cost 
As discussed before, Agency Theory suggests that businesses would use 
voluntary disclosure to reduce information asymmetry problems between owners and 
managers which subsequently would help them to reduce agency cost. Agency Theory 
has been used by several studies in the disclosure literature to explain voluntary 
reporting practices. They suggest that disclosure is a means by which companies can 
reduce the conflict between owners (principals) and managers (agents), and 
subsequently decrease the agency costs. If we apply this principles to explain the 
relationship between carbon disclosure and agency cost, we can suggest that if carbon 
disclosure of a firm increases, its agency cost will decrease. Therefore, we can 
hypothesis that:  
 
H8: There is a negative relationship between carbon disclosure and agency cost 
 
5.9 Relationship between carbon performance and agency cost 
To the best of my knowledge, there is no known study that investigates the 
relationship between environmental performance/carbon performance and agency cost. 
It has already been mentioned before that the divergence of action due to incomplete 
alignment of the interests of agents and principals may lead to an agency problem. The 
sacrifice of wealth by the principal and potential costs associated with monitoring the 
agents is known as the agency cost. It has also been discussed and hypothesized in 
section 5.8 (hypothesis 8), that there is a negative relationship between carbon disclosure 
and agency cost i.e., if carbon disclosure of a firm increases, its agency cost will 
decrease. On the other hand, in section 5.3 of this study, it has been argued and 
93 
 
hypothesised (hypothesis 3) that carbon disclosure and carbon performance influence 
each other positively, i.e. better carbon performance will lead to higher carbon 
disclosure, and increased carbon disclosure will subsequently improve the firm’s carbon 
performance.    
From hypotheses 3 and 8, we can predict two sets of relations. 1) If carbon 
disclosure of a business improves, its carbon performance will subsequently improve 
and 2) On the other hand, if a business increases its carbon disclosure, its agency cost 
will decrease. Therefore, combining these two arguments, we can predict that if carbon 
performance of a business improves, its agency cost will decrease. The following 
diagram depicts these relationships:  
 
Figure 5.4 Relationship between carbon performance and agency cost 
 
Source: developed for this study 
 
The above arguments give rise to the next hypothesis of this study as below: 
 
H9: There is a negative relationship between carbon performance and agency cost 
 
Carbon disclosure  Carbon performance  
 
Carbon disclosure Agency cost  
 
Carbon performance    Agency cost  
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5.10 Trends in improvement of carbon disclosure and carbon 
performance over time 
Due to increases in regulatory pressure, ever increasing voluntary disclosure 
channels and their desire to legitimise their operations, as per Legitimacy Theory, it can 
be assumed that carbon emission disclosure by business would increase overtime. On the 
other hand, there is no known research that studies the trends in improvement of carbon 
performance, i.e. there is a lack of empirical research that tries to find out whether 
carbon performance of business has improved over the years. Therefore, this study 
would like to find out if carbon disclosure and carbon performance of businesses has 
improved over the years. This gives our last hypothesis as below:   
 
H10: There is an improvement of both carbon disclosure and carbon performance by 
businesses over time  
 
 
5.11 Chapter summary 
This chapter utilises the research gaps identified in chapter 4, the propositions of 
relevant theories, and several conceptual frameworks developed in this study to 
formulate hypothesis for this study. Firstly, Socio Political and Economic Based 
Theories are used to develop the first two hypotheses of this study, that propose 
relationships between carbon disclosure and carbon performance. The next section of 
this study uses relevant theories and a conceptual framework developed for this study, to 
develop a hypothesis that predicts interrelationship between carbon disclosure and 
carbon performance. This chapter then develops hypothesis related to disclosure 
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practices of average carbon performers. The next part of the chapter uses relevant 
theories and a conceptual framework developed for this study, to develop hypotheses 
that predict relationship and interrelationship between carbon performance and financial 
performance. The next section of this study hypothesise a relationship between carbon 
disclosure and financial performance based on a conceptual framework developed for 
this study. This study then utilises relevant theories to hypothesise a relationship 
between carbon disclosure and agency cost. Based on a conceptual framework 
developed for this study, the next section develops a hypothesis relating carbon 
performance and agency cost. The final section of this chapter proposes a hypothesis 
related to the trends of improvement in carbon disclosure and carbon performance over 
the study period. Hypotheses formulated in this chapter, will be tested by regression 
models that will be developed in the next chapter.    
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CHPATER 6 RESEARCH METHOD 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter outlines the methods used in this study to test the hypotheses 
developed in previous chapter. This chapter is organized as below: Section 6.2 and 6.3 
explain the research sample selection process. Section 6.4 shows the process of selecting 
and measuring the dependent and independent variables. Section 6.5 outlines the 
methods used to select the control variables for this study, which are used to control the 
regression results. Section 6.6 outlines the models used in this study to test its 
hypotheses. Finally, section 6.7 summarises the chapter.  
 
6.2 Sample period   
This study intends to examine the relationship among carbon disclosure, carbon 
performance, financial performance and agency cost, for the world’s largest 500 firms 
that participated in the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) questionnaire survey over the 
years 2011 to 2015. It also intends to study the trends in improvement of carbon 
disclosure and carbon performance over the same period. There are multiple reasons for 
choosing this study period. The data related to carbon disclosure and carbon 
performance of the firms were collected from the CDP database. CDP scoring 
methodology was developed in 2008. Initially, it focused on disclosure scores only. CDP 
started reporting carbon performance scores from 2010. However, during 2010, the 
response rate from companies were not very high. Since 2011, for most of the 
companies whose disclosure scores were available, their performance scores were also 
97 
 
available. Therefore, the sample period for this study starts in 2011. When I started 
collecting data for this study, full data set was available until the end of 2015.  
Therefore, the duration of the study ends in 2015.  
 
6.3 Sample selection 
The targeted sample for this study are the largest 500 firms worldwide (referred 
to as Financial Times Global 500 firms) who participated in CDP during the period 2011 
to 2015. These 500 firms are chosen from the FTSE Global Equity Index Series as of 31 
December 2015. They are also referred to as G500. These firms were ranked as the 
biggest in terms of sales and have a market capitalisation of US $32,387 billion. The 
companies are ranked by market capitalisation. The greater the stock market value of a 
company, the higher it’s ranking (Financial Times, 2015).  
There are multiple reasons for choosing the G500 firms. An important reason is 
that these firms responded to CDP carbon disclosure and carbon performance 
questionnaire during the study period of 2011 to 2015. CDP is a non-profit organisation, 
which represents 534 institutional investors worldwide. CDP was launched in 2000. 
Since 2003, it started requesting information relevant to climate change from more than 
3,700 firms across the world. This information includes the identification of carbon and 
climate change–associated risks and opportunities; the actions taken by firms to manage 
and adapt to these risks and opportunities; carbon and greenhouse gas emissions, 
actions, and strategies that have been and are taken to mitigate carbon emissions and 
finally governance strategies adopted by firms to deal with carbon and climate change 
matters. Hence, the CDP’s database is the most comprehensive database of carbon and 
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climate change–related information that is publicly available (Griffin et al., 2017; 
Matsumura et al., 2013).   
Another reason for choosing G500 firms, is their impact on the economies where 
they perform their operations (Jose and Lee, 2007). Some prior research such as 
Clarkson et al. (2008) and Patten (2002), have identified small sample size and the 
context as the reasons for their studies’ mixed results. Therefore, a large sample like 
G500, which includes a wide range of industries and countries, may be able to overcome 
these limitations. 
From G500 firms, financial firms have been excluded, as their business does not 
involve substantial carbon emission. To be included in the sample, firms should have 
both a carbon disclosure score and a carbon performance score available, for each of the 
years between 2011 and 2015. So, after excluding financial companies and companies 
whose carbon disclosure score and carbon performance scores are missing in any of the 
years between 2011 to 2015, the final sample constitutes 189 firms. Sample firms have 
been classified as per the Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS). The following 
table shows the distribution of sample firms based on the GICS as on 31 December 
2015.  
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Table 6.1 Distribution of sample firms by sector 
Sector No of firms Percentage 
Consumer Discretionary 25 13.23 
Consumer Staples 28 14.81 
Energy 20 10.58 
Health Care 23 12.17 
Industrials 30 15.87 
Information Technology 22 11.64 
Materials 17 8.99 
Telecommunication Services 14 7.41 
Utilities 10 5.29 
Total  189 100 
  
Figure 6.1 Sector-wise distribution of sample firms 
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Out of 189 sample companies 91 belong to North America, 52 belong to the 
European Union, 22 belong to the United Kingdom, 22 are from the countries of Asia-
Pacific, and from the remaining four, 2 are from Brazil and another 2 are from South 
Africa. The following table shows the breakdown:  
 
Table 6.2 Distribution of sample firms by regions 
Region No. of 
firms 
Percentage 
North America 91 48 
European Union 52 28 
Asia-Pacific 22 12 
United Kingdom 20 11 
Others 4 2 
Total 189 100 
 
Data sources 
The source of carbon disclosure and carbon performance scores is the CDP 
database. Financial performance in this study is measured by Return on Asset (ROA) 
and Tobin’s Q, and agency cost is measured by Expense Ratio (ER) and Asset 
Utilisation Ratio. Data to measure financial performance, agency cost and control 
variables, are collected from Thomson Reuters Datastream database.  
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6.4 Measurement of dependent and independent variables 
This study uses carbon disclosure, carbon performance, financial performance 
and agency cost, as dependent and independent variables. These variables are used 
sometimes as dependent variables and at other times as independent variables, 
depending on the requirement of the hypothesis being tested. This study uses CDP 
Carbon Disclosure Scores as the proxy for carbon disclosure, and CDP Carbon 
Performance Scores as the proxy for carbon performance for the sample companies. 
CDP prepares Carbon Disclosure Scores and Carbon Performance Scores based on its 
climate change scoring methodology. Scoring was developed in 2008 and initially 
focused on carbon disclosure. Carbon performance scores were started in 2011. CDP 
scoring is closely aligned with its mission to work with market forces to motivate 
companies to disclose their impacts on the environment and natural resources and take 
action to reduce negative impacts. CDP uses a scoring methodology that incentivise 
companies to measure and manage environmental impacts through participation in 
CDP’s climate change, water, forests and supply chain programs. The scoring 
methodology is a means to assess the responder's progress towards environmental 
stewardship as communicated through the company's CDP response. The methodology 
ultimately yields a score based on the evaluation. The scoring methodology assess the 
level of detail and comprehensiveness in a response, as well as the company's awareness 
of environmental issues, and its management methods.  
The scoring methodology provides a disclosure score, which assesses the level of 
detail and comprehensiveness in disclosure, and a performance score, which assesses the 
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level of action taken on climate change evidenced by the company's CDP response. The 
methodology for both the scores is presented below.  
 
6.4.1 Measurement of CDP carbon disclosure scores 
Disclosure scores are expressed as a number between 0 and 100. The disclosure 
score represents the potential quality in completeness of disclosure and hence it’s likely 
usefulness to data users. The disclosure score is a matrix of comprehensiveness of the 
responses, good internal data management and understanding of climate change issues 
and is a measure of complete transparency on climate change. However, it is important 
to understand that disclosure score is not a measure of how green or sustainable a 
company is.  
In general, the number of points allocated to each question asked in CDP 
questionnaire, which is filled in by the respondent companies on a voluntary basis, 
depends on the amount of data requested. Some questions have more than one point 
attached to a single piece of information where the information is of particularly high 
importance, e.g. the gross global Scope 1 emissions figure. Questions which allow text 
responses are usually judged according to how many of the required data points they 
achieve. At the end of scoring, the number of points a company has been awarded (the 
numerator) is divided by the maximum number that could have been awarded (the 
denominator). The fraction is then converted to a percentage by multiplying it by 100 
and rounded to the nearest whole number as below:  
 
(Points awarded / points attainable) x 100 = Disclosure Score 
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A low disclosure score is not necessarily an indicator of poor performance, but it 
suggests a company has insufficient information based on which a judgment of 
performance can be made. 
 
6.4.2 Measurement of CDP carbon performance score 
Performance points are awarded when a company highlights that it is 
undertaking or has undertaken a positive climate change action. Performance points are 
awarded for evidence provided in the CDP response of actions considered to contribute 
to climate change mitigation, adaptation and transparency. Actions considered to be 
more fundamental to progress on combating climate change, are awarded more points. 
External verification/assurance of emissions data is rewarded under the performance 
scoring, as it is considered that this potentially increases the usefulness of the 
information to decision makers, and can act as a pre-qualifier of the data submitted that 
should be recognized when evaluating performance. The performance score is solely 
based on activities and positions disclosed in CDP questionnaire, that is filled in by 
respondent companies on a voluntary basis. It therefore, does not consider actions not 
mentioned in CDP response. To receive a performance score, a company must achieve a 
minimum disclosure score of 50. This is to ensure that the judgment is based on 
sufficient information. Performance scores are converted to percentages in a similar way 
to the disclosure score percentage is generated. The percentages are then grouped into 
bands of A, A-, B, C, D, E, with A being the best. The numeric equivalent for A and A- 
is same. The difference between an A and A- band is whether the company has made to 
the A list for two years or not. Below are the numeric equivalents (score out of 100) of 
the performance bands for the years 2012-2015. The numeric equivalents for 2011 were 
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slightly different. However, for the sake of simplicity this study uses only 2012-15 
scoring methodology.  
 
Performance Band Numeric Equivalents 
(score out of 100) 
A and A- 86-100 
B 61-85 
C 41-60 
D 21-40 
E 0-20 
 
As letter bands are difficult to use in statistical analysis, they have been 
converted to numeric values in this study. To find a numeric equivalent of a letter band, 
the upper and lower range of the scores of a letter band has been divided by 2 and then 
rounded to the nearest whole number. For example, the numeric equivalent of A and A- 
= (86+100) / 2 = 93. Similarly other letter bands B, C, D and E have been converted to 
numeric equivalents.  
Several previous studies use CDP scores as a measure for carbon disclosure and 
carbon performance for their sample firms. Ennis et al. (2012) in their study, analyses 
the relationship between emissions performance and financial performance of FTSE 350 
companies over the period 2006-2009, and uses CDP data to measure emission 
performance.  In the study titled “Carbon disclosure, carbon performance, and cost of 
capital”, He et al. (2013) use CDP scores in measuring carbon disclosure and carbon 
105 
 
performance for their sample firms. Luo and Tang (2014) also use CDP data to examine 
the relationship between voluntary carbon disclosure and carbon performance. Cotter 
and Najah (2012) in their study entitled “Institutional investor influence on global 
climate change disclosure practices”, use CDP scoring methodology to calculate 
disclosure scores.  
 
 6.4.3 Measurement of Financial performance 
Return on Asset (ROA) and Tobin’s Q are used as proxies for financial 
performance in this study. Several previous studies use ROA and Tobin’s Q as measures 
for financial performance. ROA is calculated by dividing a company's annual earnings 
by its total assets. It is an indicator of how profitable a company is relative to its total 
assets. It gives an idea as to how efficient management is at using its assets to generate 
earnings. On the other hand, Tobin's Q or the Q ratio, is the ratio of the market value of a 
company's assets (as measured by the market value of its outstanding stock and debt) 
divided by the replacement cost of the company's assets (book value).  ROA is an 
accounting based measures of a firm’s financial performance, while Tobin’s Q is a 
market based measures of a firm’s financial performance (Horváthová, 2010). Both 
ROA and Tobin’s Q have been chosen as proxies for financial performance in this study, 
so that we can examine the relationship between carbon performance and both 
accounting based measures of a firm’s financial performance, as well as its market based 
measure of financial performance.  
Delmas and Nairn-Birch (2011) and Busch and Hoffmann (2011) use both ROA 
and Tobin’s Q to measure financial performance. They find that carbon performance is 
negatively related to financial performance when it is measured by ROA, whilst it is 
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positively related to financial performance when it is measured by Tobin’s Q. Jaggi and 
Freedman (1992) use ROA to measure economic performance while evaluating the 
impact of pollution performance of pulp and paper firms in the United States on their 
economic and market performance. Hart and Ahuja (1996) use ROA as a measure of 
firm performance, in order to analyse the relationship between emission reductions and 
firm performance of US firms during the period 1989 to 1992. Russo and Fouts (1997) 
also use ROA as proxy for economic performance, in their study to examine relationship 
between environmental performance and economic performance. Nakao et al. (2007) 
uses ROA to measure financial performance while examining the relationship between 
environmental performance and financial performance of Japanese corporations. 
Gallego-Álvarez et al. (2015) in their study titled “Carbon emission reduction: the 
impact on the financial and operational performance of international companies”, use 
ROA to measure financial performance.  
On the other hand, several studies explore the relationship between 
environmental performance/carbon performance and financial performance, using 
Tobin’s Q as an indicator for financial performance. For example, Nishitani and Kokubu 
(2012) use Tobin’s Q to measure firm value while examining the relationship between 
the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and firm value. Similarly, Wang et al. (2014) 
in their study to determine the relationship between GHG emissions and financial 
performance in Australia, use Tobin’s Q to measure financial performance.  
 
6.4.4 Measurement of agency cost 
As mentioned earlier in literature review section, the sacrifice of wealth by the 
principal (owners of the business) and potential costs associated with monitoring the 
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agents (manager of the business), is known as the agency cost. Agency cost is measured 
by Expense Ratio (ER) and Asset Utilization Ratio (AUR) (Rashid, 2015). Expense 
Ratio (ER) is the ratio of operating expenses (selling, general, and administrative 
expenses, excluding financing expenses and any non-recurring expenses, such as losses 
on the sale of assets) to total annual sales (Ang et al., 2000). It measures how effectively 
a firm’s management controls operating costs. According to Ang et al. (2000, p. 82), 
‘this measure captures excessive expenses including perk consumption’. The second 
measure of agency cost is the Asset Utilization Ratio (AUR), or the Asset Turnover 
Ratio. It is the ‘proxy for the loss in revenues attributable to inefficient asset utilization’ 
(Ang et al., 2000, p. 82). It is calculated as the ratio of annual sales to total assets. It is an 
efficiency ratio. It measures how effectively a firm’s assets are employed (Ang et al. 
2000). A low ER indicates that the management is controlling the operating expenses 
and vice versa, whereas a low AUR indicates that the management is using the assets in 
a non-cash flow generating venture and vice versa (Singh and Davidson III 2003). 
 
6.5 Selection and measurement of control variables 
A number of control variables are used in the hypotheses testing process because 
of their potential impact on the dependent variables. The following section explains 
these variables and justifies the reasons for their selection as control variables based on 
review of relevant literature.   
 
Firm Size: Most voluntary disclosure studies control for a firm’s size as a key 
determinant of disclosure level. There are two primary reasons that explain the 
108 
 
relationship between voluntary disclosure and firm size. Large firms have the resources 
to disseminate detailed information, and these firms are susceptible to a high degree of 
public scrutiny (Liu and Anbumozhi, 2009; Stanny and Ely, 2008).  Studies such as 
Clarkson et al. (2008); Cormier et al. (2005); Freedman and Jaggi (2005); Liu and 
Anbumozhi (2009), and Stanny and Ely (2008), support the opinion that voluntary 
disclosure is positively associated with firm size. Recent studies such as Prado-Lorenzo 
et al. (2009), find that a firm’s size positively influences its disclosure of GHG 
emissions information. Choi et al (2013) find in their study, that large firms will engage 
more actively in voluntary carbon reporting since they are more visible and also have 
more resources to prepare comprehensive disclosures. In this study, firm size is 
measured as a natural logarithm of total asset value measured as of the end of fiscal year. 
A number of previous studies such as Clarkson et al. (2008) and Sutantoputra et al. 
(2012) and King and Lenox (2001), use natural logarithm of total assets as a proxy for 
firm size.  
 
Leverage: A number of studies use leverage to control for voluntary disclosures. 
Agency costs of debt are higher for firms with relatively more debt in their capital 
structure (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The reason for using leverage to control 
disclosure, is that firms with high leverage adopt accounting policies that allow them to 
disclose detailed information about their financial, environmental or social performance. 
This behavior can be attributed to those fact that firms with high leverage would try to 
avoid agency costs which may be imposed by creditors (Clarkson et al., 2008), or they 
would try to keep particular stakeholders (investors, creditors) informed in order to 
avoid debt-covenants’ breaches (Freedman and Jaggi, 2005). Therefore, firms with high 
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leverage are more likely to provide detailed information about their carbon emissions 
and climate change–related risks and opportunities. For this study, leverage is calculated 
as a percentage of total debt to total capital.  
 
Firm age: Firm age has been used to control environmental performance by de Villiers 
et al (2011). According to Mohana-Neill, (1995) older firms are more likely to possess 
the necessary infrastructure to manage environmental issues at a lower cost. Similarly, 
Huergo and Jaumandreu (2004) argue that older firms are more likely to engage in 
environmental activities. Similar to previous studies such as Wagner and Schaltegger 
(2004), firm age, for this study, has been calculated as the natural logarithm of the age of 
the firm, starting from the year it was established until the end of 2015.  
 
Growth opportunities: Growth opportunity has been used as a proxy for future growth. 
It is measured as ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity (Gaver and 
Gaver, 1993; Smith and Watts, 1992).  Al-Tuwaijri et al. (2004) argue that as this ratio 
measures the difference between the market’s appraisal of firm value and the estimate of 
value aggregated accounting transactions, growth opportunities should be positively 
related to economic performance. They also use growth as a proxy for intangible assets 
associated with innovation (Porter and van der Linde, 1995a), and therefore, argue that 
growth is positively related to environmental performance as well. 
 
Capital intensity: Clarkson et al (2008) argue that firms with newer, cleaner 
technologies are likely to have a superior environmental performance measure, and it is 
reasonable to assume that they will want stakeholders to know about this superior 
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environmental performance in discretionary disclosure channels. For similar reasons, 
firms with higher sustaining capital expenditures are expected to have newer equipment 
and may want to signal their environmental type through more discretionary disclosures 
regarding their environmental performance. It is calculated by dividing total capital 
spending by total sales revenue of a company, for a particular year.  
 
Carbon intensity:  Carbon intensity is used as a control variable as firms operating in 
carbon-emission-intensive industry are subject to more climate change legislation and 
regulations, and their carbon disclosure tends to be more open. A binary code of ‘1’ or 
‘0’, will be used to indicate industry classification. A firm will receive a score of ‘1’ if it 
is considered to be operating in a carbon intensive industry such as materials, energy and 
utilities. Firms from other industries are not considered carbon intensive and hence 
awarded a score of ‘0’ (Luo and Tang, 2014). 
 
Dividend yield and dividend payout per share: Dividend yield and dividend payout 
per share have been used in this study to control for corporate financial performance and 
carbon performance. Numerous studies have shown relationship between dividend 
payment and corporate financial performance. Denis and Igor (2008) examine cross-
sectional and time-series evidence on the propensity to pay dividends, in several 
developed financial markets over the period 1989–2002. Their study find that the 
likelihood of paying dividends is associated with firm size, growth opportunities, and 
profitability and the propensity to pay dividends is higher among larger, more profitable 
firms.  
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Myers and Frank (2004) empirically examine the data for a sample of 483 firms 
taken from the Multex Investor Database, to assess the impact of selected financial 
variables on the dividend decision. The study uses the firm's dividend payout ratio as the 
dependent variable to represent the dividend decision. The Price Earnings Ratio and 
sales growth related positively to the dividend payout ratio. Labhane and Mahakud 
(2016), examine the determinants of dividend payout ratio for Indian companies during 
the period 1994–1995 to 2012–2013. From the trend analysis carried out, the authors 
found that the larger and profitable firms have high dividend payout ratio. Petra et al. 
(2012) examine the determinants of corporate dividend policy of listed firms in Greece. 
The analysis is based on 945 firm year observations of 63 nonfinancial firms which paid 
dividends annually from 1993 to 2007. The authors find that size, profitability and 
liquidity factors increase the probability to pay dividends. 
While firm profitability affects dividend distribution, profitability itself is 
affected by the business’s environmental performance. For instance, Richardson et al. 
(1999) suggest that socially and environmentally responsible companies are more 
profitable. The reasons are (1) companies that voluntary engage in social and 
environmental behaviour may avoid the adverse effect of future regulatory costs on their 
future cashflows. Social and environmental projects undertaken by firms are seen as 
self-regulation acts undertaken (2) it is argued that customers accept more 
environmentally sensitive products. Consumers will vote with their money and choose to 
pay more for a product sold by firms that support a social and environmental cause for 
which they have an affinity. As dividend distribution is related to corporate financial 
performance and corporate financial performance is affected by the business’s 
environmental performance, we can argue that there is a relationship between corporate 
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carbon performance and dividend distribution. The dividend yield expresses the 
dividend per share as a percentage of the share price. On the other hand, dividend payout 
per share = dividends per share / earnings per share * 100.  
 
6.6 Models used in this study 
All hypotheses that are developed in chapter 5 are tested using Ordinary Least 
Square (OLS) regressions. The following models are developed in this study: 
 
Relationship between carbon disclosure and carbon performance: 
To test hypotheses 1 and 2 which examines the relationship between carbon 
disclosure and carbon performance, this study uses the following model:  
CD i,t  = α + β1 CP i,t  + β2 SIZE i,t  + β3 LEV i,t  + β4 CAPIN i,t  + β5 AGE i,t  + β6 GROWTHi,t  
+ β7 CINT i,t  + β8 DIVYIELD i,t  + β9 DIVPAY i,t  + εi,t      (1) 
 
 
Interrelation between carbon disclosure and carbon performance: 
To test hypothesis 4 which tries to determine the interrelationship between carbon 
disclosure and carbon performance, the following models are used:  
 
CP i,t  = α + γ1 CD(-1) i,t  + γ2 SIZE i,t  + γ3 LEV i,t  + γ4 CAPIN i,t  + γ5 AGE i,t  +  
γ6 GROWTH i,t + γ7 CINT i,t  + γ8 DIVYIELD i,t  + γ9 DIVPAY i,t  + εi,t  (2) 
 
 
CD i,t  = α + γ1 CP(-1) i,t  + γ2 SIZE i,t  + γ3 LEV i,t  + γ4 CAPIN i,t  + γ5 AGE i,t  +  
γ6 GROWTH i,t  + γ7 CINT i,t  + γ8 DIVYIELD i,t  + γ9 DIVPAY i,t  + εi,t  (3) 
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Relationship between carbon performance and financial performance: 
To test hypothesis 5, which examines the relationship between carbon performance and 
financial performance, the following regression models have been used: 
 
When financial performance is measured by ROA, the below model is used: 
 
ROA i,t  = α + β1 CP i,t  + β2 SIZE i,t  + β3 LEV i,t  + β4 CAPIN i,t  + β5 AGE i,t  +  
β6 GROWTH i,t  + β7 CINT i,t  + β8 DIVYIELD i,t  + β9 DIVPAY i,t  + εi,t  (4) 
 
When financial performance is measured by Tobin’s Q, the below model is used: 
 
TOBINSQ i,t  = α + β1 CP i,t  + β2 SIZE i,t  + β3 LEV i,t  + β4 CAPIN i,t  + β5 AGE i,t   
+ β6 GROWTH i,t + β7 CINT i,t  + β8 DIVYIELD i,t  + β9 DIVPAY i,t  + εi,t (5) 
 
Interrelation between carbon performance and financial performance:  
To test hypothesis 6, which addresses the interrelation between carbon disclosure and 
carbon performance, the following regression models are used: 
 
When financial performance is measured by ROA:  
 
ROA i,t  = α + γ1 CP(-1) i,t  + γ2 SIZE i,t  + γ3 LEV i,t  + γ4 CAPIN i,t  + γ5 AGE i,t  +  
γ6 GROWTH i,t  + γ7 CINT i,t  + γ8 DIVYIELD i,t  + γ9 DIVPAY i,t  + εi,t  (6) 
 
 
CP i,t  = α + γ1 ROA(-1) i,t  + γ2 SIZE i,t  + γ3 LEV i,t  + γ4 CAPIN i,t  + γ5 AGE i,t  +  
γ6 GROWTH i,t  + γ7 CINT i,t  + γ8 DIVYIELD i,t  + γ9 DIVPAY i,t  + εi,t  (7) 
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When financial performance is measured by Tobin’s Q: 
 
TOBINSQ i,t  = α + γ1 CP(-1) i,t  + γ2 SIZE i,t  + γ3 LEV i,t  + γ4 CAPIN i,t  + γ5 AGE i,t   
+ γ6 GROWTH i,t  + γ7 CINT i,t  + γ8 DIVYIELD i,t  + γ9 DIVPAY i,t  + εi,t  (8) 
 
CP i,t  = α + γ1 TOBINSQ(-1) i,t  + γ2 SIZE i,t  + γ3 LEV i,t  + γ4 CAPIN i,t  + γ5 AGE i,t  +  
γ6 GROWTH i,t  + γ7 CINT i,t  + γ8 DIVYIELD i,t  + γ9 DIVPAY i,t  + εi,t  (9) 
 
 
Relationship between carbon disclosure and financial performance:  
To test hypothesis 7, which examines the relationship between carbon disclosure and 
financial performance, the following regression models are used: 
When financial performance is measured by ROA:  
 
ROA i,t  = α + β1 CD i,t  + β2 SIZE i,t  + β3 LEV i,t  + β4 CAPIN i,t  + β5 AGE i,t  +  
β6 GROWTH i,t  + β7 CINT i,t  + β8 DIVYIELD i,t  + β9 DIVPAY i,t  + εi,t   (10) 
 
When financial performance is measured by Tobin’s Q: 
 
TOBINSQ i,t  = α + β1 CD i,t  + β2 SIZE i,t  + β3 LEV i,t  + β4 CAPIN i,t  + β5 AGE i,t  +  
β6 GROWTH i,t  + β7 CINT i,t  + β8 DIVYIELD i,t  + β9 DIVPAY i,t  + εi,t  (11) 
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Relationship between carbon disclosure and agency cost:  
To test hypothesis 8, which addresses the relationship between carbon disclosure and 
agency cost, the following regression models are used: 
 
When agency cost is measured by Expense Ratio: 
 
ER i,t  = α + β1 CD i,t  + β2 SIZE i,t  + β3 LEV i,t  + β4 CAPIN i,t  + β5 AGE i,t  + β6 GROWTHi,t  
+ β7 CINT i,t  + β8 DIVYIELD i,t  + β9 DIVPAY i,t  + εi,t       (12) 
 
When agency cost is measured by Asset Utilization Ratio: 
AUR i,t  = α + β1 CD i,t  + β2 SIZE i,t  + β3 LEV i,t  + β4 CAPIN i,t  + β5 AGE i,t  +  
β6 GROWTH i,t  + β7 CINT i,t  + β8 DIVYIELD i,t  + β9 DIVPAY i,t  + εi,t  (13) 
Relationship between carbon performance and agency cost:  
To test hypothesis 9, which addresses the relationship between carbon performance and 
agency cost, the following regression models are used: 
When agency cost is measured by Expense Ratio: 
 
ER i,t  = α + β1 CP i,t  + β2 SIZE i,t  + β3 LEV i,t  + β4 CAPIN i,t  + β5 AGE i,t  + β6 GROWTH i,t  
 + β7 CINT i,t  + β8 DIVYIELD i,t  + β9 DIVPAY i,t  + εi,t       (14) 
 
When agency cost is measured by Asset Utilisation Ratio: 
 
AUR i,t  = α + β1 CP i,t  + β2 SIZE i,t  + β3 LEV i,t  + β4 CAPIN i,t  + β5 AGE i,t  + β6 
GROWTH i,t  + β7 CINT i,t  + β8 DIVYIELD i,t  + β9 DIVPAY i,t  + εi,t   (15) 
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Trends in improvement of carbon disclosure and carbon performance overtime: 
To test hypothesis 10, which intends to examine the trends in improvement of carbon 
disclosure and carbon performance over the study period, the following regression 
models are used: 
 
To examine improvement of carbon disclosure over time: 
 
CD i,t  = α + β1T2 i,t  + β2T3 i,t  + β3T4 i,t  + β4T5 i,t  + β5 SIZE i,t  + β6 LEV i,t  + β7 CAPIN i,t   
+ β8 AGE i,t  + Β9 GROWTH i,t  + β10 CINT i,t  + β11 DIVYIELD i,t   
+ β12 DIVPAY i,t  + εi,t                  (16) 
 
To examine improvement of carbon performance over time: 
 
CP i,t  = α + β1T2 i,t  + β2T3 i,t  + β3T4 i,t  + β4T5 i,t  + β5 SIZE i,t  + β6 LEV i,t  + β7 CAPIN i,t   
+ β8 AGE i,t  + Β9 GROWTH i,t  + β10 CINT i,t  + β11 DIVYIELD i,t   
+ β12 DIVPAY i,t  + εi,t                 (17) 
Where:  
CD i,t  = CDP carbon disclosure score for firm i for year t 
CP i,t  = CDP carbon performance score for firm i for year t 
SIZE i,t  = Firm size for firm i for year t. It is measured as natural logarithm of total asset 
value 
LEV i,t  = Leverage for firm i for year t. It is measured as the ratio of total debt to total 
assets 
CAPIN i,t  = Capital intensity for firm i for year t. It is measured as the ratio of capital 
spending divided by total sales revenues  
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AGE i,t  = Firm age for firm i for year t. It is measured as the natural log of total number 
of years since the firm was established. 
GROWTH i,t  = Growth opportunity for firm i for year t. It is measured as ratio of market 
value of equity to book value of equity as a proxy for future growth opportunities  
CINT i,t  = Carbon intensity for firm i for year t. Firms operating in a carbon-intensive 
industry (materials, energy or utilities) are assigned a value of 1 and other firms are 
assigned a value of 0.  
DIVYIELD i,t  = Dividend yield for firm i for year t. It is measured as the ratio of 
dividend per share to share price 
 
DIVPAY i,t  = Dividend payout for firm i for year t. It is measured as dividend payout per 
share. It is calculated as Dividends per share / Earnings per share * 100 
 
ROA i,t  = Return on Asset for firm i for year t. It is calculated by dividing a company's 
annual earnings by its total assets. 
TOBINSQ i,t  = Tobin’s Q for firm i for year t. It is the ratio of the company stock market 
value to the total assets book value for the company.   
ER i,t  = Expense Ratio for firm i for year t. It is the ratio of operating expenses (selling, 
general, and administrative expenses, excluding financing expenses and any non-
recurring expenses, such as losses on the sale of assets) to total annual sales.  
AUR i,t  = Asset Utilisation Ratio for firm i for year t. It is calculated as the ratio of 
annual sales to total assets 
α = intercept 
β/γ = Regression coefficient 
ε = error term 
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T = current fiscal year 
T-1 = previous fiscal year 
T1 = fiscal year 2011 
T2 = fiscal year 2012 
T3 = fiscal year 2013 
T4 = fiscal year 2014 and  
T5 = fiscal year 2015 
 
Dummy variables: 
Industry sectors and time have been used as dummy variables to control for 
industry and time effects. The sample companies are divided into nine sectors such as: 
Consumer Discretionary, Consumer Staples, Energy, Health Care, Industrials, 
Information Technology, Materials, Telecommunication Services and Utilities.   
 
6.7 Chapter Summary 
This chapter outlines the methodologies used in this research and justifications 
for using them. Firstly, this chapter discusses the sample selection process followed by 
the data sources and justification for using these sources. Secondly, it discusses how this 
study measures its dependent, and independent variables. The dependent and 
independent variables are carbon disclosure, carbon performance, financial performance 
and agency cost. Thirdly, this chapter discusses the control variables, how these 
variables are measured and the theoretical reasoning for using them. Finally, the 
regression models which are used in this study to test its hypotheses are stated. The next 
chapter conducts data analysis and interprets the results.  
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CHAPTER 7 DATA ANALYSIS, RESULTS AND 
INTERPRETATION 
7.1 Introduction  
The objectives of this chapter are to analyse and interpret the relationship 
between carbon disclosure and carbon performance; between carbon performance and 
financial performance; between carbon disclosure and financial performance; between 
carbon disclosure and agency cost and between carbon performance and agency cost. 
This chapter also aims to investigate any trends in improvement of carbon disclosure and 
carbon performance during the study period. These analyses are done for both full 
sample and region wise. However, most of the similar research in this area (for example: 
Cotter & Najah, 2012) have termed region-wise analysis as country-wise analysis. To 
keep consistency with previous studies, the term country has been used to mean region 
in this study. This chapter provides the multiple regression results from the tests 
conducted to test the hypotheses of this study. This chapter also conducts normality, 
multicollinearity and heteroscedasticity tests to validate the data and the regression 
models used in this study. This chapter is organized as below:  
Section 7.2 provides the descriptive statistics of this study. Section 7.3 provides 
the diagnostics test used to validate the data and regression models used in this research.  
Section 7.4 analyses and interprets relationship and interrelationship between carbon 
disclosure and carbon performance. Section 7.5 analyses and interprets the relationship 
and interrelationship between carbon performance and financial performance. Section 
7.6 investigates the relationship between carbon disclosure and financial performance. 
The relationship between carbon disclosure and agency cost and between carbon 
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performance and agency cost is analysed and interpreted in Section 7.7. Section 7.8 
conducts a trend analysis to investigate any improvement for carbon disclosure and 
carbon performance over the study period. Section 7.9 summarizes the chapter. All 
hypotheses in the study have been tested both for full sample and country-wise.  
 
7.2 Descriptive statistics 
The purpose of this section is to provide the descriptive statistics for the variables 
used in this study. It provides descriptive statistics for full sample as well as country-
wise. 
 
7.2.1 Descriptive statistics for dependent, independent and control variables 
The following table displays the descriptive statistics for dependent, independent 
and control variables for the full sample, for the entire study period (years 2011–2015).  
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Table 7.1 Descriptive statistics for dependent, independent and control variables 
  N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Carbon Disclosure 944 50.00 100.00 85.81 12.87 
Carbon Performance 944 10.00 93.00 66.55 21.07 
Return on Asset (%) 945 -148.37 51.24 10.42 9.78 
Tobin’s Q  945 0.00 8.13 1.57 1.05 
Expense Ratio 945 0.00 0.82 0.25 0.17 
Asset Utilisation ratio 945 0.11 4.49 0.78 0.51 
Firm Size 945 8.72 12.86 10.68 0.77 
Firm Age 945 0.00 5.86 3.96 8.51 
Growth Opportunity  945 -7003.03 4139.18 35.40 351.07 
Dividend Yield (%) 945 0.00 16.55 2.87 1.81 
Dividend Payout per share 945 0.00 99.67 38.54 26.83 
Capital Intensity 945 0.00 0.93 0.10 0.11 
Carbon Intensity 945 0.00 1.00 0.25 0.43 
Leverage  945 0.00 83.87 24.98 13.34 
 
 
As per the above table, the mean of carbon disclosure score for the whole sample 
is 85.81 out of 100. As discussed in previous chapter, carbon disclosure score represents 
the potential quality in completeness of disclosure and hence it’s likely usefulness to 
data users. The disclosure score is a matrix of comprehensiveness of the responses, good 
internal data management and understanding of climate change issues and is a measure 
of complete transparency on climate change.  Therefore, an average score of 85.81 
indicate that the data disclosed by sample companies are of high quality and are useful to 
the uses. It also indicates that the sample companies have good level of understanding 
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about climate change related issues and they are disclosing a good amount of data 
related to their climate change activities. Carbon disclosure score ranges from a 
minimum of 50 to a maximum of 100 among the sample companies. Only those 
companies who have a minimum of 50 in disclosure scores are selected in this study, as 
companies who get less than 50 are not awarded performance score. Therefore, the 
minimum disclosure score of 50 and maximum of 100 indicate huge variation in the 
extent of carbon disclosure made by the sample firms. 
The mean of carbon performance score for the whole sample is 66.87 out of 100, 
which is less than the mean of carbon disclosure score. Carbon performance scores are 
awarded to companies for evidence provided in the CDP response of actions considered 
to contribute to climate change mitigation, adaptation and transparency.  Therefore, the 
average score of 66.87 indicate above average carbon performance by the sample 
companies. The minimum carbon performance score is 10 and maximum is 93. This 
suggest a huge variation among sample companies in regards to their carbon 
performance. Return on asset has a mean of 10.42%. Minimum ROA from the sample 
companies is -148.37% and maximum is 31.24%.  Tobin’s Q has a mean of 1.57% with 
a minimum of 0.00% and a maximum of 8.13%. Minimum expense ratio for the sample 
firms is 0.00 while the maximum is 0.82. It has a mean of 0.25. Asset utilization ratio 
ranges from 0.11 to 4.49 with a mean of 0.78.  
 
7.2.2 Country-wise descriptive statistics for major variables 
The following table displays the country-wise descriptive statistics for major 
variables for the entire study period (years 2011-2015).  
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Table 7.2 Country-wise descriptive statistics for major variables  
 
Panel A: Carbon disclosure score 
Region N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
North America 455 50 100 84.25 13.25 
EU 259 50 100 88.15 13.01 
UK 100 53 100 86.106 10.99 
Asia-Pacific 110 54 100 85.48 12.32 
 
Panel B: Carbon performance score 
North America 455 10 93 62.83 21.42 
EU 259 10 93 72.34 20.72 
UK 100 10 93 70.7 19 
Asia-Pacific 110 10 93 66.13 19.39 
 
Panel C: Financial Performance measured by ROA 
North America 455 -148.37 38 11.63 11.34 
EU 259 -8.29 51.24 9.92 8.5 
UK 100 -13.65 32.37 9.18 7.33 
Asian-Pacific 110 -12.53 21.42 7.8 6.08 
 
Panel D: Financial Performance measured by Tobin’s Q 
North America 455 0 6.21 1.8 1 
EU 259 0.23 8.13 1.49 1.32 
UK 100 0.54 2.84 1.37 0.63 
Asia-Pacific 110 0.15 2.47 1.07 0.5 
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The above table presents country wise descriptive statistics for major variables. 
Panel A shows that European Union firms have the highest scores in carbon disclosure 
with a mean of 88.15, followed by UK (88.15) and Asia-Pacific (85.48). North 
American firms have the lowest carbon disclosure score with an average score of 84.25. 
This is consistent with CERES (2007) and Doran and Quinn (2009) which suggest that 
US firms are behind their counterparts in reporting their exposure to climate change and 
carbon emissions.  
Panel B shows that EU firms have the best carbon performance scores with an 
average score of 72.34 followed by UK (72.34) and Asia-Pacific (66.13). Similar to 
carbon disclosure scores, North American firms have the worst carbon performance 
scores with a mean of 62.83. Therefore, we can see that better carbon performers make 
more carbon disclosure. This is consistent with studies such as Peng et al. (2015) and 
 
Panel E: Agency cost measured by Expense Ratio 
North America 455 0 0.82 0.26 0.16 
EU 259 0 0.55 0.26 0.15 
UK 100 0 0.79 0.26 0.24 
Asia-Pacific 110 0.01 0.76 0.21 0.14 
 
Panel F: Agency cost measured by Asset Utilization Ratio 
North America 455 0.11 4.49 0.82 0.6 
EU 259 0.3 2.17 0.76 0.37 
UK 100 0.26 1.43 0.66 0.24 
Asia-Pacific 110 0.17 2.71 0.81 0.52 
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Cotter and Najah (2012), who predict a positive association between carbon performance 
and carbon disclosure.  
Panel C and D indicate that North American firms have the best financial 
performance both in terms of ROA and Tobin’s Q. Asia and Pacific has the worst 
financial performance. This suggests that carbon performance and financial performance 
are negatively associated. This is consistent with many studies such as Jaggi and 
Freedman (1992) and Wang et al. (2014).  
Panel E shows average Expense Ratios of firms from different regions. Firms 
from North America, EU and UK have an average of 0.26 Expense Ratio, whilst Asia-
Pacific has an average Operating Ratio of 0.21. As mentioned earlier, Expense Ratio 
(ER) is the ratio of operating expenses (selling, general, and administrative expenses, 
excluding financing expenses and any non-recurring expenses, such as losses on the sale 
of assets) to total annual sales. It measures how effectively a firm’s management controls 
operating costs. Therefore, we can say that companies from Asia-Pacific region are more 
effective in controlling operating costs than companies from other regions.  
Panel F illustrates the Asset Utilization Ratio (AUR) of companies from different 
regions. North American firms have the highest average AUR followed by Asia-Pacific, 
EU and UK. As discussed before, AUR is calculated as the ratio of annual sales to total 
assets. It measures how effectively a firm’s assets are employed. Therefore, we can 
suggest that North American firms are most effective in utilizing their assets followed by 
Asia-Pacific, EU and UK. 
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7.3 Diagnostic tests  
As explained before, the hypotheses of this study are primarily tested by using 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) multiple regression model.  To perform statistical 
analysis, it is necessary that the regression models used in a study meet the assumptions 
of statistical analysis, such as:   
 
1. Normality  
2. Multicollinearity  
3. Heteroscedasticity.  
 
To validate the data and models used in this study Normality, Multicollinearity and 
Heteroscedasticity tests have been done. The results are discussed below: 
 
7.3.1 Normality Test 
The normality assumption requires that observations be normally distributed in 
the population. Although Coakes and Steed (2001) argue that violations of normality are 
of little concern when the sample size is large (greater than 30). The Residual 
Test/Histogram-Normality Test carried out for all the models used in this study produce 
bell-shaped curves which confirms that the data used in this study are normally 
distributed.  
 
7.3.2 Multicollinearity test 
Multicollinearity refers to high correlations among the independent (or 
explanatory) variables. In other words, multicollinearity is present in a data set when the 
explanatory variables are significantly correlated with one another. When a high degree 
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of correlation is found among explanatory variables, these variables must be removed. 
For all the models used in this study, the correlation coefficients among the independent 
(or explanatory) variables are very small (less than 0.50 or negative). Furthermore, the 
Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) of all the variables are less than 2, while it is argued 
that VIFs of more than 10 are an indication of Multicollinearity (Dielman, 2001; 
Gujarati, 2003; Hills and Adkins, 2003). Therefore, we can conclude that there is no 
multicollinearity in any of the models used in this study. 
 
7.3.3 Heteroscedasticity test 
The heteroskedasticity assumption requires that the variance of the error be 
constant across observations (all levels of explanatory variables) or that the residuals of 
the dependent variables be approximately equal or constant. In other words, the data 
points will be spread uniformly across the regression line. If the plots of standardized 
residuals (ZRESID) against the standardized predicted value (ZPRED) of a model 
appear as a funnel or curve shape, it indicates evidence of heteroskedasticity in the 
model. The Chi squared statistics and corresponding p value of the Breusch–Pagan–
Godfrey test can also find out whether there heteroskedasticity is present in a model. 
Presence of heteroskedasticity has been checked in all models of this study. Whenever 
heteroskedasticity has been found in any model it has been corrected by using the 
correction technique for unknown heteroskedasticity proposed by White (1980). 
  
128 
 
7.4 Empirical results for the relationship and interrelationship between 
carbon disclosure and carbon performance  
There are three objectives of this section. Firstly, this section would like to 
analyse and interpret the relationship between carbon disclosure and carbon performance 
(H1 and H2). Secondly, it would like to analyse and interpret the interrelationship 
between carbon disclosure and carbon performance (H3), and thirdly, it would like to 
analyse carbon disclosure practices of average carbon performers (H4).   
 
7.4.1 Regression results for the relationship between carbon disclosure and carbon 
performance for H1 and H2  
This section analyses the relationship between carbon disclosure, carbon 
performance and control variables. Table 7.3 (panel A) shows the regression results 
between carbon disclosure and carbon performance and between carbon disclosure and 
the control variables. The t tests are presented in the parentheses in this table and in all 
subsequent relevant tables. The regression results from this table indicate that there is 
significant positive relations between carbon disclosure and carbon performance at 1% 
significance level. This means firms with better carbon performance would make more 
carbon disclosure. This result supports hypothesis 2 which proposes a positive 
relationship between carbon performance and carbon disclosure. This finding is in 
congruence with the economics-based theories (Voluntary Disclosure Theory and 
Signalling Theory) which suggest firms with good performance are likely to disclose 
more information to signal their good quality to investors, and to differentiate 
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themselves from companies with ‘bad news’ to avoid the adverse selection problem 
(Clarkson et al, 2008; Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Peng et al., 2015; Cotter & Najah 2012).  
After testing the control variables, the regression results show that carbon 
disclosure is significantly positively related to company size and growth opportunities 
(both at 5% significance level) and negatively related to dividend yield (at 1% 
significant level). Other explanatory variables such as leverage, capital intensity, firm 
age, carbon intensity and dividend payout, do not have any significant influence on firm 
carbon disclosure. 
These results imply that larger firms would make more carbon disclosure than 
smaller firms.  This finding is supported by numerous studies which suggest that large 
firms have the resources to disseminate detailed information, and these firms are more 
visible and are susceptible to a high degree of public scrutiny (Liu & Anbumozhi, 2009; 
Stanny & Ely, 2008; Clarkson et al., 2008; Cormier et al., 2005; Freedman & Jaggi 
2005; Prado-Lorenzo et al., 2009; Choi et al, 2013). These results also imply that there is 
a significant positive relationship between firm’s carbon disclosure and its growth 
opportunity, i.e. firms with higher growth opportunities would make more carbon 
disclosure. This finding is supported by Dhaliwal et al. (2011) and Wang (2017). In 
regards to the relationship between carbon disclosure and dividend yield, the results 
suggest that companies with higher dividend yield, i.e. those who pay more dividend per 
share, make less carbon disclosure and vice versa. This result contradicts previous 
studies such as Richardson et al. (1999) who suggest that socially and environmentally 
responsible companies are more profitable and therefore, are likely to pay more 
dividend.  Needless to say, the analysis results from Table 7.3 do not support  
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hypothesis 1 which proposes a negative relationship between carbon disclosure and 
carbon performance.  
Adjusted R–squared of 0.59 shows that carbon disclosure is explained by all the 
variables (carbon performance, firm size, leverage, capital intensity, firm age, firm 
growth opportunity, carbon intensity, dividend yield and dividend payout) to the extent 
of 58%. F test implies that the model appears to be good since the p value is less than 
1%. Panel B of Table 7.3 shows the regression results between carbon disclosure and 
carbon performance and control variables, after controlling the regression equation for 
industry and time effects. The relationship between carbon disclosure and carbon 
performance remains significantly positive even after controlling for industry and time 
effect. However, in the industry and time adjusted regression results, 
relationship/significance of relationship between carbon disclosure and some of the 
control variables such as firm size, leverage, capital intensity, carbon intensity and 
dividend yield, seem to vary across industry and time periods.   
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Table 7.3 Regression results for the relationship between carbon disclosure and 
carbon performance   
CD i,t  = α + β1 CP i,t  + β2 SIZE i,t  + β3 LEV i,t  + β4 CAPIN i,t  + β5 AGE i,t  + β6 GROWTH 
i,t  + β7 CINT i,t  + β8 DIVYIELD i,t  + β9 DIVPAY i,t  + εi,t 
 
 Panel A   Panel B   
(Before controlling for 
industry and time) 
(After controlling for 
industry and time) 
       
Intercept 46.944*** 
(12.509) 
  48.169*** 
(15.639) 
  
CP 0.460*** 
(35.724) 
  0.424*** 
(35.911) 
  
SIZE 0.699** 
(2.021) 
  0.082 
(0.2774) 
  
LEV 0.092 
(4.224) 
  0.064*** 
(3.354) 
  
CAPIN -2.998 
(-0.913) 
  -4.226* 
(-1.656) 
  
AGE -0.075 
(-0.226) 
  -0.059 
(-0.203) 
  
GROWTH 0.000** 
(2.219) 
  0.000*** 
(2.413) 
  
CINT 1.072 
(1.555) 
  -0.567 
(-0.429) 
  
DIVYIELD -0.310*** 
(-1.949) 
  -0.111 
(-0.762) 
  
DIVPAY -0.007 
(-0.667) 
  -0.003 
(-0.422) 
  
Adjusted 0.5908   0.736   
R-squared       
F-statistic 151.845***   121.071***   
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
***, ** and * represent significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. t-statistics are provided in 
parentheses. 
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7.4.2 Regression results for the interrelationship between carbon disclosure and 
carbon performance for H3 
The purpose of this section is to analyse the interrelationship between carbon 
disclosure and carbon performance. To do so, two models have been used. The first 
model is used to analyse the relationship between previous year’s carbon disclosure and 
current year’s carbon performance and relevant control variables. The second model is 
used to analyse the relationship between previous year’s carbon performance and current 
year’s carbon disclosure and relevant control variables. The regression results of first 
and second models are shown in Tables 7.4 and Table 7.5 respectively.    
Regression results from Table 7.4 (panel A), show that there is a significant 
positive relationship between last year’s carbon disclosure and current year’s carbon 
performance at 1% significance level. On the other hand, regression results from Table 
7.5 (panel A) also show that there is a significant positive relationship (at 1% 
significance level) between last year’s carbon performance and current year’s carbon 
disclosure. These results indicate that if a firm’s carbon disclosure improves in a year, its 
carbon performance is likely to improve next year which is supported by the 
propositions of Instrumental Stakeholder Theory.  On the other hand, if the carbon 
performance of a firm improves in a year, its carbon disclosure is likely to improve next 
year which can be explained by the propositions of Signalling Theory. Both these results 
hold true when industry and time effects are also considered as shown is Panel B of 
Table 7.4 and 7.5. Combining these two results, we can argue that there is a two-way 
positive relationship between carbon disclosure and carbon performance, where increase 
in carbon disclosure of a firm in a period will improve its carbon performance for the 
next period (as predicted by Instrumental Stakeholder Theory), and consequently, 
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improved carbon performance will lead to more carbon disclosure by the firm in the 
subsequent period as predicted by Signalling Theory. Therefore, we can conclude that 
the above results support hypothesis 3 which proposes that carbon disclosure and carbon 
performance influence each other positively.   
 Table 7.4 (panel A) also shows that, from the control variables, firm size, firm age, 
dividend yield and dividend payout are significantly positively related to carbon 
performance, while capital intensity, and growth opportunity are significantly 
negatively related to carbon performance. This means larger and older firms and firms 
who pay more dividend per share would have better carbon performance. Numerous 
previous studies predict a positive relationship between firm size and environmental and 
carbon disclosure which have been mentioned in the previous section. However, this 
study could not find any previous study that predict a relationship between firm size and 
carbon performance. However, it can be assumed that larger firms would have more 
resources to improve their carbon performance. A number of previous studies support 
the positive relationship between firm age and environmental/carbon performance, for 
example, Mohana-Neill (1995) suggest that older firms are more likely to possess the 
necessary infrastructure to manage environmental issues at a lower cost. Similarly, 
Huergo and Jaumandreu (2004) argue that older firms are more likely to engage in 
environmental activities.  
Many previous studies such as Denis and Igor (2008), Myers and Fr (2004), 
Labhane and Mahakud (2016) and Petra et al. (2012), find that dividend distribution is 
positively related to corporate financial performance. Richardson et al. (1999) find that 
corporate financial performance is positively affected by the business’s environmental 
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performance. Therefore, we can argue that there is a positive relationship between 
corporate carbon performance and dividend distribution.  
The negative relationship between carbon performance and capital intensity is 
contradicted by Clarkson et al. (2008) who argue that firms who would make more 
capital spending are likely to have newer, cleaner technologies and consequently, these 
firms are likely to have a superior environmental performance measure. The negative 
relationship between carbon performance and growth opportunity is also contradicted by 
previous studies. Al-Tuwaijri et al. (2004) use growth as a proxy for intangible assets 
associated with innovation (Porter & van der Linde, 1995a), and therefore argue that 
growth is positively related to environmental performance.   
Panel B of Table 7.4 shows the regression results between carbon performance 
and control variables after controlling the regression equation for industry and time 
effects. Regression results and relationship/significance of relationship between carbon 
performance and some of the control variables such as firm leverage, capital intensity, 
growth opportunity and dividend payout, seem to vary across industry and time periods.  
Table 7.5 shows a positive relationship of firm size and leverage with carbon 
disclosure while it shows a negative relationship between carbon disclosure and 
leverage. The positive relationship between firm size and carbon disclosure has already 
been discussed before. A number of studies such as Clarkson et al. (2008) and Freedman 
and Jaggi (2005) support the positive relationship between firm leverage and voluntary 
disclosure. However, the negative relationship between carbon disclosure and capital 
intensity is contradicted by previous studies such as Clarkson et al. (2008) who suggest 
firms with higher sustaining capital expenditures are expected to have newer equipment 
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and may want to signal their environmental type through more discretionary disclosures 
regarding their environmental performance. 
In Table 7.4, p value of both the models used (before and after controlling for 
industry and time effects) are less than 1%.  This implies that both these models are 
good. Similarly, both the models used in Table 7.5 also appear to be good models, as p 
value of their F test is less than 1%.  
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Table 7.4 Regression results for the relationship between previous year’s carbon 
disclosure and current year’s carbon performance  
CP i,t  = α + γ1 CD(-1) i,t  + γ2 SIZE i,t  + γ3 LEV i,t  + γ4 CAPIN i,t  + γ5 AGE i,t  + γ6 
GROWTH i,t  + γ7 CINT i,t  + γ8 DIVYIELD i,t  + γ9 DIVPAY i,t  + εi,t 
 
 Panel A   Panel B   
(Before controlling for  
industry and time) 
(After controlling for  
industry and time) 
       
Intercept -33.343*** 
(-3.681) 
  -70.549*** 
(-7.885) 
  
CD(-1) 0.627*** 
(12.260) 
  0.883*** 
(15.438) 
  
SIZE 3.232*** 
(4.0523) 
  3.488*** 
(4.486) 
  
LEV 0.038 
(0.786) 
  -0.007 
(-0.160) 
  
CAPIN -13.365** 
(-2.162) 
  -3.940 
(-0.625) 
  
AGE 1.712** 
(2.347) 
  1.186* 
(1.665) 
  
GROWTH -0.001* 
(-1.730) 
  -0.001 
(-1.585) 
  
CINT -2.105 
(-1.337) 
  -6.101 
(-1.240) 
  
DIVYIELD 1.371*** 
(3.447) 
  1.152*** 
(2.857) 
  
DIVPAY 0.047** 
(2.089) 
  0.021 
(0.988) 
  
Adjusted  
R-squared 
0.223   0.361   
F-statistic 31.081***   25.240***   
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
***, ** and * represent significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. t-statistics are provided in 
parentheses. 
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Table 7.5 Regression results for the relationship between previous year’s carbon 
performance and current year’s carbon disclosure  
CD i,t  = α + γ1 CP(-1) i,t  + γ2 SIZE i,t  + γ3 LEV i,t  + γ4 CAPIN i,t  + γ5 AGE i,t  + γ6 
GROWTH i,t  +γ7 CINT i,t  +  γ8 DIVYIELD i,t  + γ9 DIVPAY i,t  + εi,t 
 
 Panel A   Panel B   
(Before controlling for  
industry and time) 
(After controlling for  
industry and time) 
 
Intercept 
 
45.3537*** 
(8.688) 
   
38.794*** 
(8.732) 
  
CP(-1) 0.268954*** 
(14.743) 
  0.246*** 
(13.964) 
  
SIZE 1.685975*** 
(3.564) 
  1.236 
(2.844) 
  
LEV 0.10678*** 
(3.807) 
  0.074*** 
(2.941) 
  
CAPIN -7.457043** 
(-2.024) 
  -5.801* 
(-1.816) 
  
AGE 0.557975 
(1.213) 
  0.435 
(1.050) 
  
GROWTH -0.000243 
(-0.623) 
  -0.000 
(-0.545) 
  
CINT 0.417346 
(0.427) 
  -3.589 
(-1.090) 
  
DIVYIEL
D 
0.144022 
(0.650) 
  0.256 
(1.211) 
  
DIVPAY -0.002014 
(-0.146) 
  -0.0031 
(-0.263) 
  
Adjusted 0.249599   0.472   
R-squared  
F-statistic 35.777***   39.308***   
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
***, ** and * represent significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. t-statistics are provided in 
parentheses. 
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7.4.3 Country-wise analysis for the relationship between carbon disclosure and 
carbon performance 
The sample companies of this study has been divided into five regions, namely: 
North America, European Union (EU), the United Kingdom (UK), Asia-Pacific and 
Others. Table 7.6 shows the relationship and interrelationship between carbon disclosure 
and carbon performance of the first four groups. Others group has been excluded from 
the country-wise analysis as this group consisted of only 4 companies. In all of the four 
regions, carbon disclosure is significantly positively related to carbon performance, all at 
1% significance level. These results are congruent with full sample results. This implies 
that in all regions, firms with better carbon performance will make more carbon 
disclosure. These findings are supported by a number of previous studies which have 
been mentioned before. This finding supports H2.  
The proposed relationship in H3 that carbon disclosure and carbon performance 
influence each other positively holds true in all regions with a significance level of 1% 
except in the UK. Even in the UK, carbon disclosure of the previous year is positively 
related to carbon performance of the current year, and carbon performance of the 
previous year is positively related to carbon disclosure of the current year.  However, 
whilst the relationship between previous year’s carbon performance and current year’s 
carbon disclosure is statistically significant at 1% level, the relationship between 
previous year’s carbon disclosure and current year’s carbon performance is not 
statistically significant.  
All the models used in Table 7.6 for country-wise analysis are good models as 
the p value of their F tests are less than 1%.  
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Table 7.6 Country wise regression results for the relationship and interrelationship between carbon disclosure and 
carbon performance  
Variable North America 
 
European Union 
 
United Kingdom 
 
Asia-Pacific 
 
CD CP CD 
 
CD CP CD 
 
CD CP CD 
 
CD CP CD 
CP 0.456*** 
   
0.486*** 
   
0.348*** 
   
0.434*** 
  
 
(24.235) 
   
(18.671) 
   
(5.930) 
   
(11.417) 
  
CD(-1) 
 
0.665*** 
   
0.410*** 
   
0.135 
   
0.494*** 
 
  
(9.680) 
   
(3.658) 
   
(0.599) 
   
(2.895) 
 
CP(-1) 
  
0.290*** 
   
0.195*** 
   
0.220*** 
   
0.196*** 
   
(10.802) 
   
(5.086) 
   
(3.9470 
   
(3.077) 
SIZE 1.176** 2.874** 1.884*** 
 
0.338 5.073*** 2.476** 
 
0.540 9.777*** 1.447 
 
0.313 4.356 1.608 
 
(2.511) (2.577) (3.055) 
 
(0.451) (93.188) (2.364) 
 
(0.365) (3.116) (0.797) 
 
(0.264) (1.418) (0.921) 
LEV 0.105*** 0.086 0.128*** 
 
0.078 0.267** 0.207*** 
 
0.258*** 0.395* 0.347*** 
 
0.096 -0.135 0.089 
 
(3.195) (1.235) (3.245) 
 
(1.603) (2.234) (2.638) 
 
(3.230) (1.975) (3.769) 
 
(1.372) (-0.912) (0.957) 
CAPIN -1.939 -2.257 -2.347 
 
-18.200* -69.465** -50.436*** 
 
6.432 -1.057 -9.408 
 
-5.112 -11.530 -8.280 
 
(-0.485) (-0.257) (-0.451) 
 
(-1.701) (-2.565) (-2.993) 
 
(0.365) (-0.026) (-0.498) 
 
(-0.446) (-0.990) (-0.858) 
AGE -0.650 0.052 -0.716 
 
0.660 4.248*** 2.418*** 
 
-0.070 -2.410 -0.469 
 
-0.940 0.666 -0.595 
 
(-1.248) (0.043) (-0.944) 
 
(1.112) (3.712) (2.936) 
 
(-0.064) (-0.840) (-0.364) 
 
(-0.763) (0.294) (-0.391) 
GROWTH 0.000 -0.011 -0.010** 
 
0.304 0.553 0.585 
 
0.001*** -0.002*** 0.000 
 
1.989* 0.357 2.227 
 
(0.051) (-0.671) (-2.486) 
 
(1.152) (0.973) (1.433) 
 
(3.201) (-4.488) (0.287) 
 
(1.849) (0.167) (1.580) 
CINT 0.325 -3.267 -1.169 
 
2.532** 1.208 3.553** 
 
-1.571 -3.480 0.720 
 
2.250 0.738 2.355 
 
(0.286) (-1.273) (-0.702) 
 
(2.565) (0.418) (2.261) 
 
(-0.413) (-0.439) (0.173) 
 
(0.710) (0.129) (0.659) 
DIVYIELD -1.028*** 1.149 -0.390 
 
0.162 1.771** 0.854 
 
-0.661 -3.928*** -1.428* 
 
-0.884 0.672 -0.849 
 
(-3.288) (1.272) (-0.910) 
 
(0.664) (2.578) (2.090) 
 
(-1.0480 (-2.970) (-1.957) 
 
(-1.631) (0.458) (-0.972) 
DIVPAY 0.015 0.068 0.013 
 
0.014 0.063 0.033 
 
-0.020 -0.066 -0.033 
 
-0.074** -0.044 -0.089** 
 
(0.721) (1.570) (0.485) 
 
(0.803) (1.142) (1.168) 
 
(-0.713) (-1.010) (-1.152) 
 
(-2.3640 (-0.624) (-2.338) 
Adjusted R2 0.578 0.235 0.274 
 
0.686 0.252 0.290 
 
0.468 0.175 0.283 
 
0.517 0.059 0.134 
F-statistic 69.996*** 16.439*** 20.036***  63.511*** 
10.581*** 12.612*** 
 
10.692*** 3.310*** 5.307*** 
 
13.981*** 1.756*** 2.863*** 
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7.4.4 Empirical results for disclosure practices of average carbon performers for 
H4 
To test this hypothesis, a single factor ANOVA analysis is done where the 
average carbon disclosure scores of superior carbon performers, average carbon 
performers and inferior carbon performers, are compared for the full sample. Firms who 
got A in carbon performance are considered as superior carbon performers. Firms who 
got B and C are considered average carbon performers, and firms who got D and E are 
considered as inferior carbon performers. To substantiate the findings from ANOVA 
analysis, Tukey’s post hoc multiple comparison tests is done. The following tables show 
the test outcomes:  
ANOVA: Single Factor 
    SUMMARY 
     
Groups Count Sum 
Average carbon 
disclosure score Variance 
Superior Carbon performers (A) 214 20579 96.163 16.913 
Average Carbon performers (B&C) 602 51889 86.194 113.724 
Inferior Carbon performers (D&E) 127 8469 66.6857 115.582 
 
ANOVA 
Disclosure  Score Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 69480.574 2 34740.287 377.555 0 
Within Groups 86492.938 940 92.014     
Total 155973.512 942       
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Tukey’s post hoc multiple comparisons 
Dependent Variable:   Disclosure score    
Tukey HSD   
Carbon  
Performance 
Carbon  
Performance 
 
Mean 
Difference  Std. Error Sig. 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
 
Lower Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Superior 
Average 9.969* 0.763 0 8.18 11.76 
Poor 29.479* 1.074 0 26.11 32 
Average 
Superior -9.969* 0.763 0 -11.76 -8.18 
Poor 19.509* 0.937 0 17.31 21.71 
Poor 
Superior -29.479* 1.074 0 -32 -26.11 
Average -19.509* 0.937 0 -21.71 -17.31 
 
The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level. 
Superior (Superior carbon performers) = A 
Average (Average carbon performers) = B & C 
Poor (Poor carbon performers) = D & E 
***, ** and * represent significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
Interpretation of the above tests:  
From the descriptive analysis shown in the summary table above, the estimated 
average disclosure scores are 96.17, 86.20 and 66.69, for superior, average and poor 
carbon performers respectively. This means on average, superior carbon performers 
142 
 
make more carbon disclosure than average carbon performers, whereas average carbon 
performers make more carbon disclosure than inferior carbon performers.  From the 
overall F test result from the next table above, we can conclude that there are 
significant (F test p- value = 0.000) differences among average disclosure scores of the 
three carbon performance group, namely superior, average and inferior performers. 
This result is backed by Tukey’s Post hoc multiple comparison test shown in the next 
table.  From this test, with 95% confidence, it can be concluded that the average 
disclosure score of superior performers, exceeds the average disclosure score of 
average performers by values between a minimum of 8.18 and a maximum of 11.76. 
Similarly, it can be also concluded that the average disclosure score of average 
performers exceeds that of the poor performers, by values between a minimum of 17.31 
and a maximum of 21.71.  
From the above findings of ANOVA and Tukey’s Post hoc multiple comparison 
test, we can see a one directional change in the carbon disclosure scores, which implies 
that superior carbon performers make more carbon disclosure than average carbon 
performers, and average carbon performers make more carbon disclosure than inferior 
carbon performers. These findings contradict H4 which suggest that both superior and 
inferior carbon performers make significantly more carbon disclosure than average 
carbon performers. However, these findings are in congruence with H2 and a number of 
studies such as Clarkson et al. (2008); Al-Tuwaijri et al. (2004); Peng et al. (2015) and 
Cotter and Najah (2012), who suggest that better carbon performers would make more 
carbon disclosure than inferior carbon performers.   
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7.5 Empirical results for the relationship and interrelationship between 
carbon performance and financial performance 
 The purpose of this section is to analyse and interpret the relationship (one-way 
relationship) and interrelationship (both-way relationship) between carbon performance 
and financial performance. These relationships are hypothesized in H5 and H6. 
 
7.5.1 Regression results for the relationship between carbon performance and 
financial performance for H5  
 This section analyses the relationship between carbon performance and financial 
performance. In this study, financial performance is alternatively measured by both 
ROA and Tobin’s Q. Table 7.7 shows the regression results between carbon 
performance and financial performance when financial performance is measured by 
ROA, while Table 7.8 shows the relationship between carbon performance and financial 
performance when financial performance is measured by Tobin’s Q.  
Panel A of Table 7.7 shows that carbon performance is significantly negatively 
related to ROA at 1% significance level.  When industry and time effects are considered 
(shown in Panel B), the relationship between carbon performance and financial 
performance still remains significantly negative (at 5% significance level). This implies 
that when carbon performance of a business improves, its financial performance in terms 
of return on asset, deteriorates. When financial performance is measured in terms of 
Tobin’s Q (as shown in Table 7.8 panel A), there is a negative but insignificant 
relationship between carbon performance and Tobin’s Q. However, when industry and 
time effects are considered (as shown in Table 7.8 panel B), carbon performance and 
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Tobin’s Q shows a significant negative relationship (at 5% significance level). 
Therefore, we can assume that carbon performance affects Tobin’s Q negatively, i.e. if a 
firm’s carbon performance improves, the financial performance of that firm, measured in 
terms of its Tobin’s Q, would decrease. Combining these two results, we can conclude 
that carbon performance and financial performance are not positively related, but rather 
they are negatively related, regardless of the way financial performance is measured. 
These findings are backed up by numerous previous studies. Jaggi and Freedman (1992) 
predict that in the short run, pollution performance is negatively associated with 
economic performance and that the markets do not reward good pollution performance. 
Cordeiro and Sarkis (1997) demonstrate a significant negative relationship between 
environmental proactivism and industry analyst earnings-per-share. Filbeck and Gorman 
(2004) find evidence of a negative relationship between financial return and a more pro-
active measure of environmental performance. Sarkis and Cordeiro (2001) find that 
pollution prevention and end-of-pipe efficiencies are both negatively related to ROS. 
Ennis et al. (2012) find if carbon emission increases and therefore carbon performance 
decreases, revenue will increase. They also find that emissions levels are not presently 
drivers of stock prices. According to them, financial markets are not yet responsive to 
the carbon performance of companies. Matsumura et al. (2013) predict and find a 
negative association between carbon emissions and firm value. They observe that 
markets penalise all firms for their carbon emissions. Wang et al. (2014) find that when 
measured by Tobin’s Q, financial performance is negatively related to carbon 
performance.  
While testing the control variables of Table 7.7, and after considering industry 
and time effects, we find that firm size and dividend payout show a positive relationship 
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with ROA, while capital intensity and dividend yield show a negative relationship with 
ROA. When financial performance is measured by Tobin’s Q (as shown in Table 7.8) 
and industry and time effects are considered, firm size and divided payout per share are 
positively related - and firm age and dividend yield are negatively related to Tobin’s Q. 
Numerous previous studies such as Nehring et al. (2009); Adenauer and Heckelei 
(2011); Chaddad and Mondelli (2013), hypothesize a direct relationship between 
organisational size and financial performance. The arguments used to justify a direct and 
positive relationship between profitability and size, focus on the greater resources and 
market opportunities of large companies, which can enable economies of scale. Large 
companies also have greater negotiating power with customers and suppliers, as well as 
easier access to international markets. As mentioned earlier, many previous studies such 
as Denis and Igor (2008), Myers and Frank (2004), Labhane and Mahakud (2016) and 
Petra et al. (2012), find that dividend distribution is positively related to corporate 
financial performance 
 
 
 
7.5.2 Country-wise regression results for the relationship between carbon 
performance and financial performance  
From Table 7.9 we can see that, in all the regions except UK carbon performance 
is negatively related to both ROA and Tobin’s Q. However, in North America, the 
relationship between carbon performance and Tobin’s Q is significant, while the 
relationship between carbon performance and ROA is insignificant. Both in EU and 
Asia-Pacific, relationships between carbon performance and ROA are significant. 
However, in these regions, the relationships between carbon performance and Tobin’s Q 
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are insignificant. The relationships of carbon performance with ROA and Tobin’s Q 
from North America, EU and UK are to some extent similar to the full sample results, 
especially in the direction of the relationship. All these regions predict a negative 
relationship between carbon performance and ROA, and Tobin’s Q. The UK is the only 
region where carbon performance is positively related to both ROA and Tobin’s Q. 
However, only the relationship between carbon performance and Tobin’s Q is 
significant in this region. All the models used in Table 7.7, Table 7.8 and Table 7.9, are 
good models, as the p value of their F tests are less than 1%.  
  
147 
 
Table 7.7 Regression results for the relationship between carbon performance and 
financial performance measured by ROA 
ROA i,t  = α + β1 CP i,t  + β2 SIZE i,t  + β3 LEV i,t  + β4 CAPIN i,t  + β5 AGE i,t  + β6 
GROWTH i,t  + β7 CINT i,t  + β8 DIVYIELD i,t  + β9 DIVPAY i,t  + εi,t   
 
 Panel A   Panel B   
(Before controlling for  
industry and time) 
(After controlling for  
industry and time) 
       
Intercept -5.291 
(-1.504) 
  -9.787 
(-2.767) 
  
CP -0.033*** 
(-2.616) 
  -0.025** 
(-1.975) 
  
SIZE 2.215*** 
(7.241) 
  2.379*** 
(6.408) 
  
LEV -0.051   -0.046 
(-1.236) 
  
CAPIN -20.038** 
(-1.442) 
  -18.192* 
(-1.818) 
  
AGE -0.850*** 
(-2.993) 
  -0.736 
(-2.636) 
  
GROWTH 0.000 
(0.244) 
  0.000 
(0.554) 
  
CINT -1.098 
(-1.329) 
  0.625 
(0.731) 
  
DIVYIEL
D 
-0.725*** 
(-3.980) 
  -0.663*** 
(-3.772) 
  
DIVPAY 0.083*** 
(8.111) 
  0.085*** 
(8.349) 
  
Adjusted 0.173   0.206   
R-squared 
F-statistic 22.848***   12.113***   
_____________________________________________________________________________________
***, ** and * represent significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. t-statistics are provided in 
parentheses. 
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Table 7.8 Regression results for the relationship between carbon performance and 
financial performance measured by Tobin’s Q 
 
TOBINSQ i,t  = α + β1 CP i,t  + β2 SIZE i,t  + β3 LEV i,t  + β4 CAPIN i,t  + β5 AGE i,t  + β6 
GROWTH i,t + β7 CINT i,t  + β8 DIVYIELD i,t  + β9 DIVPAY i,t  + εi,t 
 
 Panel A   Panel B   
(Before controlling for  
industry and time) 
(After controlling for 
 industry and time) 
       
Intercept -0.280 
(-0.698) 
  -0.299 
(-0.737) 
  
CP -0.002 
(-1.525) 
  -0.003** 
(-2.107) 
  
SIZE 0.252*** 
(7.525) 
  0.179*** 
(5.042) 
  
LEV 0.003 
(0.687) 
  0.001 
(0.276) 
  
CAPIN -0.805*** 
(-3.758) 
  -0.164 
(-0.863) 
  
AGE -0.099*** 
(-2.768) 
  -0.101*** 
(-2.851) 
  
GROWTH 0.000 
(1.601) 
  0.000 
(0.375) 
  
CINT -0.301*** 
(-5.304) 
  0.075 
(0.932) 
  
DIVYIEL
D 
-0.172*** 
(-8.862) 
  -0.116*** 
(-5.865) 
  
DIVPAY 0.007*** 
(5.413) 
  0.007*** 
(5.370) 
  
Adjusted 0.174   0.238   
R-squared       
F-statistic 23.054***   14.398***   
_____________________________________________________________________________________
***, ** and * represent significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. t-statistics are provided in 
parentheses. 
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Table 7.9 Country wise regression results for the relationship between carbon performance and financial performance   
Variable North America 
 
European Union 
 
United Kingdom 
 
Asia-Pacific 
  ROA Tobin’s Q 
 
ROA Tobin’s Q 
 
ROA Tobin’s Q 
 
ROA Tobin’s Q 
 
CP 
-0.019 -0.004** 
 
-0.039* -0.000 
 
0.039 0.006** 
 
-0.041* -0.001 
  (-.968) (-2.026) 
 
(-1.794) (0.1822) 
 
(1.383) (2.367) 
 
(-2.005) (-0.695) 
SIZE 1.126*** 0.181*** 
 
1.194** -0.015 
 
2.693** 0.358*** 
 
3.396*** 0.158*** 
  (2.9420 (4.182) 
 
(2.364) (-0.285) 
 
(2.1920 (4.488) 
 
(5.053) (5.264) 
LEV -0.028 0.020*** 
 
-0.122*** -0.020*** 
 
0.073 0.014*** 
 
-0.099** -0.009*** 
  (-.489) (5.026) 
 
(-.3.803) (-.4.245) 
 
(1.156) (2.629) 
 
(-0.2600) (-4.281) 
CAPIN -34.494** -1.509*** 
 
24.928*** 1.847*** 
 
-14.262 0.364 
 
4.992 0.705*** 
  (-2.212) (-5.967) 
 
(4.045) (2.788) 
 
(-0.982) (0.344) 
 
(0.834) (3.163) 
AGE -1.309*** -0.215*** 
 
0.895** 0.114** 
 
-0.617 -0.021 
 
-0.604 -0.019 
  (.3.510) (4.464) 
 
(2.244) (2.3620 
 
(-0.812) (-0.335) 
 
(-0.971) (-0.801) 
GROWTH 0.011* 0.000 
 
2.396*** 0.441*** 
 
0.000 0.000*** 
 
3.138*** 0.395*** 
  (1.720) (0.327) 
 
(9.491) (11.511) 
 
(0.370) (2.773) 
 
(5.721) (12.151) 
CINT -0.984 -0.327*** 
 
1.134* -0.033 
 
0.080 -0.430* 
 
0.742 0.104* 
  (-.5870 (-0.401) 
 
(1.655) (-0.6280 
 
(0.264) (-1.837) 
 
(0.514) (1.747) 
DIVYIELD -1.102*** -0.333*** 
 
-0.099 0.023 
 
-1.168** -0.129*** 
 
0.261 0.000 
  (-4.127) (-11.010) 
 
(-.525) (1.248) 
 
(-2.316) (-3.673) 
 
(0.893) (0.0240 
DIVPAY 
0.101 
(5.739)*** 
0.009*** 
(4.433)***  
0.027** 
(2.079) 
0.004*** 
(2.810) 
 
0.112*** 
(4.715) 
0.006*** 
(3.367) 
 
0.015 
(0.937) 
0.002** 
(2.414) 
Adjusted 
R2 
0.229 0.318 
 
0.620 0.793 
 
0.307 0.495 
 
0.507 0.810 
F-statistic 15.944*** 24.515 
 
47.860*** 110.880*** 
 
5.879*** 11.792*** 
 
13.452*** 52.720*** 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
***, ** and * represent significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. t-statistics are provided in parentheses. 
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7.5.3 Regression results for the interrelationship between financial performance 
(measured by ROA) and carbon performance for H6  
 
From Table 7.10, we find that previous year’s carbon performance significantly 
negatively affects current year’s ROA at 1% significance level. This relationship 
remains valid after controlling for industry and time effects. On the other hand, Table 
7.11 shows that although there is a negative relationship between last year’s ROA and 
current year’s carbon performance, this relationship is not significant. This relationship 
between last year’s ROA and current year’s carbon performance remains the same, even 
after controlling for industry and time effects. When these two results are put together, 
we can suggest that when financial performance is measured by Return on Asset, there 
seems to be no significant interrelationship between carbon performance and financial 
performance. These findings negate hypothesis 6. Regression results of Table 7.10 and 
7.11, indicate that after controlling for industry and time effects, size and dividend 
payout show positive relationship with ROA, while capital intensity, firm age and 
dividend yield show negative relationships with ROA. On the other hand, firm size, firm 
age, dividend yield, and dividend payout are positively related to carbon performance, 
while carbon intensity and capital intensity are negatively related to carbon performance. 
Studies related to the positive relationship of firm size, firm age, dividend yield and 
dividend payout with carbon performance, have already been discussed before. The 
negative relationship between capital intensity and carbon performance is contradicted 
by studies such as Clarkson et al. (2008), who argue that firms who would make more 
capital spending are likely to have newer, cleaner technologies. Consequently, these 
firms are likely to have a superior environmental performance measure. The negative 
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relationship between carbon intensity and carbon performance is supported by Luo et al. 
(2014), who suggest that firms from carbon intensive industries inherently emit more 
carbon, and therefore carbon intensity would negatively affect firm carbon performance. 
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Table 7.10 Regression results for the relationship between financial performance 
measured by ROA of current year and carbon performance of previous year  
ROA i,t  = α + γ1 CP(-1) i,t  + γ2 SIZE i,t  + γ3 LEV i,t  + γ4 CAPIN i,t  + γ5 AGE i,t  + γ6 
GROWTH i,t + γ7 CINT i,t  + γ8 DIVYIELD i,t  + γ9 DIVPAY i,t  + εi,t 
 
 
 Panel A   Panel B   
(Before controlling for 
industry and time) 
(After controlling for  
industry and time) 
       
Intercept -4.694 
(-1.344) 
  -8.496** 
(-2.438) 
  
CP(-1) -0.045*** 
(-3.813) 
  -0.035*** 
(-2.932) 
  
SIZE 2.247*** 
(7.143) 
  2.414*** 
(6.228) 
  
LEV -0.051 
(-1.461) 
  -0.046 
(-1.264) 
  
CAPIN -20.510** 
(-2.064) 
  -18.435* 
(-1.828) 
  
AGE -0.878*** 
(-3.116) 
  -0.772*** 
(-2.752) 
  
GROWTH 0.000 
(0.396) 
  0.000 
(0.578) 
  
CINT -0.937 
(-1.134) 
  0.859 
(0.989) 
  
DIVYIEL
D 
-0.770*** 
(-4.122) 
  -0.672*** 
(-3.758) 
  
DIVPAY 0.085*** 
(8.094) 
  0.086*** 
(8.371) 
  
Adjusted 0.178   0.209   
 R-squared   
F-statistic 23.597***   12.303***   
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
***, ** and * represent significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. t-statistics are provided in 
parentheses. 
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Table 7.11 Regression results for the relationship between financial performance 
measured by ROA of previous year and carbon performance of current year 
 
CP i,t  = α + γ1 ROA(-1) i,t  + γ2 SIZE i,t  + γ3 LEV i,t  + γ4 CAPIN i,t  + γ5 AGE i,t  + γ6 
GROWTH i,t + γ7 CINT i,t  + γ8 DIVYIELD i,t  + γ9 DIVPAY i,t  + εi,t 
 
 
 Panel A   Panel B   
(Before controlling for  
industry and time) 
(After controlling for  
industry and time) 
       
Intercept 8.306 
(0.863) 
  -0.503 
(-0.051) 
  
ROA(-1) -0.005 
(-0.067) 
  -0.020 
(-0.298) 
  
SIZE 4.216*** 
(4.755) 
  5.014*** 
(5.290) 
  
LEV 0.088* 
(1.690) 
  0.048 
(0.874) 
  
CAPIN -22.359*** 
(-3.463) 
  -11.823* 
(-1.754) 
  
AGE 1.919** 
(2.476) 
  1.506* 
(1.867) 
  
GROWTH -0.002 
(-1.055) 
  -0.001 
(-0.864) 
  
CINT -1.492 
(-0.858) 
  -9.952* 
(-1.684) 
  
DIVYIEL
D 
1.211*** 
(2.943) 
  1.605*** 
(3.722) 
  
DIVPAY 0.069*** 
(2.787) 
  0.046* 
(1.812) 
  
Adjusted       
R-squared 0.081 0.158   
F-statistic 10.171***   9.062***   
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
***, ** and * represent significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. t-statistics are provided in 
parentheses. 
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7.5.4 Regression results for the interrelationship between financial performance 
(measured by Tobin’s Q) and carbon performance for H6  
Table 7.12 shows that there is a negative but insignificant relationship between 
carbon performance of last year and financial performance of current year when 
financial performance is measured by Tobin’s Q. However, when the results are 
controlled by industry and time, this relationship becomes significant. This finding 
implies that there is a possibility of a negative relationship between carbon performance 
of last year and financial performance of current year when financial performance is 
measured by Tobin’s Q. However, this relationship might vary across industries. The 
negative relationship between carbon performance and financial performance (measured 
by Tobin’s Q), is supported by Wang et al. (2014). On the other hand, Table 7.13 shows 
that last year’s financial performance significantly negatively affect current year’s 
carbon performance, when financial performance is measured by Tobin’s Q. However, 
when industry and time effects are considered, this relationship still remains negative but 
becomes insignificant. This again indicates that the relationship between last year’s 
financial performance (measured by Tobin’s Q) and current year’s carbon performance, 
may vary across industries. The negative relationship between carbon performance and 
financial (measured by Tobin’s Q), is supported by Wang et al. (2014), as mentioned 
before. 
Putting these two findings together, we can see an interrelationship between 
carbon performance and financial performance (measured by Tobin’s Q), where carbon 
performance and financial performance seem to be affecting each other negatively rather 
than positively, as predicted in H6.  
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Table 7.12 Regression results for the relationship between financial performance 
measured by Tobin’s Q, of current year and carbon performance of previous year 
TOBINSQ i,t  = α + γ1 CP(-1) i,t  + γ2 SIZE i,t  + γ3 LEV i,t  + γ4 CAPIN i,t  + γ5 AGE i,t   
+ γ6 GROWTH i,t  + γ7 CINT i,t  + γ8 DIVYIELD i,t  + γ9 DIVPAY i,t  + εi,t 
  
 Panel A   Panel B   
(Before controlling for  
industry and time) 
(After controlling for  
industry and time) 
       
Intercept -0.257 
(-0.639) 
  -0.184 
(-0.450) 
  
CP(-1) -0.002 
(-1.381) 
  -0.003** 
(-2.049) 
  
SIZE 0.250 
(7.438) 
  0.175*** 
(4.962) 
  
LEV 0.003 
(0.654) 
  0.001 
(0.260) 
  
CAPIN -0.811*** 
(-3.765) 
  -0.156 
(-0.826) 
  
AGE -0.099*** 
(-2.769) 
  -0.103*** 
(-2.885) 
  
GROWTH 0.000* 
(1.734) 
  0.000 
(0.494) 
  
CINT -0.290*** 
(-5.073) 
  0.107 
(1.380) 
  
DIVYIEL
D 
-0.176*** 
(-8.867) 
  -0.120*** 
(-5.933) 
  
DIVPAY 0.007*** 
(5.372) 
  0.007*** 
(5.373) 
  
Adjusted 0.173   0.238   
R-squared      
F-statistic 22.915***   14.367***   
_____________________________________________________________________________________
***, ** and * represent significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. t-statistics are provided in 
parentheses. 
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Table 7.13 Regression results for the relationship between financial performances 
measured by Tobin’s Q, of previous year and carbon performance of current year 
CP i,t  = α + γ1 TOBINSQ(-1) i,t  + γ2 SIZE i,t  + γ3 LEV i,t  + γ4 CAPIN i,t  + γ5 AGE i,t  +  
γ6 GROWTH i,t  + γ7 CINT i,t  + γ8 DIVYIELD i,t  + γ9 DIVPAY i,t  + εi,t 
 
 
 Panel A   Panel B   
(Before controlling for 
industry and time) 
(After controlling for  
industry and time) 
       
Intercept 8.798 
(0.919) 
  -0.202 
(-0.021) 
  
TOBINSQ(-
1) 
-1.478** 
(-2.185) 
  -0.906 
(-1.377) 
  
SIZE 4.441*** 
(5.052) 
  5.085*** 
(5.401) 
  
LEV 0.091* 
(1.748) 
  0.051 
(0.921) 
  
CAPIN -23.165*** 
(-3.595) 
  -11.939* 
(-1.777) 
  
AGE 1.840** 
(2.374) 
  1.483* 
(1.843) 
  
GROWTH -0.001 
(-0.988) 
  -0.001 
(-0.846) 
  
CINT -1.846 
(-1.066) 
  -9.979* 
(-1.696 
  
DIVYIELD 1.038** 
(2.457) 
  1.549*** 
(3.535) 
  
DIVPAY 0.076*** 
(3.035) 
  0.050* 
(1.960) 
  
Adjusted  
0.0856 
     
R-squared 0.160   
F-statistic 10.793***   9.165***   
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
***, ** and * represent significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. t-statistics are provided in 
parentheses. 
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7.5.5 Country-wise regression results for the interrelationship between carbon 
performance and financial performance  
From Table 7.14, we can see that there is no significant relationship between last 
year’s carbon performance and current year’s ROA, in any region except in North 
America. Similarly, last year’s ROA does not have any significant relationship with 
current year’s carbon performance, in any of the regions. Last year’s carbon 
performance does not have any significant relationship with current year’s Tobin’s Q in 
any region either. However, last year’s Tobin’s Q is significantly related to current 
year’s carbon performance, in both North America and Asia-Pacific. This relationship 
does not exist in the EU and UK. In summary, the country wise regression results from 
Table 7.14 do not consistently and significantly indicate any interrelationship between 
carbon performance and financial performance (measured by both ROA and Tobin’s Q), 
in any of the four regions. All the models used in Tables 7.10, 7.11, 7.12, 7.113 and 
7.14, are good models as the p value of their F tests are less than 1%.  
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Table 7.14 Country wise regression results for the interrelationship between carbon performance and financial 
performance  
Variable North America European Union United Kingdom Asia-Pacific 
 
ROA CP Tobin's Q CP ROA CP Tobin's Q CP ROA CP Tobin's Q CP ROA CP Tobin's Q CP 
 
CP(-1) -0.039** 
   
-0.027 
   
-0.061 
   
-0.023 
   
 
(-2.250) 
   
(-1.574) 
   
(-1.226) 
   
(-1.241) 
   
ROA(-1) 
 0.005 
  
 0.203 
  
 0.372 
  
 -0.375 
  
  
(0.056) 
  
 
(1.223) 
  
 
(1.189) 
  
 
(0.998) 
  
CP(-1) 
 
 
-0.003 
 
 
 
-0.001 
 
 
 
0.001 
 
 
 
0.000 
 
  
 
(-1.326) 
 
 
 
(-0.695) 
 
 
 
(0.389) 
 
 
 
(0.374) 
 Tobin's 
Q(-1)    
-
2.901***    
1.148 
   
2.066 
   
10.231** 
  
  
(-2.852) 
 
  
(1.019) 
 
  
(0.621) 
 
  
(-2.524) 
SIZE 1.184** 3.564*** 0.176*** 3.664*** 1.108*** 6.000*** -0.013 6.321*** 3.748** 9.371*** 0.403*** 9.571*** 3.290*** 5.777 0.153*** 5.648* 
 
(2.968) (2.870) (4.101) (2.977) (2.212) (3.650) (-0.256) (3.881) (2.434) (3.334) (4.570) (2.934) (5.117) (1.651) (5.030) (1.783) 
LEV -0.027 0.107 0.020*** 0.142* -0.131*** 0.384*** -0.020*** 0.384*** 0.109* 0.401** 0.016*** 0.421** -0.102*** -0.121 0.009*** -0.115 
 
(-0.479) (1.393) (5.004) (1.800) (-4.157) (3.319) (-4.314) (3.3040 (1.7970 (2.497) (3.122) (2.415) (-2.661) (0.757) (-4.057) (-0.744) 
CAPIN -34.736** -8.071 -1.505*** -12.010 25.690*** -96.943*** 1.803*** 94.038*** -10.594 -4.591 0.268 -6.077 5.430 -6.221 0.713*** -2.691 
 
(-2.217) (-0.901) (-5.837) (-1.356) (4.301) (-3.583) (2.767) (-3.4550 (-0.647) (-0.116) (0.236) (-0.146) (0.860) (0.571) (3.224) (-0.251) 
AGE -1.298*** -0.241 -0.214*** -0.476 0.766* 4.972*** 0.118** 4.961*** -0.807 -2.520 -0.033 -2.496 -0.596 0.241 -0.020 0.282 
 
(-3.516) (-0.187) (-4.444) (-0.368) (1.955) (4.033) (2.518) (4.036) (-1.037) (-0.861) (-0.529) (-0.877) (-0.9330 (0.110) (-0.806) (0.132) 
GROWTH 0.012* -0.009 0.000 -0.011 2.377 0.287*** 0.442*** 0.295 0.000 -0.002*** 0.000** 0.002*** 3.124*** 2.482 0.393*** 4.643* 
 
(1.910) (0.455) (0.4730 (-0.627) (9.449) (0.383) (11.577) (0.380) (0.225) (-4.689) (2.355) (-4.149) (5.606) (1.1930 (12.027) (1.842) 
CINT -0.996 -4.174 -0.316*** -4.947* 1.199 2.419* -0.031 2.756 -1.335 -2.741 -0.429* (-2.483) 0.828 1.499 0.102* 2.381 
 
(-0.612) (-1.455) (-3.853) (-1.732) (1.752) (0.846) (-0.589) (0.972) (-0.431) (-0.348) (-1.786) -0.293 (0.570) (0.261) (1.730) (0.425) 
DIVYIELD -1.179*** 0.446 -0.338*** -0.162 -0.122 1.819*** 0.024 1.777*** -1.435** -4.137*** -0.150*** 4.109*** 0.154 -0.413 0.002 -0.769 
 
(-4.437) (0.441) (-10.910) (-0.162) (-0.6410 (2.777) (1.3800 (2.7150 (-2.533) (-4.099) (-3.891) (-3.659) (0.417) (0.299) (0.125) (-0.593) 
DIVPAY 0.107*** 0.127*** 0.009*** 0.141*** 0.024 0.078* 0.004*** 0.074 0.108*** -0.078 0.005*** -0.079 0.020 -0.074 0.002*** -0.054 
 
(5.499) (2.674) (4.326) (3.057) (1.790) (1.398) (2.859) (1.331) (4.597) (-1.142) (3.161) (-1.214) (1.132) (0.970) (2.359) (-0.761) 
Adjusted 
R2 
0.233 0.070*** 0.314 0.086 0.617 0.197 0.793 0.196 0.323 0.190 0.470 0.173 0.492 -0.027 0.809 0.006 
F-statistics 16.248*** 4.789*** 24.056*** 5.737*** 47.022*** 8.019*** 110.531 7.961*** 6.205*** 3.549 10.658*** 3.277*** 12.626*** 0.687 51.933*** 1.074*** 
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7.6 Empirical results for the relationship between carbon disclosure 
and financial performance      
The purpose of this section is to analyse and interpret the relationship between 
carbon disclosure and financial performance, which is hypothesized in H7 
 
7.6.1 Regression results for the relationship between carbon disclosure and 
financial performance for H7  
 
From Table 7.15, we can see that when financial performance is measured by 
ROA, there is a significant negative relationship between carbon disclosure and financial 
performance at 1% significance level. This relationship remains the same when industry 
and time effects are considered. As mentioned earlier, there is no existing study that 
investigates the relationship between carbon disclosure and financial performance. 
However, research in related areas such as studies by Belkaoui (1976); Berman et al. 
(1999); Brammer and Pavalin (2006); Weber et al. (20080 and Tang et al. (2012), who 
investigate the relationship between pollution disclosure/CSR performance disclosure 
and financial performance, suggest that there should be a positive relationship between 
these variables.  
On the other hand, from Table 7.16, we do not find any significant or consistent 
relationship between carbon disclosure and financial performance, when financial 
performance is measured by Tobin’s Q. This finding is supported by a similar study by 
Freedman and Jaggi (1988), who find that there is no association between the 
extensiveness of pollution disclosure and economic performance. 
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Therefore, we can conclude that there is a negative relationship between carbon 
disclosure and financial performance when financial performance is measured by ROA. 
However, there seems to be no significant relationship between carbon disclosure and 
financial performance when financial performance is measured by Tobin’s Q.  
 
7.6.2 Country-wise regression results for the relationship between carbon 
disclosure and financial performance  
From Table 7.17, we can see that there is significant negative relationship 
between carbon disclosure and financial performance when financial performance is 
measured by ROA in all four regions. This finding is consistent with the full sample 
results, which also find significant negative relationship between carbon disclosure and 
ROA.  However, as in the full sample results, country-wise analysis does not find any 
significant relationship between carbon disclosure and financial performance when 
financial performance is measured by Tobin’s Q, in any of the four regions.    
All the models used in Table 7.15, Table 7.16 and Table 7.17 are good models, as the p 
value of their F tests are less than 1%.  
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Table 7.15 Regression results for the relationship between carbon disclosure and 
financial performance, measured by ROA 
ROA i,t  = α + β1 CD i,t  + β2 SIZE i,t  + β3 LEV i,t  + β4 CAPIN i,t  + β5 AGE i,t  + β6 
GROWTH i,t  + β7 CINT i,t  + β8 DIVYIELD i,t  + β9 DIVPAY i,t  + εi,t   
 
 Panel A   Panel B   
(Before controlling for  
industry and time) 
(After controlling for  
industry and time) 
       
Intercept -0.337 
(-0.094) 
  -7.049** 
(-2.001) 
  
CD -0.103*** 
(-5.016) 
  -0.056*** 
(-2.617) 
  
SIZE 2.349*** 
(7.392) 
  2.378*** 
(6.185) 
  
LEV -0.039 
(-1.157) 
  -0.042 
(-1.140) 
  
CAPIN -20.676*** 
(-2.086) 
  -18.419* 
(-1.833) 
  
AGE -0.829*** 
(-2.960) 
  -0.741*** 
(-2.637) 
  
GROWTH 0.000 
(0.323) 
  0.000 
(0.604) 
  
CINT -1.007 
(-1.239) 
  0.603 
(0.695) 
  
DIVYIELD -0.741*** 
(-4.033) 
  -0.670*** 
(-3.788) 
  
DIVPAY 0.083*** 
(8.093) 
  0.084*** 
(8.261) 
  
Adjusted 
 R-squared 
0.185   0.207   
F-statistic 24.805***   12.198***   
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
***, ** and * represent significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. t-statistics are provided in 
parentheses. 
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Table 7.16 Regression results for the relationship between carbon disclosure and 
financial performance, measured by Tobin’s Q  
TOBINSQ i,t  = α + β1 CD i,t  + β2 SIZE i,t  + β3 LEV i,t  + β4 CAPIN i,t  + β5 AGE i,t  + β6 
GROWTH i,t  + β7 CINT i,t  + β8 DIVYIELD i,t  + β9 DIVPAY i,t  + εi,t 
  
 Panel A   Panel B   
(Before controlling for 
industry and time) 
(After controlling for 
industry and time) 
       
Intercept -0.449 
(-1.048) 
  -0.194 
(-0.4640 
  
CD 0.002 
(1.215) 
  -0.002 
(-0.790) 
  
SIZE 0.234*** 
(7.122) 
  0.168*** 
(4.733) 
  
LEV 0.002 
(0.532) 
  0.001 
(0.283) 
  
CAPIN -0.715*** 
(-3.373) 
  -0.147 
(-0.783) 
  
AGE -0.105*** 
(-2.942) 
  -0.104*** 
(-2.925) 
  
GROWTH 0.000* 
(1.770) 
  0.000 
(0.519) 
  
CINT -0.299*** 
(-5.213) 
  0.094 
(1.139) 
  
DIVYIELD -0.174*** 
(-8.994) 
  -0.119*** 
(-5.953) 
  
DIVPAY 0.006*** 
(5.215) 
  0.006*** 
(5.253) 
  
Adjusted 
R-squared 
0.173   0.235   
F-statistic 22.957***   14.190***   
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
***, ** and * represent significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. t-statistics are provided in 
parentheses. 
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Table 7.17 Country wise regression results for the relationship between carbon 
disclosure and financial performance   
Variable North America 
 
European Union 
 
United Kingdom 
 
Asia-Pacific 
 
ROA Tobin’s Q 
 
ROA Tobin’s Q 
 
ROA Tobin’s Q 
 
ROA Tobin’s Q 
CD -0.116*** 0.002 
 
-0.093*** -0.002 
 
-0.146** 0.005 
 
-0.082** 0.000 
 
(-4.080) (0.913) 
 
(-3.236) (-0.3620 
 
(-2.2100 (1.086) 
 
(-2.3900 (-0.222) 
SIZE 1.384*** 0.161*** 
 
1.268** -0.012 
 
3.670*** 0.395*** 
 
3.395*** 0.156*** 
 
(3.310) (3.734) 
 
(2.550) (-0.233) 
 
(2.8460 (4.860) 
 
(5.349) (5.216) 
LEV -0.012 0.019*** 
 
-0.112*** -0.020*** 
 
0.151** 0.014** 
 
-0.091** -0.009*** 
 
(-0.224) (4.840) 
 
(-3.5000 (-4.0610 
 
(2.5540 (2.627) 
 
(-2.4650 (-4.1280 
CAPIN -34.988** -1.465*** 
 
22.607*** 1.789*** 
 
-13.617 0.317 
 
4.618 0.708*** 
 
(-2.245) (-5.556) 
 
(3.790) (2.7140 
 
(-0.8830 (0.285) 
 
(0.742) (3.222) 
AGE -1.391*** -0.212*** 
 
0.991** 0.117** 
 
-0.849 -0.030 
 
-0.686 -0.020 
 
(-3.723) (-4.394) 
 
(2.5160 (2.2810 
 
(-1.1200 (-0.487) 
 
(-1.142) (-0.834) 
GROWTH 0.011* 0.000 
 
2.429*** 0.442*** 
 
0.000 0.000** 
 
3.293*** 0.395*** 
 
(1.763) (0.388) 
 
(9.360) (11.4100 
 
(0.227) (2.366) 
 
(6.120) (12.286) 
CINT -1.093 -0.307*** 
 
1.388** -0.028 
 
-0.561 -0.440* 
 
0.916 0.104* 
 
(-0.684) (-3.714) 
 
(2.0500 (-0.5160 
 
(-0.181) (-1.832) 
 
(0.6180 (1.772) 
DIVYIELD -1.208*** -0.332*** 
 
-0.071 0.024 
 
-1.618*** -0.141*** 
 
0.197 0.001 
 
(-4.649) (-10.615) 
 
(-0.3930 (1.2460 
 
(-3.030) (-4.0190 
 
(0.642) (0.062) 
DIVPAY 0.107*** 0.008*** 
 
0.029** 0.004*** 
 
0.104*** 0.005*** 
 
0.009 0.002** 
 
(5.681) (4.117) 
 
(2.2480 (2.760) 
 
(4.560) (3.319) 
 
(0.627) (2.415) 
Adjusted 
 R2 
0.244 0.313 
 
0.630 0.793 
 
0.339 0.477 
 
0.516 0.810 
F-statistic 17.317*** 23.977*** 
 
49.718*** 110.976 
 
6.645*** 11.017 
 
13.916*** 52.525 
            
***, ** and * represent significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. t-statistics are provided in parentheses. 
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7.7 Empirical results for the relationship of agency cost with carbon 
disclosure and carbon performance 
The purpose of this section is to analyse and interpret the relationship between 
carbon disclosure and agency cost (H8), and between carbon performance and agency 
cost (H9)  
 
 
 
7.7.1 Regression results for the relationship between carbon disclosure and agency 
cost for H8  
Table 7.18 shows a positive but insignificant relationship between carbon 
disclosure and agency cost when agency cost is measured by Expense Ratio (ER). Table 
7.19 also shows a positive but insignificant relationship between carbon disclosure and 
agency cost, when agency cost is measured by Asset Utilization Ratio (AUR). These two 
findings together suggest that there is a positive but insignificant relationship between 
carbon disclosure and agency cost. These findings contradict H8. Firm size, growth 
opportunity, and dividend payout, seem to positively affect ER. On the other hand, 
capital intensity, firm age, and carbon intensity, seems to negatively affect ER. 
However, after moderating for industry and time effects, it seems that the relationship of 
ER to firm size, capital intensity, and dividend payout, vary across industries and time 
periods. On the other hand, firm size, leverage, and capital intensity and growth 
opportunity, seem to have a negative relationship with AUR. The positive relationship 
between firm size and agency cost is supported by Rashid (2015), who argue that larger 
firms are likely to achieve economies of scale that may influence their agency cost. As a 
firm’s size increases, there is a greater need for monitoring by independent outside 
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directors, and therefore an increase in firm’s size may lead to increased agency cost. The 
relationship between growth opportunity and agency cost is supported by McConnell 
and Servaes (1990) and Florackis (2008). They argue that the effectiveness of 
governance mechanisms in reducing agency problems, is dependent on the firm’s 
growth opportunities  
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Table 7.18 Regression results for the relationship between carbon disclosure and 
agency cost measured by ER 
ER i,t  = α + β1 CD i,t  + β2 SIZE i,t  + β3 LEV i,t  + β4 CAPIN i,t  + β5 AGE i,t  + β6 GROWTHi,t  
+ β7 CINT i,t  + β8 DIVYIELD i,t  + β9 DIVPAY i,t  + εi,t 
   
    
 Panel A   Panel B   
(Before controlling for 
industry and time) 
(After controlling for  
industry and time) 
       
Intercept 0.169** 
(2.221) 
  0.185*** 
(2.465) 
  
CD 0.001 
(1.297) 
  0.000 
(0.562) 
  
SIZE 0.018*** 
(3.054) 
  0.005 
(0.761) 
  
LEV -0.001 
(-1.443) 
  0.000 
(-1.070) 
  
CAPIN -0.218*** 
(-4.697) 
  -0.069 
(-1.351) 
  
AGE -0.026*** 
(-4.249) 
  -0.022*** 
(-3.902) 
  
GROWTH 0.000* 
(2.001) 
  0.000* 
(1.789) 
  
CINT -0.08*** 
(-6.743) 
  -0.079** 
(-2.240) 
  
DIVYIELD -0.005 
(-1.585) 
  -0.003 
(-0.742) 
  
DIVPAY 0.000* 
(1.798) 
  0.000 
(1.450) 
  
Adjusted 
R-squared 
0.149   0.283   
F-statistic 19.279***   17.946***   
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
***, ** and * represent significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. t-statistics are provided in 
parentheses. 
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Table 7.19 Regression results for the relationship between carbon disclosure and 
agency cost measured by AUR 
AUR i,t  = α + β1 CD i,t  + β2 SIZE i,t  + β3 LEV i,t  + β4 CAPIN i,t  + β5 AGE i,t  + β6 
GROWTH i,t + β7 CINT i,t  + β8 DIVYIELD i,t  + β9 DIVPAY i,t  + εi,t 
   
 Panel A    Panel B   
(Before controlling for  
industry and time) 
 (After controlling for  
industry and time) 
        
Intercept 1.775*** 
(6.545) 
   1.641*** 
(5.482) 
  
CD 0.000 
(0.319) 
   0.002 
(1.344) 
  
SIZE -0.071*** 
(-3.279) 
   -0.061*** 
(-2.357) 
  
LEV -0.006*** 
(-4.949) 
   -0.008*** 
(-6.182) 
  
CAPIN -1.674*** 
(-10.588) 
   -1.622*** 
(-10.990) 
  
AGE 0.022 
(1.360) 
   -0.002 
(-0.113) 
  
GROWTH 0.000** 
(-2.252) 
   0.000** 
(-2.385) 
  
CINT -0.013 
(-0.446) 
   0.165*** 
(3.326) 
  
DIVYIELD -0.017** 
(-2.405) 
   -0.002 
(-0.256) 
  
DIVPAY 0.001 
(1.107) 
   0.000 
(0.334) 
  
Adjusted 
R-squared 
0.185    0.240   
F-statistic 24.729***    14.554***   
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
***, ** and * represent significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. t-statistics are provided in 
parentheses. 
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7.7.2 Regression results for the relationship between carbon performance and 
agency cost for H9  
Regression results from Table 7.20, show that there is a positive relationship 
between carbon performance and agency cost, when agency cost is measured by 
Expense Ratio. However, this relationship is not statistically significant. The relationship 
remains the same when the regression equation is controlled for industry and time effect. 
These results indicate that carbon performance does not significantly affect a firm’s 
agency cost, when agency cost is measured by Expense Ratio. This finding does not 
support H 9.  
On the other hand, Table 7.21 shows a significantly negative relationship 
between carbon performance and agency cost when agency cost is measured by Asset 
Utilization Ratio. These results hold when the results are controlled for industry and 
time effect. Therefore, we can conclude from these results that carbon performance of a 
business would negatively affect its agency cost when agency cost is measured by Asset 
Utilization ratio. In other words, when agency cost is measured by Asset Utilization 
ratio, if a firm’s carbon performance improves, its agency cost would decrease and vice 
versa. This finding is supported by H9. 
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Table 7.20 Regression results for the relationship between carbon performance and 
agency cost measured by ER  
ER i,t  = α + β1 CP i,t  + β2 SIZE i,t  + β3 LEV i,t  + β4 CAPIN i,t  + β5 AGE i,t  + β6 GROWTH i,t  
 + β7 CINT i,t  + β8 DIVYIELD i,t  + β9 DIVPAY i,t  + εi,t      
 
 
 Panel A   Panel B   
(Before controlling for 
industry and time) 
(After controlling for  
industry and time) 
       
Intercept 0.194 
(2.647) 
  0.197*** 
(2.817) 
  
CP 0.000 
(0.593) 
  0.000 
(0.417) 
  
SIZE 0.019*** 
(3.192) 
  0.005 
(0.778) 
  
LEV 0.000 
(-1.277) 
  0.000 
(-1.010) 
  
CAPIN -0.222*** 
(-4.792) 
  -0.070 
(-1.376) 
  
AGE -0.026*** 
(-4.239) 
  -0.022*** 
(-3.927) 
  
GROWTH 0.000** 
(2.029) 
  0.000* 
(1.795) 
  
CINT -0.083*** 
(-6.708) 
  -0.079** 
(-2.242) 
  
DIVYIELD -0.005 
(-1.595) 
  -0.003 
(-0.744) 
  
DIVPAY 0.000* 
(1.804) 
  0.000 
(1.440) 
  
Adjusted 
R-squared 
0.147   0.283   
F-statistic 19.100***   17.937***   
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
***, ** and * represent significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. t-statistics are provided in 
parentheses. 
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Table 7.21 Regression results for the relationship between carbon performance and 
agency cost measured by AUR 
AUR i,t  = α + β1 CP i,t  + β2 SIZE i,t  + β3 LEV i,t  + β4 CAPIN i,t  + β5 AGE i,t  + β6 
GROWTH i,t  + β7 CINT i,t  + β8 DIVYIELD i,t  + β9 DIVPAY i,t  + εi,t 
 
 Panel A   Panel B   
(Before controlling for  
industry and time) 
(After controlling for  
industry and time) 
       
Intercept 1.805*** 
(7.001) 
  1.718*** 
(6.109) 
  
CP -0.002* 
(-1.913) 
  -0.001* 
(-1.734) 
  
SIZE -0.064*** 
(-3.046) 
  -0.050** 
(-2.049) 
  
LEV -0.006*** 
(-4.877) 
  -0.008*** 
(-6.193) 
  
CAPIN -1.714*** 
(-10.583) 
  -1.654** 
(-11.017) 
  
AGE 0.026 
(1.577) 
  0.001 
(0.070) 
  
GROWTH 0.000** 
(-2.411) 
  0.000** 
(-2.426) 
  
CINT -0.015 
(-0.519) 
  0.144*** 
(3.391) 
  
DIVYIELD -0.015** 
(-2.127) 
  0.001 
(0.171) 
  
DIVPAY 0.001 
(1.353) 
  0.000 
(0.524) 
  
Adjusted 
R-squared 
0.189   0.242   
F-statistic 25.362***   14.697***   
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
***, ** and * represent significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. t-statistics are provided in 
parentheses. 
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Table 7.22 Country wise regression results for the relationship of agency cost with carbon disclosure and carbon 
performance  
 
 
Variable North America European Union United Kingdom Asia-Pacific 
  ER AUR ER AUR ER AUR ER AUR ER AUR ER AUR ER AUR ER AUR 
CD 0.001** 0.000 
  
0.001 0.001 
  
0.001 -0.002 
  
-0.001 0.003 
  
 
(2.127) (0.114) 
  
(0.830) (0.723) 
  
(-0.370) (-0.659) 
  
(-1.231) (0.922) 
  CP 
 
 
0.001* -0.003** 
 
 
0.000 0.001 
 
 
-0.001 0.000 
 
 
0.000 0.003 
  
 
(1.692) (-2.225) 
 
 
(0.127) (1.186) 
 
 
(-0.925) (0.271) 
 
 
(-0.851) (1.636) 
SIZE 0.013* -0.115*** 0.015* -0.104*** 0.036*** -0.110*** 0.038*** -0.112*** 0.006 0.038 0.013 0.027 -0.005 -0.040 -0.005 -0.046 
 
(1.697) (-3.149) (1.876) (-2.948) (3.183) (-4.485) (3.274) (-4.645) (0.148) (1.009) (0.343) (0.715) (-0.601) (-0.890) (-0.629) (-1.042) 
LEV 0.001 -0.004* 0.001* -0.003 -0.001 -0.014*** -0.001 -0.014*** -0.003 -0.009*** -0.003 -0.010*** -0.004*** -0.001 -0.005*** -0.001 
 
(1.443) (-1.754) (1.695) (-1.613) (-1.010) (-8.102) (-0.815) (-8.387) (-1.208) (-3.041) (-1.201) (-3.607) (-5.504) (-0.416) (-5.514) (-0.270) 
CAPIN -0.095* -1.751*** -0.097* -1.777*** -0.018 -1.015*** -0.053 -0.989*** -0.424 -1.773*** -0.433 -1.781*** -0.491*** -1.872*** -0.486*** -1.873*** 
 
(-1.864) (-7.616) (-1.895) (-7.907) (-0.100) (-4.460) (-0.285) (-4.276) (-0.809) (-3.455) (-0.817) (-3.385) (-5.227) (-6.475) (-4.774) (-6.573) 
AGE -0.031*** -0.005 -0.032*** -0.006 -0.021** 0.063*** -0.019* 0.061*** -0.058* 0.171*** -0.060* 0.173*** -0.005 0.001 -0.004 -0.003 
 
(-3.696) (-0.177) (-3.727) (-0.2070 (-2.011) (3.363) (-1.868) (3.380) (-1.837) (4.141) (-1.903) (4.336) (-0.309) (0.022) (-0.255) (-0.057) 
GROWTH 0.000 0.001*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.010*** 0.069**** 0.011*** 0.069*** 0.000** 0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.017 0.252*** 0.015 0.255*** 
 
(-1.337) (3.596) (-1.286) (3.244) (3.029) (6.348) (3.115) (6.448) (2.105) (-1.045) (1.890) (-1.012) (1.468) (2.982) (1.282) (2.958) 
CINT -0.090*** -0.051 -0.089*** -0.065 -0.088*** 0.077** -0.086*** 0.078** -0.033 -0.089 -0.035 -0.081 -0.089*** -0.053 -0.091*** -0.050 
 
(-5.173) (-1.0410 (-5.156) (-1.326) (-3.744) (2.205) (-3.622) (2.295) (-0.357) (-0.764) (-0.380) (-0.701) (-3.183) (-0.524) (-3.143) (-0.507) 
DIVYIELD -0.015*** -0.048*** -0.017*** -0.047*** -0.004 0.040*** -0.004 0.040*** 0.022 0.021 0.020 0.027 0.026*** -0.034 0.027*** -0.034 
 
(-2.825) (-3.145) (-3.055) (-2.911) (-0.8280 (4.592) (-0.733) (4.518) (1.168) (1.130) (1.016) (1.413) (3.230) (-1.488) (3.376) (-1.467) 
DIVPAY 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001* 0.000 0.001* 0.000 0.001* 0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.001* 0.001 -0.001 0.001 
 
(0.509) (1.124) (0.547) (1.502) (1.673) (0.293) (1.781) (0.256) (1.685) (0.064) (1.639) (0.163) (-1.6780) (0.703) (-1.521) (0.642) 
Adjusted 
R2 
0.140 0.185 0.136 0.197 0.207 0.542 0.205 0.543 0.149 0.352 0.154 0.350 0.503 0.346 0.499 0.352 
F-statistic 9.202*** 12.468*** 8.963*** 13.360*** 8.502*** 34.894*** 8.395*** 35.095*** 2.928*** 6.981*** 3.009*** 6.915*** 13.265*** 7.401*** 13.084*** 7.591*** 
 
***, ** and * represent significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. t-statistics are provided in parentheses. 
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7.7.3 Country-wise regression results for the relationship of agency cost with 
carbon disclosure and carbon performance  
From Table 7.22, we can see that, in North America, carbon disclosure 
significantly positively affects agency cost, when agency cost is measured by Expense 
Ratio. However, carbon disclosure does not have any significant relationship with 
agency cost in any other region regardless of whether agency cost is measured by 
Expense Ratio or Asset Utilization Ratio. On the other hand, carbon performance 
significantly positively affect agency cost in North America, both when agency cost is 
measured by Expense Ratio or Asset Utilization Ratio. Carbon performance also does 
not have any significant relationship with agency cost in all other regions, whether 
agency cost is measured by Expense Ratio or by Asset Utilization Ratio. In summary, 
both carbon disclosure and carbon performance significantly positive affect agency cost 
only in North America, which contradicts the full sample results.  
All the models used in Tables 7.18 to 7.22, are good models as the p value of their F 
tests are less than 1%.  
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7.8 Empirical results for the trends in improvement of carbon 
disclosure and carbon performance  
 
The purpose of this section is to conduct a trend analysis to assess whether level 
of carbon disclosure and carbon performance improved over the study period, which is 
hypothesized in H10.  
  
7.8.1 Regression results for the trends in improvement of carbon disclosure and 
carbon performance for H10  
Table 7.23 shows that level of carbon disclosure has consistently improved from 
year 1 to year 5. These improvements are statistically highly significant as all the p 
values are less than 1%. When the regression results are controlled for industry effects, 
improvement of level of carbon disclosure over the years still remains consistently 
positive and statistically highly significant.  
On the other hand, Table 7.24 shows that carbon performance does not significantly 
improve from year 1 to year 2. Compared to year 1, carbon performance improves 
significantly in years 3, 4 and 5. However, while carbon performance increases from 
year 1 to year 3 and from year 3 to year 4, it decreases from year 4 to year 5. All these 
results are statistically highly significant at 1% significance level. These results remain 
the same when they are controlled for industry effect.  
In summary, level of carbon disclosure consistently and significantly improved 
during the study period. On the other hand, compared to 2011, carbon performance did 
not significantly improve in 2012. However, it improved significantly in years 2013, 
2014 and 2015, but these improvements were not always consistent.  
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7.8.2 Country-wise trend analysis for improvement of carbon disclosure and 
carbon performance  
From Table 7.25, we can see that compared to year 1, level of carbon disclosure 
keeps improving consistently and significantly over years 2, 3, 4 and 5 in all the regions. 
These results are similar to full sample results. On the other hand, similar to full sample 
results, carbon performance does not significantly improve in year 2 in comparison to 
year 1 in any of the regions. In North America, carbon performance increases from year 
1 to year 3 but then keeps decreasing in year 4 and 5. In EU, carbon performance keeps 
improving in year 3 and year 4 before decreasing in year 5. In UK, carbon performance 
improves in year 3 and then keeps decreasing in year 4 and 5. In Asia-Pacific, carbon 
performance keeps improving in years 3 and 4 before decreasing in year 5. All the 
models used to assess trends in improvements of carbon disclosure and carbon 
performance are good models, as p values of their F test are less than 1. 
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Table 7.23 Regression results for improvement of carbon disclosure from year 1 to 5  
CD i,t  = α + β1T2 i,t  + β2T3 i,t  + β3T4 i,t  + β4T5 i,t  + β5 SIZE i,t  + β6 LEV i,t  + β7 CAPIN i,t   
+ β8 AGE i,t  + Β9 GROWTH i,t  + β10 CINT i,t  + β11 DIVYIELD i,t  + β12 DIVPAY i,t  + εi,t 
 
 Panel A   Panel B   
(Before controlling for  
industry and time) 
(After controlling for  
industry and time) 
       
Intercept 53.864*** 
(10.302) 
  47.852*** 
(9.091) 
  
T2 6.173*** 
(4.888) 
  6.037*** 
(4.877) 
  
T3 11.292*** 
(9.369) 
  11.098*** 
(9.311) 
  
T4 13.109*** 
(10.907) 
  12.943*** 
(10.908) 
  
T5 18.955*** 
(17.909) 
  18.729*** 
(17.804) 
  
SIZE 1.589*** 
(3.386) 
  2.211*** 
(4.382) 
  
LEV 0.086*** 
(3.255) 
  0.085*** 
(2.932) 
  
CAPIN -14.431*** 
(-4.288) 
  -9.176*** 
(-2.646) 
  
AGE 0.664 
(1.555) 
  0.578 
(1.246) 
  
GROWTH 0.000 
(-0.104) 
  0.000 
(-0.143) 
  
CINT 0.426 
(0.444) 
  -4.693 
(-1.580) 
  
DIVYIELD 0.294 
(1.462) 
  0.535** 
(2.337) 
  
DIVPAY 0.020 
(1.560) 
  0.017 
(1.287) 
  
Adjusted 
R-squared 
0.309   0.331   
F-statistic 36.170***   23.171***   
***, ** and * represent significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. t-statistics are provided in 
parentheses. 
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Table 7.24 Regression results for improvement of carbon performance year 1 to 5  
CP i,t  = α + β1T2 i,t  + β2T3 i,t  + β3T4 i,t  + β4T5 i,t  + β5 SIZE i,t  + β6 LEV i,t  + β7 CAPIN i,t   
+ β8 AGE i,t  + Β9 GROWTH i,t  + β10 CINT i,t  + β11 DIVYIELD i,t  + β12 DIVPAY i,t  + εi,t 
 
 Panel A   Panel B   
(Before controlling for  
industry and time) 
(After controlling for  
industry and time) 
 
Intercept 9.434 
(0.997) 
  -0.748 
(-0.076) 
  
T2 3.093 
(1.379) 
  2.880 
(1.317) 
  
T3 11.128*** 
(5.139) 
  10.812*** 
(5.081) 
  
T4 12.408*** 
(5.666) 
  12.125*** 
(5.633) 
  
T5 8.108*** 
(3.673) 
  7.739*** 
(3.575) 
  
SIZE 3.560*** 
(4.146) 
  5.010*** 
(5.346) 
  
LEV 0.071 
(1.392) 
  0.048 
(0.870) 
  
CAPIN -22.499*** 
(-3.417) 
  -11.651* 
(-1.733) 
  
AGE 1.837** 
(2.434) 
  1.499* 
(1.865) 
  
GROWTH -0.001 
(-0.778) 
  -0.001 
(-0.851) 
  
CINT -1.428 
(-0.826) 
  -9.710 
(-1.636) 
  
DIVYIELD 1.107*** 
(2.748) 
  1.521*** 
(3.522) 
  
DIVPAY 0.066*** 
(2.725) 
  0.048 
(1.905) 
  
Adjusted 
R squared 
0.127   0.159   
F-statistic 12.381***   9.501***   
***, ** and * represent significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. t-statistics are provided in 
parentheses. 
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Table 7.25 Country wise trend analysis for improvement of carbon disclosure and carbon performance  
Variable North America 
 
European Union 
 
United Kingdom 
 
Asia-Pacific 
 
CD CP 
 
CD CP 
 
CD CP 
 
CD CP 
T2 7.138*** 4.225 
 
5.771** 0.487 
 
4.569 6.791 
 
7.512** 5.177 
 
(3.946) (1.347) 
 
(2.357) (0.112) 
 
(1.517) (1.004) 
 
(2.144) (0.759) 
T3 11.925*** 12.095*** 
 
10.274*** 9.483** 
 
11.516*** 11.871* 
 
13.492*** 13.911** 
 
(6.824) (3.923) 
 
(4.384) (2.250) 
 
(4.072) (1.983) 
 
(4.368) (2.117) 
T4 12.439*** 9.470*** 
 
14.088*** 14.688*** 
 
11.769*** 10.967* 
 
16.187*** 19.308*** 
 
(6.837) (2.888) 
 
(6.311) (3.812) 
 
(4.334) (1.864) 
 
(5.175) (3.033) 
T5 19.608*** 6.863** 
 
18.016*** 9.570** 
 
19.275*** 6.767 
 
20.651*** 11.454* 
 
(12.384) (2.032) 
 
(8.367) (2.346) 
 
(7.732) (1.028) 
 
(7.201) (1.754) 
SIZE 1.132* 3.003** 
 
3.053*** 5.710*** 
 
3.983*** 9.753*** 
 
1.491*** 4.018 
 
(1.703) (2.363) 
 
(3.409) (3.684) 
 
(3.190) (3.458) 
 
(0.959) (1.375) 
LEV 0.058 0.088 
 
0.262*** 0.363*** 
 
0.357*** 0.441** 
 
0.087 -0.100 
 
(1.494) (1.138) 
 
(3.869) (3.367 
 
(5.171) (2.484) 
 
(1.078) (-0.652) 
CAPIN -7.455 -8.804 
 
-75.380*** -99.908*** 
 
2.572 -8.880 
 
-3.146 -2.000 
 
(-1.594) (-1.019) 
 
(-5.239) (-3.975) 
 
(0.166) (-0.213) 
 
(-0.484) (-0.150) 
AGE -0.479 -0.147 
 
2.557*** 4.673*** 
 
-1.706 -2.915 
 
-0.749 0.771 
 
(-0.674) (-0.118) 
 
(3.206) (3.633) 
 
(-1.406) (-0.994) 
 
(-0.751) (0.380) 
GROWTH 0.001 -0.008 
 
0.386 0.477 
 
0.000 -0.002*** 
 
1.892* 1.257 
 
(0.099) (-0.364) 
 
(1.036) (0.882) 
 
(-0.694) (-2.820) 
 
(1.740) (0.585) 
CINT -1.933 -4.411 
 
3.699*** 2.470 
 
-1.378 -2.856 
 
1.276 0.177 
 
(-1.158) (-1.552) 
 
(2.890) (0.906) 
 
(-0.426) (-0.342) 
 
(0.419) (0.028) 
DIVYIELD -0.090 0.571 
 
0.997*** 1.825*** 
 
-2.487*** -4.345*** 
 
-1.509*** -1.442 
 
(-0.198) (0.613) 
 
(2.968) (2.621) 
 
(-4.890) (-3.888) 
 
(-2.952) (-1.197) 
DIVPAY 0.046* 0.113** 
 
0.036 0.067 
 
-0.009 -0.050 
 
-0.081*** -0.059 
 
(1.839) (2.520) 
 
(1.363) (1.259) 
 
(-0.358) (-0.713) 
 
(-2.684) (-0.763) 
Adjusted R2 0.289 0.102 
 
0.431 0.262 
 
0.535 0.182 
 
0.387 0.076 
F-statistic 16.382*** 5.294*** 
 
17.310*** 8.615*** 
 
10.504*** 2.836*** 
 
6.730*** 1.749* 
***, ** and * represent significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. t-statistics are provided in parentheses. 
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7.9 Chapter summary 
This chapter provides the empirical results obtained from testing the hypotheses 
of this study. Result of this chapter indicate that carbon disclosure and carbon 
performance are significantly positively related, which supports H2 but negates H1. This 
finding is in congruence with the economics-based theories, Voluntary Disclosure 
Theory, and Signalling Theory. This finding supports studies such as Clarkson et al., 
2008; Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Peng et al., 2015 and Cotter and Najah 2012. In country-
wise analysis also, carbon disclosure is significantly positively related to carbon 
performance in all of the four regions. This implies that in all regions, firms with better 
carbon performance make more carbon disclosure.  
Results of this chapter also indicate that there is a two-way positive relationship 
between carbon disclosure and carbon performance, where increase in carbon disclosure 
of a firm will improve its carbon performance (as predicted by Instrumental Stakeholder 
Theory), and consequently, improved carbon performance will lead to more carbon 
disclosure by the firm in the subsequent period, as predicted by Signalling Theory. 
These results support hypothesis 3 which proposes that carbon disclosure and carbon 
performance influence each other positively. The both-way positive relationship between 
carbon disclosure and carbon performance, holds true in all regions. However, while the 
relationship is significant in North America, EU and Asia-Pacific, it is insignificant in 
the UK.  
Results found from investigating disclosure practices of average carbon 
performers conducted in this study, indicate that superior carbon performers make more 
carbon disclosure than average carbon performers, and average carbon performers make 
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more carbon disclosure than inferior carbon performers. These findings contradict H4 
which suggest that both superior and inferior carbon performers make significantly more 
carbon disclosure than average carbon performers. 
Results of this study also show that when financial performance is measured by 
Return on Asset, it has a negative relationship with the firm’s carbon performance. 
When financial performance is measured by Tobin’s Q, it also has a negative 
relationship with the firm’s carbon performance. Therefore, we can conclude from 
these results that carbon performance and financial performance influence each other 
negatively regardless of the way financial performance is measured. These findings 
negate H5. This finding is backed by numerous previous studies such as Jaggi and 
Freedman (1992), Cordeiro and Sarkis (1997), Filbeck and Gorman (2004), Sarkis and 
Cordeiro (2001), and Wang et al. (2014). In country-wise analysis, we find that carbon 
performance is negatively related to both ROA and Tobin’s Q in all regions except the 
UK.  
Results also suggest that, when financial performance is measured by Return on 
Asset, there seems to be no significant interrelationship between carbon performance 
and financial performance. However, there is a significant negative interrelationship 
between carbon performance and financial performance when financial performance is 
measured by Tobin’s Q. However, this relationship might vary across industries. The 
country-wise regression results do not consistently and significantly indicate any 
interrelationship between carbon performance and financial performance, regardless of 
the way it is measured in any of the four regions.  
Results from this study also indicate that when financial performance is 
measured by ROA, there is a significant negative relationship between carbon disclosure 
180 
 
and financial performance. This finding is contradicted by studies by Belkaoui (1976); 
Berman et al. (1999); Brammer and Pavalin (2006); Weber et al. (20080 and Tang et al. 
(2012). Results also indicate that there is no significant or consistent relationship 
between carbon disclosure and financial performance when financial performance is 
measured by Tobin’s Q. This finding is supported by Freedman and Jaggi (1988). In 
country-wise analysis, this study finds that there is significant negative relationship 
between carbon disclosure and financial performance when financial performance is 
measured by ROA in all four regions. However, there is no significant relationship 
between carbon disclosure and financial performance, when financial performance is 
measured by Tobin’s Q, in any region.    
The next set of results of this study indicate that there is a positive but 
insignificant relationship between carbon disclosure and agency cost when agency cost 
is measured by Expense Ratio. When agency cost is measured by Asset Utilization 
Ratio, there is still a positive but insignificant relationship between carbon disclosure 
and agency cost. Results also indicate that there is a positive relationship between 
carbon performance and agency cost when agency cost is measured by Expense Ratio. 
However, this relationship is not statistically significant. When agency cost is measured 
by Asset Utilization Ratio, we find a significantly negative relationship between carbon 
performance and agency cost. Therefore, we can conclude that carbon performance of a 
business would negatively affect its agency cost when agency cost is measured by Asset 
Utilization ratio. In other words, when agency cost is measured by Asset Utilization 
ratio, if a firm’s carbon performance improves, its agency cost would decrease. Country-
wise analysis shows that both carbon disclosure and carbon performance significantly 
positive affect agency cost, only in North America. We don’t find any significant and 
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consistent relationship between agency cost and carbon disclosure/carbon performance, 
in any other region. 
Results of this study also show that level of carbon disclosure for the sample 
companies have significantly and consistently improved during the study period. On the 
other hand, compared to 2011, carbon performance did not significantly improve in 
2012. However, it improved significantly in years 2013, 2014 and 2015 but these 
improvements were not always consistent. In country-wise analysis, we can see that 
compared to year 1, level of carbon disclosure keeps improving consistently and 
significantly over years 2, 3, 4 and 5 in all the regions. However, the study could not 
find any consistent and significant trend in increase or decrease of carbon performance 
of the sample companies, in any of the regions during the study period. 
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CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter concludes the thesis and summarises the major findings from 
Chapter 7. Section 8.2 outlines the conclusions about the research objectives/questions 
developed in chapter 1. Section 8.3 discusses several implications of this study on theory 
and practice. Section 8.4 discusses the limitations of this study, and finally section 8.5 
identifies a number of areas for future research.  
 
 
8.2 Conclusions about research objectives 
As mentioned in chapter 1, the specific objectives of this study are: 
1. To examine the relationship and interrelationship between carbon disclosure and 
carbon performance  
2. To examine the relationship and interrelationship between carbon performance 
and financial performance  
3. To examine the relationship between carbon disclosure and financial 
performance  
4. To examine the relationship between agency cost and carbon disclosure and 
between agency cost and carbon performance  
5. To study the trends in improvement of carbon disclosure and carbon performance 
over the study period. 
Sections 8.2.1 to 8.2.6 discuss the conclusions about the above research objectives based 
on the analysis conducted in previous chapter.  
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8.2.1 Relationship and interrelationship between carbon disclosure and carbon 
performance  
Results obtained from testing the hypotheses regarding the relationship between 
carbon disclosure and carbon performance indicate that carbon disclosure and carbon 
performance are significantly positively related. This finding is supported by the 
economics-based theories (Voluntary Disclosure Theory and Signalling Theory) which 
suggest that firms with good performance are likely to disclose more information to 
signal their good quality to investors, and to differentiate themselves from companies 
with ‘bad news’ to avoid the adverse selection problem (Clarkson et al, 2008; Al-
Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Peng et al., 2015; Cotter & Najah 2012). Naturally, this finding 
contradicts many studies that suggest a negative relationship between 
environmental/carbon disclosure and carbon performance as predicted by Stakeholder 
and Legitimacy Theories.  This positive relationship between carbon disclosure and 
carbon performance, remains significantly positive, even after controlling the regression 
results for industry and time effect. This indicates that these findings are robust.  
In country-wise analysis also, carbon disclosure is significantly positively related 
to carbon performance in all of the four regions, namely: North America, EU, UK and 
Asia-Pacific. This implies that in all regions, firms with better carbon performance make 
more carbon disclosure.  
Many studies have investigated the relationship between environmental 
disclosure/carbon disclosure and environmental performance/carbon performance. 
However, to the best of my knowledge, no study has yet investigated whether there is 
an interrelation between environmental disclosure/carbon disclosure, and 
environmental performance/carbon performance. This study tests a hypothesis that 
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proposes a both-way relationship between carbon disclosure and carbon performance. 
Results from testing this hypothesis indicate that there is a two-way positive 
relationship between carbon disclosure and carbon performance, whereby increase in 
carbon disclosure of a firm in a period will improve its carbon performance (supported 
by Instrumental Stakeholder Theory), and consequently, improved carbon performance 
will lead to more carbon disclosure by the firm in the subsequent period (supported by 
Signalling Theory). These results are robust as the findings remain the same even after 
controlling them for industry, time and dummy variables. The both-way positive 
interrelationship between carbon disclosure and carbon performance holds true in all 
regions except UK.  
The empirical results for disclosure practices of average carbon performers 
conducted in this study indicate that superior carbon performers make more carbon 
disclosure than average carbon performers, and average carbon performers make more 
carbon disclosure than inferior carbon performers.  
 
8.2.2. Relationship and interrelationship between carbon performance and 
financial performance  
Results of this study indicate that carbon performance is negatively related to 
both accounting based measure (ROA) as well as market based measure (Tobin’s Q), 
of a firm’s financial performance. This finding is backed by some of the studies such as 
Jaggi and Freedman (1992), Cordeiro and Sarkis (1997), Filbeck and Gorman (2004), 
Sarkis and Cordeiro (2001) and Wang et al. (2014). However, this finding contradicts a 
large number of existing studies such as Porter and van der Linde (1995), Albertini 
(2013), Salama (2005), Stefan and Paul (2008), Russo and Fouts (1997), Song et al. 
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(2017), Boiral et al. (2012), Gallego-Álvarez et al. (2015), Wang et al. (2016), 
Nishitani et el. (2014), Nishitani and Kokubu (2012) and Griffin et al. (2017).   
In country-wise analysis, this study finds that carbon performance is negatively related 
to both accounting based measure as well as market based measure of a firm’s financial 
performance, in all regions except the UK. These results can be considered robust as 
they have been controlled for industry and time effect.   
While many studies investigate the relationship between environmental 
performance/carbon performance and financial performance, there is no known research 
that investigates interrelation between carbon performance and financial performance. 
This study proposes a positive both-way relationship between carbon performance and 
financial performance whereby improvement in carbon performance of a firm will lead 
to improvement in its financial performance, and this improvement in financial 
performance will allow the firm to invest in emission reduction technologies and 
activities, which in turn will improve the firm’s future carbon performance.  
Results from this study suggest that accounting based measure of firm financial 
performance does not have any significant interrelationship with its carbon 
performance. However, market based measure of firm financial performance and carbon 
performance influence each other negatively. However, this relationship might vary 
across industries. There is no significant interrelationship between carbon performance 
and any of the measures of firm financial performance, in any of the four regions.  
 
 
186 
 
8.2.3 Relationship between carbon disclosure and financial performance  
There is no existing research that investigates the relationship between carbon 
disclosure and financial performance. Even the relationship between environmental 
disclosure/corporate social performance disclosure, and financial performance are not 
well researched. The limited research that has been done in this area has produced 
conflicting results. The results of this study indicate that there is a significant negative 
relationship between carbon disclosure and accounting based measure of firm financial 
performance. This finding is contradicted by studies such as Belkaoui (1976); Berman et 
al. (1999); Brammer and Pavalin (2006); Weber et al. (2008) and Tang et al. (2012), 
who suggest that relationship between pollution disclosure/CSR performance disclosure 
and financial performance should be positive. Findings of the study also indicate that 
there is no significant or consistent relationship between carbon disclosure and market 
measure of financial performance. This finding is supported by Freedman and Jaggi 
(1988), who find that there is no association between the extensiveness of pollution 
disclosure and economic performance. Therefore, we can conclude that there is a 
negative relationship between carbon disclosure and accounting based measure of a 
firm’s financial performance. However, there seems to be no significant relationship 
between carbon disclosure and market based measure of a firm’s financial performance. 
In country-wise analysis, this study finds that there is significant negative relationship 
between carbon disclosure and accounting measure of firm financial performance in all 
four regions. However, there is no significant relationship between carbon disclosure 
and market measure of firm financial performance in any of the four regions.    
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8.2.4 Relationship of agency cost with carbon disclosure and carbon performance  
Results of this study indicate that there is a positive but insignificant relationship 
between carbon disclosure and agency cost both when agency cost is measured by 
Expense Ratio or by Asset Utilization Ratio. Results also indicate that carbon 
performance does not significantly affect a firm’s agency cost when agency cost is 
measured by Expense Ratio. However, when agency cost is measured by Asset 
Utilization Ratio, we find a significantly negative relationship between carbon 
performance and agency cost. Therefore, we can conclude from these results that carbon 
performance of a business would negatively affect its agency cost when agency cost is 
measured by Asset Utilization ratio. In other words, when agency cost is measured by 
Asset Utilization ratio, if a firm’s carbon performance improves, its agency cost would 
decrease. Country-wise analysis shows that both carbon disclosure and carbon 
performance significantly positive affect agency cost only in North America. We don’t 
find any significant and consistent relationship between agency cost and carbon 
disclosure/carbon performance in any other region. 
 
8.2.5 Trends in improvement of carbon disclosure and carbon performance over 
time  
Results of this study show that the level of carbon disclosure for the sample 
companies have significantly and consistently improved during the study period. On the 
other hand, compared to 2011, carbon performance did not significantly improve in 
2012. However, it improved significantly in years 2013, 2014 and 2015, but these 
improvements were not always consistent. In country-wise analysis, we can see that 
compared to year 1, level of carbon disclosure keeps improving consistently and 
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significantly over years 2, 3, 4 and 5 in all the regions. However, the study could not 
find any consistent and significant trend in increase or decrease of carbon performance 
of the sample companies, in any of the regions during the study period. 
 
8.3 Implications of this study 
This study investigates many aspects of the relationship and interrelationships 
between carbon disclosure, carbon performance and financial performance which have 
never been investigated before. Unlike most previous studies, this study investigates the 
above relationships globally by taking a sample of 500 largest global companies across 
most major industry sectors and from all major regions of the world. Additionally, 
country-wise analysis has been done to test the above mentioned relationships. By doing 
so, this study produces a number of first ever findings that make a valuable contribution 
to the literature. These findings also have several implications for future policy and 
practice in this area. 
 
8.3.1 Implications for literature  
Most of the studies that investigate the relationship between carbon disclosure 
and carbon performance have been done for specific countries and on specific industries. 
This study investigates this relationship on a global scale covering all major industries 
except financial services. This study also investigates interrelationship between carbon 
disclosure and carbon performance and disclosure practices of average carbon 
performers, which have not been done by any previous research. Findings of this study 
indicate that there is significant positive relationship between carbon disclosure and 
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carbon performance. This means firms with better carbon performance would make 
more carbon disclosure. This finding supports economics-based theories (Voluntary 
Disclosure Theory and Signalling Theory) which suggest firms with good performance 
are likely to disclose more information. However, this finding contradicts the 
assumptions of Stakeholder Theory and Legitimacy Theory, which suggest that 
companies with inferior carbon performance would make more carbon disclosure, to 
satisfy important stakeholders and retain their legitimacy. These findings supplement 
and add to the body of limited literature in this area.  
Confirming the predictions of Instrumental Stakeholder Theory and Signalling 
Theory, findings of this study also suggest that carbon disclosure and carbon 
performance influence each other positively, i.e., there is a positive two-way relationship 
between carbon disclosure and carbon performance. As a first ever finding, this result is 
likely to be of great value to future researchers in this area.  
This research investigates the relationship between carbon performance and both 
accounting based measure of financial performance, as well as market based measure of 
financial performance. Results suggest that carbon performance and financial 
performance are negatively related to each other regardless of the way financial 
performance is measured. Future researchers would find this result interesting as it 
contradicts most of the previous research which proposed a positive relationship 
between environmental disclosure/carbon disclosure and environmental 
performance/carbon performance.  
As a novel attempt, this study investigates a both-way relationship between 
carbon performance and financial performance. Results indicate that accounting based 
measure of firm financial performance does not have any significant interrelationship 
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with its carbon performance. However, market based measure of firm financial 
performance and carbon performance, influence each other negatively. These new 
findings open up possibilities for new research in this under researched area.  
Although a handful of previous studies investigate the relationship between 
environmental disclosure and economic performance, no study has yet assessed the 
relationship between carbon disclosure and financial performance. As another novel 
attempt, this study investigates the relationship between carbon disclosure and financial 
performance. Results indicate that there is a significant negative relationship between 
carbon disclosure and accounting based measure of financial performance. However, 
there is no significant or consistent relationship between carbon disclosure and market 
based measure of financial performance. These new findings would add great value to 
the scant literature that deal with the relationship between environmental 
disclosure/carbon disclosure and financial performance. 
The relationship between carbon disclosure and agency cost has not been studied 
by any previous research. Similarly, there is no existing research that investigates the 
relationship between carbon performance and agency cost. As another novel attempt, 
this study comprehensively investigates both these relationships by using both measures 
of agency cost namely, Expense Ratio and Asset Utilization Ratio. Results indicate that 
there is no significant relationship between carbon disclosure and agency cost, 
regardless of whether agency cost is measured by Expense Ratio or by Asset Utilization 
Ratio. Carbon performance also does not have any relationship with agency cost when it 
is measured by Expense Ratio. However, when measured by Asset Utilization Ratio, 
there is a significant positive relationship between Agency cost and carbon performance. 
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Therefore, we can suggest that if carbon performance of a business improves, its agency 
cost will decrease. These new findings should be valuable to future researchers as well.  
While a few studies have conducted trend analysis of carbon disclosure for 
certain companies, no study has yet conducted a trend analysis for carbon performance. 
This study also adds to the existing literature by conducting a trend analysis for both 
carbon disclosure and carbon performance for a global sample over a recent period.   
Finally, unlike most previous studies, this study conducts country-wise analysis 
for all of its hypotheses which produces many interesting and novel findings. Many of 
these findings are likely to add much value to the literature.   
 
  
8.3.2 Implications for policy and practice  
In addition to the above mentioned contributions, findings of this research are 
likely to have important implications for policy makers and practitioners. Stakeholders 
of businesses such as managers, shareholders, institutional investors, regulators and so 
on, can use results of this study to better understand the relationship and 
interrelationship between carbon disclosure and carbon performance, between carbon 
performance and financial performance, between carbon disclosure and financial 
performance, and between agency cost and carbon disclosure/carbon performance. This 
understanding will help them to make better business decisions.  
As mentioned earlier, as a novel attempt, this study finds that carbon disclosure 
and carbon performance influence each other positively. This implies that increase in 
carbon disclosure of a firm will improve its carbon performance, and consequently, 
improved carbon performance will lead to more carbon disclosure by the firm in the 
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subsequent period. This finding can be very useful to business managers to make 
decisions regarding their carbon disclosure and carbon performance activities. This 
finding will encourage managers to increase carbon disclosure of their businesses as 
increased carbon disclosure is likely to improve the carbon performance of their 
business. Improved carbon performance is likely to make the business more attractive to 
potential investors. It would also improve the image of the business to stakeholders such 
as customers and the general public.  
This study also comes up with a first ever finding that carbon performance and 
financial performance influence each other negatively. This means, if a firm improves its 
carbon performance it will negatively affect its financial performance which 
consequently will negatively affect its future carbon performance. This finding can help 
business managers to assess the impact of any carbon performance activities they would 
like to undertake.  
This study also finds that there is a negative relationship between carbon 
disclosure and financial performance, i.e. if a business improves its carbon disclosure, its 
financial performance will worsen. This finding will help firms’ management assess the 
potential benefit of disclosing carbon activities.  
The findings of the study also indicate that there is no relationship between 
agency cost and carbon disclosure. However, it finds that carbon performance positively 
affects agency cost, i.e. if a firm improves its carbon performance, its agency cost would 
decrease. These findings should be of great interest to several stakeholders of 
businesses, particularly the shareholders, institutional investors and creditors, who can 
decrease agency cost by compelling the managers to improve carbon performance of the 
business. 
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8.4 Research limitations 
Despite the fact that this study is one of the first and the most comprehensive 
study to investigate the relationship and interrelationship between carbon disclosure, 
carbon performance and financial performance, it still has some limitations. Firstly, the 
carbon performance scores used in this study, which are taken from CDP, originally 
were in letter bands such as A, A-, B, C, D and E. As letter bands are difficult to use in 
statistical analysis, they have been converted to numeric values in this study. To find a 
numeric equivalent of a letter band, the upper and lower range of the scores of a letter 
band have been divided by 2 and then rounded to the nearest whole number. For 
example, the numeric equivalent of A or A- = (86+100) / 2 = 93. Due to this conversion, 
for example, all the companies who had a CDP performance score of A or A-, are 
assigned carbon performance score of 93 in this study. The same has been done to 
convert other letter bands. Due to the approximate conversions of letter bands to 
numeric scores, carbon performance scores used in this study may not be arithmetically 
100% accurate.  
This study has been done for multiple years, and country-wise analysis has been 
done for all the research questions. However, one of the limitations is that no industry-
wise or sector-wise analysis has been done in this study.    
 
8.5 Suggestions for future research 
There are several opportunities for future research that can enhance the findings 
of this study. Firstly, further research can be done by conducting an industry-wise 
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analysis regarding the relationship and interrelationship between carbon disclosure, 
carbon performance, financial performance and agency cost.  
Secondly, while investigating the relationship between carbon disclosure and 
carbon performance, future researchers can go into more depth by analysing the carbon 
disclosure practices of businesses in terms of hard disclosure and soft disclosure as done 
by Clarkson et al. (2008) for environmental disclosure. Previous research has indicated 
that both inferior and superior environmental performers make extensive carbon 
disclosure. However, superior performers make verifiable hard disclosure so that others 
cannot mimic their performance, as suggested by Voluntary Disclosure and Signalling 
Theory. On the other hand, poor environmental performers make soft unverifiable 
disclosure to satisfy various stakeholders and maintain legitimacy as supported by 
Stakeholder and Legitimacy Theory.  Therefore, a new study of carbon disclosure 
practices in terms of hard and soft disclosure is likely to add great value to the existing 
literature.  
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